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* Redundant' is a highly emotive as well as a technical term and, 
although it can he equally applied to outmoded machinery and natural 
resources superseded by synthetic technology, it is no accident that it has 
become almost exclusively associated with the human contribution to economic 
activity* It is this which adds the complicating social and political 
considerations to the economic question and necessarily means that redundancy, 
particularly on a-large scale, has to be seen from a number of different 
perspectives.
From the worker's standpoint it means having to face up to the loss of 
his job with the risk of subsequent unemployment depending on the availability 
of alternative opportunities as well as on his own capabilities. For policy 
makers, besides posing the problem of devising appropriate redundancy 
policies, it also offers the opportunity of increasing the efficiency of the 
economy throu^ a judicious redeployment of the redundant workers. By the 
same token, it can help some firms to overcome labour shortages while, for 
others, especially if they believe themselves to be responsible employers, 
it means having to face up to the social as well as the economic consequences 
of a radical out-back in their labour force.
This research evaluates these various considerations. It does so by 
investigating the labour market behaviour and the employment experience of 
a random sample of 4OO workers made redundant by Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd. 
between the summer of 196^ and the winter of 1970 in an attempt to become 
commercially viable. It also assesses how effective public manpower policy 
was in cushioning the impact of redundancy and in helping the men involved 
to find other jobs. Moreover, since the attempt made by U.C.S. to attain 
viability ended in failure during the course of our fieldwork, the study 
also provides a unique backdrop against which the furore of the U.C.8$ 
'work-in* and subsequent developments become more fully understood.
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The main research tool was a household survey which yielded 328 
successful interviews, giving a response rate of 82.5 per cent. Additional 
research data were acquired from previous"publications on the working of 
labour markets in theory and in practice, the shipbuilding industry and the 
problems posed by major redundancies on other occasions. Full use was also 
made of the professional journals and of relevant statistical series 
published by bodies like the Department of Employment, the Scottish Office 
and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. In addition, information 
specific to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was acquired through direct interviews 
with Personnel management and workers' representatives and through access to 
the labour records of the company.
Inasmuch as the research uses, in a comparative way, the labour market 
and other research of previous authors it might be seen, to that extent, as 
a continuation of the work done by the various scholars acknowledged 
throughout the study. Circumstances change, however, and this research is 
unique in that it evaluates the behaviour and problems of redundant workers, 
as well as the relevance of public manpower policy, in the worst employment 
conditions encountered in Great Britain in the post-Keynesian era. 
Consequently, the study can claim to be a particularly well documented 
critique of the rationale of British manpower policy and, particularly, of 
its adequacy in dealing with the problems of the labour market at the local 
level especially in conditions of high unemployment. In this respect, the 
quantitative analysis of the performance of the Employment Service, the 
effectiveness of financial labour market measures like unemployment benefit 
and redundancy pay and the costs imposed by redundancy on the workers goes 
beyond that reported in any other major study of redundancy previously 
undertaken in this country. In addition, surprisingly little comprehensive 
information yet exists on the 'work histories' of the active labour force 
and the extent to which their labour market behaviour is determined by such 
past experience. This research does something to fill this gap in the case 
of Clydeside shipbuilding workers and casts useful light on the nature of 
their attachment to and dependence on the industry*
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The research was assisted by financial support from the Social Science 
Research Council and also from the Department of Employment whose advice and 
co-operation particularly of its local officials were also invaluable 
throughout. Grateful recognition must also be paid to the assistance and 
insight provided by the Personnel staff of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 
Clydebank and, more so, Govan, Although the analysis calls into question 
some aspects of the UCS redundancy^ programme, criticism is in no sense 
personally directed at any of the individuals whose co-operation did so much 
to further this research. The shopstewards' committee of Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders Ltd. also lent a sympathetic ear. At the time, they had more 
on their minds than whole-hearted participation in an in-depth research 
project and, in any event, felt that the decision to co-operate in the 
research should be left up to the redundant men themselves. At the same time, 
no obstacles were put in our way and, for this, we are duly grateful.
A multitude of thanks are due to my many colleagues in the University 
of Glasgow, whose support, learning, and incisive criticism contributed 
towards the successful completion of the research. Maureen Robb, Ifery Smith 
and Ann Carey provided invaluable technical assistance, and the whole thing 
was made manageable by the computing skills of Sue Farbman and Fiona Williams. 
The work was typed with diligence and efficiency by the secretarial staff 
of the Department of Social and Economic Research, amongst whom Pat Rennie 
and Hilda Walker were particularly prominent. gratitude cannot be 
adequately expressed to Laurie Hunter and my other academic colleagues in 
the Department who provided such a stimulating environment that my own, often 
imprecise, ideas could hardly fail to be improved. My greatest debt, in this 
respect, is owed to the others in a labour research team of which I was 
privileged to be a member, ^nald MacKay and Graham Reid, some of whose 
economic expertise has hopefully rubbed off on me, and Brenda Thomas whose 
sociological insightfulness reinforced my own conviction that, in the last 
analysis, labour market research is fundamentally concerned with people.
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While the study has ■unquestionably been improved by various criticisms, 
any remaining deficiencies in analysis and interpretation remain, of course, 
my own. Last, but by no means least, I can do no less than record my heartfelt 
appreciation of my wife Pat, and children, whose tolerance and enduring good 
humour in the face of my neglect can only be seen as a vital contribution 
towards the successful completion of the research.
FRAMC HERRON
May 1974
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The Operation of Looal Labour Markets - 
With Respeot to Redundancies From Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders Limited
How labour markets respond to économie and/or industrial change has 
been, particularly in the post-Keynesian era, the concern of policy makers 
as well as of academic investigators. Although their interests have by no 
means been mutually exclusive the latter have, in general, been more concerned 
with investigating whether theoretical models of behaviour help to explain the 
actions of labour market participants while the former have primarily been 
interested in devising policies which would improve the working of labour 
markets to increase economic growth and the general welfare of the community.
This research links these two main sets of interests. It does so 
fundamentally by investigating the labour market behaviour and the employment 
experience of a random sample of 400 workers made redundant by Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders Ltd. between the summer of I969 and the winter of 1970 in an 
attempt to become commercially viable. It also evaluates how effective public 
manpower policy was in cushioning the impact of redundancy and in helping men 
to find other jobs.
The main research tool was a household survey which yielded $28 (82.5^) 
successful live interviews. These took place in the summer of 1971 when our 
respondents had been 'in the market' on average I5 months# Coincidentally, 
the attempt made by U.C.S. to attain viability ended in failure while the 
field work was under way. Consequently, besides analysing the behaviour and 
problems of redundant workers and the relevance of public manpower policy, 
the study also provides a unique backdrop against which the U.C.8. 'liquidation 
crisis' and its repercussions are more readily understood.
Additional research data were acquired from previous publications on 
the working of labour markets in theory and in practice, the shipbuilding 
industry and the problems posed by major redundancies on other occasions.
Pull use was also made of the professional journals and relevant statistical 
series published by bodies like the Department of Employment, the Scottish 
Office and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, In addition, 
information specific to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders vas acquired throu#i direct 
interviews with Personnel management and workers* representatives and through
access to the labour records of the company.
Initially, the study presents the background to the redundancies 
including the post-war development of the British shipbuilding industry,
L
particularly its regional implications, and the proposals for change made 
by the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee (I965). The subsequent experience of 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders is then surveyed and, in particular, the planned 
reduction of its labour force, implemented mainly through a programme of 
voluntary redundanoy. Details are then presented of the redundant workers 
who, in comparison with the industry labour force and that remaining at 
U.C.8., are seen as relatively youthful and skilled* Moreover, most of them 
were 'finishing' tradesmen and, therefore, seemingly in possession of skills 
required outside shipbuilding. Against this, however, employment conditions 
in Great Britain and, more so, on Clydeside during the run-down were, by 
post war standards, unprecedentedly bad.
Although the cut back was based largely on voluntarism this did not 
confer many advantages on the redundant workers. The failure to allow paid 
time off for job search and the prevailing employment conditions did much to 
explain this. Consequently, the post redundancy employment experience of the 
U.C.So workers was, in most respects, substantially worse than that of any 
other redundant workers previously studied in this country*
A regression analysis showed that, amongst the sample, age was the most 
important single variable influencing subsequent unemployment. Skill level 
and job search behaviour also seemed to exert an influence but financial labour 
market measures had no significant impact. Moreover, the overall employment 
experience of those workers who did find other jobs suggested that they were 
worse off than had they remained at U.C.8, The problems of the redundant 
workers were underlined by the facts that twelve percent were continuously 
unemployed after redundancy and almost a third were out of work when interviewed. 
Despite the unfavourable employment conditions, however, some of the workers 
were observed to adopt and benefit from 'economically motivated' labour market 
behaviour.
■7
In the prevailing circumstances, public manpower policy had virtually 
no impact. The employment service compared badly with informal job search 
methods. Similarly, unemployment benefit and redundancy pay did not 
substantially affect labour market behaviour and did not appear related to 
the amount of subsequent hardship experienced. All this suggests that 
public manpower policy has to be developed much further if it is to deal 
adequately with problems such as those occasioned by the decline of Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders,
Chanter 1 
The Background, to the Redundancies
1 Introduction
*,nau'K»ntmraauiiw««Mt4M)i«nWni«zn*«mB
This is a study of the impact of redundancy on a sample of shipbuilding workers, 
most of them skilled craftsmen, who were released by Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (U,CoS.) 
Ltd., during 19&9 and 1970. The brief history of U.C.8, was notable for the publicity 
and controversy which surrounded it. In the series of incidents which chequered the 
life of the company, it is the 'liquidation crisis' of June 1971 which stands out 
as by far the most prominent. The circumstances of this crisis and ensuing events, 
including the much publicised 'work-in' by the labour force, have been discussed in 
considerable detail elsewhere.^ * This crisis, however, was by no means the first 
encountered by U.C.8. during its short existence.
Between February 1968, w^ hen U.C.S. was set up, and June 1971 when its continued 
existence came into serious question, there were two other occasions ;'on which the 
Government had to rescue the company with special financial support. The company did, 
however, take serious measures in an attempt to put itself on a viable long term footing. 
Economies were made, productivity rose and a pla^med reduction of the labour force began 
in the middle of 1969. It is the experience of the workers made redundant under this 
planned manpower reduction programme which is explored in the following chapters. As 
we shall see, the problems they encountered do much to explain some of the developments 
which followed the subsequent liquidation crisis, in particular the 'work-in'. Their
(l) The situation at U.C.S. was widely reported in the British press during June 
that year and the following months. Also see Buchan, A,, The Right to Work,
Calder and Boyars 1972, which gives a journalistic summary of the crisis and 
subsequent developments, Thompson, W, and Hart, F,, 'The U.C.8. Work-in', 
Laurence-and .Wishart 1972; Murray, R,, 'U.C.S.: The inatomy of Bankruptcy', 
Spokesman Books 1972 and McGill, J., 'Crisis on the Clyde', Davis-Roynter 1975,
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experience also had important implications both for national manpower 
policy and for regional policy.
A fuller 'understanding of these implications, however, requires 
a closer look at the circumstances in which the redundancies took place.
This involves, in the first instance, an appreciation of the rationale 
which led to 'the emergence of U.C.S. as a shipbuilding group.
The formation of U.C.8. was one result of a serious deterioration 
in the competitive position of British shipbuilding in the period following 
World War II. A brief appraisal of this decline is provided in Section 
2. Because of the high concentration of shipbuilding in particular 
regions of the British economy, the problems of the industry had more 
serious implications for such regions. Some of 'these are explored in 
Section Inevitably the shipbuilding question was the subject of
considerable governmental concern. This resulted in the appointment 
of a Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee which began an investigation into 
the nature and extent of the industry's difficulties in February I965.
It was the competitive position of the industry as a whole rather 'than 
its regional significance which was most emphasised by both the Government 
and the Committee of Inquiry. The recommendations of the Inquiry Committee 
are covered in Section 4 = In the following chapter the proposals made 
for shipbuilding are associated more specifically with the formation of 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd,
2. The Post-War Position of British Shipbuilding
It was no surprise when the Labour Government, in February I965, 
appointed a Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee under R. M. Geddes 'to establish 
what changes are necessary in organisation, in the methods of production 
and any other fadtors affecting costs to make the shipbuilding industry
(2)competitive in world markets. ^  A deficiency in competitiveness was 
clearly suggested by a further substantial fall in Britain's share of
(5)world output in the post-war period.  ^ Between the wars the British 
shipbuilding industry's market share had averaged around 40/. Immediate­
ly after the second World War this had risen to 50/. Admiralty 
requirements and the obvious need for replacement building were clearly 
major factors in this resurgence in the position of British shipbuilding.
As the competitiveness of the reconstructed German and Japanese industries 
made itself felt, however, Britain's share declined steadily until, by 
the time the Geddes Committee was investigating, it represented only 
around 10/ of world output. This severe diminution of market share 
occurred moreover during a period in which the world output of merchant 
vessels was expanding at the rate of 6/ per year.^^^
In addition to the dramatic increase in shipbuilding output of 
competitors, particularly Japan, the post-war drop in Britain's share 
of the world market was also attributable to a falling trend in the 
output of British yards. For example, during the 196O's the average 
merchant tonnage launched per annum by British builders was 1,102,000 
tons, a reduction of ^/5 in comparison with an average of l,375>OOOtons 
during the 19^0's . T h i s  falling "trend in output was accompanied by 
a considerable reduction in the employment offered by the industry.
In 1959} total employment in the British shipbuilding industry stood 
at 186,000 as against 217,000 a decade before. By I969 this had fallen 
to 149,000 which represented a contraction of -J- in the employment provided
(2) The Report of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee (The Geddes Report), 
HMSO, 1966, p.5.
(5) The British shipbuilding industry's share of the world market had, 
however, been declining secularly since the last decade of the 19th 
century. See Parkinson, J.R., The Economics of Shipbuilding in the 
United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, I96O, pp.12-15 end pp.215-217.
(4) Geddes, op. cit., p.56.
(5) Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, Annual Reports 1959-60, p.187;
1970, p.45.
(6)
by the industry between 1949 and I969.
The reasons for such a serious decline are many. J.R. Parkinson 
considered that the outlook of the shipbuilding firms and the ordering 
of national priorities had particularly detrimental effects on the 
fundamental capabilities of the industry; 'The industry undoubtedly 
suffered from too gloomy a view being taken of its prospects in the 
post-war period. This affected it in two ways. First, too little i
I
priority was given to securing steel supplies, and too little priority • 
was given to the comparatively small sums that bhe industry needed ... 
Secondly, the combined effects of market forebodings and resbrictions | 
on the means to increase output reacted on initiative - and resulted 
in complete failure to exploit what proved, for many years, to be a large
(7)and growing market.' ' In view of the recommendations later made by 
Geddes, it is interesting to observe that Parkinson, six years earlier, 
identified the structure of the industry as being a contributory 
factor to its obvious lack of dynamism,
5. More Looal Considerations
The post-war deterioration of British shipbuilding could be seen as 
part of a process of secular decline. Nevertheless, it still 
represented a structural change of considerable importance particularly 
in a regional context. Although structural change occurs in all 
economies with the passage of time, adjustment to it, as well as the 
cost involved varies from case to case. This process of adaptation 
is affected by various factors. For example, the transferability of 
factors of production and the presence or absence of policies designed 
to promote or cushion structural change will clearly influence the
(6) Ministry of Labour Gazettq August 1949 and 1959> and Employment 
and Productivity Gazette, August I969.
(7) Parkinson, op, cit., p.213.
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redeployment of released resources. Another important consideration is the resilience 
of the economic environment in which the structural change is taking place. If the 
economy is a robust and diversified one, the required adaptation to the forces of 
change can usually be made easily and advantageously. On the other hand, adjustment 
is much more difficult and costly if it takes place in an economy ill-equipped to 
reabsorb the redundant factors of production. In this regard, however, redundant 
kTorkers clearly cannot be seen in the same light as outmoded machinery and insensitively 
considered as mere "factors of production". Indeed most of the concern justifiably 
axpressed about large scale redundancies arises from the fact that they almost invariably 
Impost severe social as well as economic costs on many of the men affected and also on 
bheir families. When the problem of deficient demand is added to the more fundamental 
weaknesses resulting from an inadequate industrial structure transition becomes still 
aore severe.
These are some of the factors which must be taken into account when evaluating the 
.mpact of a declining shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding, because of its vintage,
.ts technology and its location is usually described as a typical "traditional* 
ndustry. It is labour intensive, craft based and pursued mainly in those regions 
if the British economy which provided the sinews of the Industrial Revolution, It has 
leen the misfortune of these regions that the circumstances which previously gave them 
, comparative advantage have, over time, been converted into a disadvantage. One 
eature of this has been their over-endowment with industries like shipbuilding which,
1 though declining, they can ill afford to lose because of the impact on income and 
mployment. The importance of shipbuilding to its traditional areas can be demonstrated 
n a number of ways.
The greater relative effect of the industry's decline at local than at national 
evel is brought out by looking, for example, at Glasgow in particular. Here ship- 
ailding's share of total employment contracted by one-third from almost TÂ in 1949 
D less than 5/ in 19&9' This was similar to the decline at national level. Ship- 
j.ilding in 1949» however, provided approximately seven times as many jobs in the Glasgow
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area as it did for Great Britain as a whole. Consequently a reduction 
by one-third in the industry’s share of total employment involved a 
larger proportionate loss of jobs than at national level. In fact, the 
number of male employees in shipbuilding and ship repairing fell by 45/
from 28,000 in 1949 to 16,500 in I969* This process of decline was
marked by tlie passing of some famous shipbuilding names, Barclay- 
Curle, Simons-Lobnitz and Ilarland and Wolff were only some of the firms 
which disappeared from Clydeside during this period. Between 1950 and 
1972 the membership of the Clyde Shipbuilders’ Association fell from 29 
to 15 firms.
Although the industry was contracting when the U.C.S, run-down began 
in 1969, shipbuilding and related engineering activities still remained 
a major source of employment when compared with the national picture. 
Table 1.1 gives some indication of this in the case of Scotland and 
more particularly, Glasgow.
Table 1,1 Percentage Distributions of Insured Male Employees
By Main Sectors, Glasgow Area^, Scotland and G,B.^
Glasgow Area Scotland G.B,
Primary 0 .7 7,5 5.4
Shipbuilding and 
marine engineering 6 ,5 5.3 0 .7
Other metals,and 
engineering 21.4 18,2 23.3
Other manufacturing 15.9 17.4 18.1
Construction 13,1 13.9 10.1
Services 42 .4 39.6 42.3
Note 1, The Glasgow Area comprises the city and 4 adjacent 
employment exchange areas including Clydebank.
Note 2, G.B. excludes Scotland and the Northern region identified 
by Geddes as the other main region where shipbuilding is 
concentrated.
Source: Department of Employment and the Employment and Productivity
Gazette, March 1970.
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Shipbuilding and related engineering activities provided over 
four times as many jobs in Scotland as in the remainder of Great 
Britain and, in Glasgow, nine times as many. When the multiplier 
effects of shipbuilding are taken into account, the importance of the 
industry at local level looms even larger. Because shipbuilding is 
characterised by a high proportion of bought-in material, a reduction 
in shipbuilding activity is likely to have wider repercussions in the i
r e g i o n . I n  addition, the higher level of unemployment prevailing '
!
in the shipbuilding centres emphasises still further their dependence on
(9) Ithis traditional industry as a 'pump primer'/  ^ {
Given, therefore, the location of the industry and the problems
of the areas where it was concentrated, the omission of any explicit
recognition of the regional question in the remit given to Geddes was
a curious one. This was underlined by the development of the 'Fairfields
crisis' during the period the Geddes Committee was investigating. It
was primarily the Government's direct intervention which prevented the ■
demise of the Clydeside Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd.,
after a receiver had been appointed in October 1965.^ ^^  ^ Governmental
determination not to see Fairfields 'go to bie wall' led to an unusual
coalition of trade union funds and private capital which, with Govern-
î' 1 1  'ment finance, ensured the survival of the company,
(s) Geddes, on. cit., p.48, suggests that at least 70/ of the cost of 
a vessel can be attributed to bought-in materials and components.
(9) For the fifteen years before the redundancies began the male employment 
rate in Glasgow was, on average, over two and a quarter times that 
for Grea,t Britain*
(10) Fairfield’s was a recently modernised yard, the largest ship­
building employer on the Upper Clyde after John Brown.
(11) For a comprehensive account of developments at Fairfields and also 
for an insightful critique of some of the more general problems of 
the British shipbuilding industry, see Alexander, K.JaW* and Jenicins, 
C«L« "Fairfields - A Study of Industrial Change", Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press, 19?0.
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At the time, considerable emphasis was put on the 'Fairfields 
experiment' as an opportunity to revolutionise industrial relations 
in the industry and elsewhere. No less important was the direct loss 
of 2,500 jobs which would have resulted in an area which could ill afford 
it. Regardless of the narrow brief offered to Geddes earlier in the 
year, the 'Government’s concern with events on the Clyde appeared to 
confer greater weight to the local aspects of the shipbuilding problem.
4» The Geddes Proposals for Shipbuilding
In framing its proposals for shipbuilding the Inquiry Committee 
decided to taice-a definite line: 'We are not concerned with general,
social or political arguments, but only with the question posed by our
(12)terms of reference.'  ^ Consequently, the Committee's recommendations 
were made in abstraction from the special position of shipbuilding in 
its traditional areas. Nationalisation was rejected as a
solution as was the introduction of additional subsidies on a basis 
and scale comparable with those operated by some of Britain's competitors 
VJhile criticism is always easier with the advantage of hindsight, it 
is clear that the later series of crises at U.C.S. might have been 
avoided or alleviated if both the Government and the Committee of 
Inquiry had explored policy options for shipbuilding within a less 
exclusive frame of reference. In the event, the main proposal made 
by Geddes to revitalise the shipbuilding industry was that independent 
shipbuilding firms should consolidate into groups.
Geddes anticipated that the consolidation of a number of individual
firms into a consortium or group would promote greater efficiency for
a number of reasons. First, it was expected that groups would secure
(12) Geddes, op, cit., p,93-
(1 3 ) Geddes, op. cit., p.44 and pp,29 and I42.
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some important scale economies, For exainple, prior to grouping, each
firm would have provided its own 'service' facilities such as design, 
drawing and purchasing, as well as its own staff functions such as 
marketing, personnel and general management. A group would he able 
to centralise these functions with a consequent reduction in cost.
Second, grouping was likely to provide the potential to develop a more 
comprehensive and efficient marketing policy especially ff each 
constituent yard specialised in a particular kind of vessel. The 
group would thus be able to offer a wider range of products than an 
individual yard and, because of the yard specialisation, at a more 
competitive price. Third, more stable employment for the labour force 
was expected from grouping since workers could be transferred from yard 
to yard as the cycle of work required it. This, it was hoped, would 
also contribute to a much needed improvement in industrial relations 
in the industry and promote more flexible and efficient use of ship­
building skills.
In making the recommendations for the restructuring of the industry 
as a whole, Geddes recognised that important differences existed between 
autonomous shipbuilding firms. It was accepted that these were bound 
to cause financial and other problems. Inevitably, there would be 
costs involved in bringing various yards into harness with each other.
To further the necessary reorganisation, Geddes proposed the setting up 
of a Shipbuilding Industry Beard. (S.I.B.) which would supervise and 
facilitate reconstruction by making loans and grants to those firms which 
did agree to merge. There was, however, a limit to this financial 
assistance which also had to 'make the best practicable contribution 
to the competitiveness of the industry as a whole.
(l4) Geddes, op. cit., paragraphs 55G-554 and paragraph 56O.
5o Conclusions
The main concern of this study is wl'iat happened to the workers
made redundant hy U.CoS* in the course of a planned run down of their
labour force beginning in the middJ.e of 1969* Their experience is 
better understood when seen against the backdrop of the British ship­
building industry and its problems, nationally and even more so, 
locally. The rising anxiety over shipbuilding which resulted in the 
appointing of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee in 1965 was an inevitable 
consequence of the international performance of the British industry. 
Despite a growing world demand for mtercliant vessels in the post-war 
period, Britain's share of the market continued to fall. This was 
accompanied by a contraction in the size and output of the industry^
Although shipbuilding- is, in the main, concentrated in areas of
above average unemployment local considerations were accorded less 
priority than the need to make the industry internationally competitive. 
The most important proposal made by the Committee of Inquiry was that 
individual firms should be encouraged to merge into groups by offer;lng 
a variety of grants and loans. This, it was hoped, would lead to 
economies of scale, a more effective marketing policy and more efficient 
U'kilisation of the industry's labour force. To encourage and oversee 
the consolidation of the indus'biy, Geddes proposed that a Shipbuilding 
Indus’try Board be set up which would dispense the prescribed financial 
assistance provided various conditions were met.
Chapter 2
U.C.S. The Redundancies and the State of the Local Economy
1o Introduction
The Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee made its recommendations in 
March 1966, approximately a year after its appointment. Although the 
proposals offered attractive financial incentives' to fims which were 
considering a merger, it was some time before they had much effect.
After all, shipbuilding was a traditional industry and some traditions^  
died harder than others. In this chapter we first of all look at |
I
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd. as a product of the Geddes Report. |
I
This is done in Section 2. In Section 3 the reasons for the U.C.S. *
redundancy programme and its implementation are discussed. In order
to provide some framework within which to evaluate the scale and
significance of these redundancies, Section 4 gives an indication of
the changing face of U.C.S. over the span of the cut-back. The
external environment in which the redundancies occurred was, if anything,
more important. Section 5 makes some assessment of this environment 
using the unemployment and unfilled vacancy statistics for the Glasgow
area between the summer of 1969 and the summer of 1971.
2. Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd.
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd. was set up in February I968 in 
accordance with the proposals made in the Geddes Report. The new 
consortium was created through a merger involving all the five firms 
still building ships on the Upper Reaches of the river. In addition 
to Fairfields, saved from extinction three years before, the other 
four constituent firms were the renowned John Brown of Clydebank,
Alexander Stephen of Linthouse, and Charles Connell and William Yarrow 
both located on the Scotstoun stretch of the river.
Creating a group out of these five yards seemed to make sound sense 
for a number of reasons. First, they were in relatively close proximity 
to each other. Fairfield and Stephen', on the south bak, virtually 
faced Yarrow and Connell opposite. John Brown lay a few miles down­
stream on the north banlc. Consequently, this presented the opportunity 
of using the employees of the five firms as a single labour force since 
there seemed no great problem in transferring labour from yard to yard 
as required. In addition, their existing specialisations promised the 
development of the broad product range recommended by Geddes, Yarrow 
specialised in Admiralty work, both Brown and Fairfield were capable of 
building medium sized barkers, liners and large bulk carriers, while 
Stephen and Connell were suited for building medium and smaller sized 
merchant ships as well as specialised vessels.
At the same time, reservations were expressed in the business press 
and elsewhere about the fundamental commercial viability of the group. 
Problems were anticipated because, among other things, the individual 
yards had been operating with capital equipment of varying vintages under 
autonomous and independent-minded managements. Indeed, when joining 
the consortium, Yarrow's retained 49/ of its own shares and reserved 
the right to buy back the other 51/ taken up by U.C.S. if, for example,
(2)the survival of the group later came into question,  ^ It was not long 
before some of these fears began to be realised.
5. The Redundancy Programme
In 1969, its second year of existence, the U.C.S, group found itself 
facing a shortage of working capital and approached the S.I.B. for further
(1) Hargrave, Andrew, 'The Agony at U.C.S.', Management Today, October
1969.
(2) Yarrow's, in fact, effectively freed itself from group control in 
mid 1970 and the financial 'divorce' was completed in February 1971, 
on the eve of the U.C.S. ‘liquidation crisis' .
22
financial assistance. An additional grant of i f j million vJas extended 
to the group in February but this proved inadequate. Representations 
were again made in June for a further injection of finance. Since the 
extent of the assistance required was clearly more than the S.I.B. was 
authorised to provide, the Government again became directly involved 
in the fate of shipbuilding on the Clyde. On this occasion, however,
a condition for continued Governmental support of U.C.S, was that the 
group should proceed to reduce its labour force in areas which were 
overmanned: U.C.S. commenced to prune its labour force in August of
that year on the basis of ’last in, first out* and entered into a more, 
comprehensive policy of labour force rationalisation the following year 
as it developed, its standard multi-purpose 'Clyde* vessel which required 
a lower input of traditional skills particularly those of the 'outfitting'
(4)
trades. It is the results of these redundancies which form the basis 
of this study.
To encourage the required run-down, U.C.S. introduced, in 1970, an 
incentive separation payments scheme which offered volunteers for 
redundancy from f>ur to eight weeks' pay free of tax over and above their 
entitlement under the Redundancy Payments Act. In order to bring about 
the desired balance in the labour force the scheme was directed primarily 
at the outfitting trades. To retain control over the cut-back, U.C.S. 
introduced the redundancy programme in tliree stages and also attached 
a number of conditions to accepting volunteers.
The first phase began in May and was directed at hourly paid 
employees with less than two years' length of sernrice. Because of 
their short service such workers were not entitled to statutory 
redundancy payments but volunteers from this group were offered four
(i) Geddes proposed a ceiling of £5 million on any grant made by the
S.I.B* to alleviate the costs which any group might incur in merging.
Geddes, op. cit., p.lfS.
(4) 'Outfitting' or 'finishing* trades include such as plumbers, painters!,
electricians, joiners, polishers, engineers and fitters who equip thej
vessel for use when the steelwork is completed.
2)
weeks' severance pay tax free, U.C.S., however, reserved the right not 
to accept all volunteers, the right to determine the date of discharge 
and the right to withhold the non-statutory severance pay if the employee 
left prior to the agreed date of discharge. In addition, at this stage 
of the planned manpower reduction programme, the company also compulsorily 
retired all employees over retirement age and offered them an ex gratia 
payment of £9 for each year of service prior to the formation of U,C,8,:
and £10 for their service with the group, |
i
Hourly paid employees with up to five years' length of service : 
were included in the second phase of the run-down which began at the ! 
end. of July. The company reserved the same discretionary authority as 
it had done at the first stage. Again, four weeks' pay was offered as 
an incentive, this time in addition to any statutory redundancy pay a 
man may have been entitled to. The opportunity to volunteer was not 
extended to manual workers with over five years' service since the 
company intended to limit its financial obligations.
This constraint was not introduced, however, in the third and final 
phase of the planned run-down which was aimed at clerical, administrative 
and technical staff employees. All such employees were, in principle, 
allowed to volunteer from the middle of August but this was subject to 
the discretion of the company. The staff were, however, offered somewhat 
more attractive severance money. In addition to any statutory payment 
they may have been entitled to, they were offered from five to eight 
weeks' pay dependent on length of service. The various phases of the 
planned cut-back were not mutually exclusive so that in the second half 
of 1970 U.C.S. was gradually releasing both staff employees and hourly 
paid workers with up to five years' length of service.
As a result of the entire manpower reduction programme, just over 
2,000 workers were made redundant between August I969 and the beginning 
of I97I' This was in addition to any natural wastage. About 20^ 
left in August I969 and the majority, under the voluntary prograjmme, 
between June and December 1970, The phasing of the reported redundancies 
is shown below.
Table 2.1 Redundancies Reported by U.C.S, to the Department
of Employment
1969 May June July August September October November December 197i Total
444 10 542 245 495 278 12 117 17 47 2,003
22 17 12 23 14 1 ■ 6 1 2 100
1, The total excludes 90 employees over 63 who were compulsorily 
retired.
The Clydebank (John Drown) and Covan (Stephen and Fairfield) divisions 
of U.C.S, accounted almost equally for Q^P/o of the redundancies and the 
two smaller yards, Connell and Yarrow, for the remaining 10^ , A 
manpower reduction programme on this scale clearly had important implicat­
ions not only for U.C.S, but also for the local community.
4. The Changing Face of U.C.S.
The experience of U.C.S. was so erratic that it would be pointless 
trying to determine any 'normal' pattern in the employment offered by 
the group. Group employment statistics began to be centralised in 
September I968, seven months after its formation. In October, the total 
labour force was just over 15,000 of whom 6l^ were craftsmen, 18^ o were 
staff and 21^ were unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Due to the 
urgency to complete the ^E2 contract, inherited from John Brown, in 
April 1969, the hiring and subsequent firing of finishing tradesmen over 
the autumn and winter of I968 prohibits the computation of anything like 
an average turnover figure.
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V/liat is evident, however, is that the group was reducing its labour 
force even prior to its commitment to a planned run-down in the summer of 
1969. Employment reached a peak of 15g thousand in IJovember I968.
By August 1969 it was down to I3& thousand. Since the planned reduction 
in the group's manpower began at this time, we may assess the effect of 
this exercise by comparing the structure of the labour force before and
after the redundancies. The effective withdrawal of Yarrow's from U.C.g.
!
in July 1970 slightly complicates this evaluation. At the beginning of 
August 1969, Yarrow's complement of workers was 2,748 in a total B.C.S.: 
labour force of 13,538° If we deduct Yarrow's men from the group total!, 
as we do below, this allows us to assess the changing face of the remainder 
of U.C.S.
Table 2.2 Occupational Structure of U.C.S. (excluding Yarrow's) 
at the Beginning and End of Redundancy Programme
. (1) (2) (5) (4) (5) (6)
August
1969 io
January
.._.1971 Difference Reduction
Staff 2,258 21 1,822 22 - 436 - 19
Skilled 5,685 53 4,259 51 - 1426 - 25
Semi-skilled 1,051 10 954 11 - 97 - 9
Unskilled 1,094 10 720 9 - 374 » 34
Apprentices 694 6 665 8 - 29 - 4
10,782 100 8,420 101 - 2362 - 22
Note: In this table and elsewhere where percentages are rounded they may
not add exactly to 100« Source: U.C.S*
Over the span of the redundancy programme, the total labour force 
fell by 2250 from almost 10,800 to 8,400, All occupational levels 
experienced some contraction bub the severest cut-back was made in the 
ranks of the skilled and unskilled workers. This, however, did not 
result in any radical change in the broad occupational structure of 
the labour force as a comparison of columns (2) and (4) illustrates.
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While the proportion of skilled workers was not too severely eroded by 
the redundancies, most of those released were, by design, those in the 
finishing trades.
In principle, these were the most transferable workers- But did they 
in fact, have skills which were suited to other activities ? Was their 
working experience wholly confined to shipbuilding? What effect was 
their age likely to have on their chances of getting another job? These 
are some of the important questions we turn to in the following chapters. 
For the moment, we briefly evaluate the local employment conditions facing 
the redundant workers,
5• The Trend of the Local Economy
Although shipbuilding employment had been declining since 1949? v^e 
saw in the introductory chapter that, in 1969? a sizeable proportion of 
the male labour force in the Glasgow area was still attached to ship­
building and related activities. The further reduction in tb.e stock of
shipbuilding jobs caused by the run-down at B.C.S. would obviously affect
the subsequent employment prospects of the workers affected. In addition, 
the general state of the local economy during the cut-back at B.C.S. 
suggests that being made redundant, voluntarily or otherwise, was only 
the start of the men's problems as table 2.3 indicates.
Table 2.3 Wholly Unemployed I-iales (fo) Glasgow Area, Scotland,
Great Britain 3rd Qtr. 1969 - 3rd Qtr. 1971
i3§2 i m .  i m
Av. fa 3rd 4 th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd
Unemployed £tr C^,tr qtr Qtr C^ tr Qtr £tr Qtr
Glasgow 6.2 6.1 6.8 6.7 7.4 8.0 9.1 9.6 10.5
Scotland 4.8 4.9 5.7 5.2 5.8 6.1 7.2 7.5 8.2
G.B. 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.4 5.5 3.5 4.2 4.5 5.0
Source: Department of Employaient unpublished data.
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After the first wave of redundancies in August, 1969, the male
unemployment rate in Glasgow for the remainder of the year was just
as
over Gfo. This was almost twice as hacy for Great Britain as a whole.
At the time the second and heavier wave of redundancies began in June, 
1970, male unemployment had risen to 6 .7^ aud by the end of the year it 
was above Bfo, over twice the national average. The situation worsened 
thereafter so that by the summer of 1971» the male unemployment rate was 
over 10/c. A similar deterioration also took place in the Scottish 
economy and in Great Britain as a whole. In Glasgow, however, the
decline had more serious implications because it started from a position 
which was already much worse.
Another indication of the progressive deterioration in the local 
economy is given by the increase in the actual numbers of men unemployed 
and by the trend in unfilled-vacancies. At the end of I969, there were 
only 3,000 or so vacancies available for nearly 21,000 wholly unemployed 
men in Glasgow, In June of 1971 vacancies had fallen to a mere 642 for 
35>000 men out of work.^  ^ By this time, 90^ of the redundant workers 
had been in the labour market for at least nine months. Under normal 
circumstances this should have given them ample time to 'find their feet* 
after losing their jobs. Quite clearly, however, the economic recession 
which coincided with the U.C.S. 'shakeout* placed considerable obstacles 
in the way of the redeployment of the shipyard workers.
6. Conclusions
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd. was set up in I968 in accordance 
with the Geddes proposals for shipbuilding. Its constituent menfoers were 
the five independent firms still active in building ships on the Upper
(5) Between August I969 and July 1971 the proportionate increases in the 
male unemployment rate for Glasgow, Scotland and Great Britain were 
1.63, 1.67 and 1.52 respectively.
(6) Bata from the Glasgow Area Office of the Department of Ehtployment.
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Reaches of the river. In its second year of existence the group found 
itself facing a liquidity problem and approached the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board for additional financial assistance. Because the scale of this was 
greater than the Board was statutorily authorised to provide, the matter 
was referred to the attention of the Government. A condition for continued 
Governmental support of U.C.S, was that it should proceed to reduce its
labour force where possible. The Group introduced a phased labour force
1
run-down beginning in August I969 and continuing to the end of 1970* !
Most of the reduction took place in the latter year under a voluntary
redundancy scheme. |
Evenliually, just over 2,000 men were released in the course of the entire 
exercise. This represented a reduction of almost one-quarter of the entire 
labour force and most of the workers involved were craftsmen from the 
so-called finishing trades. Such a reduction in the amount of employment 
offered by shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde had serious implications for 
the redundant men. First of all, apart from some firms still engaged 
in ship-repairing and Yarrow’s which had effectively left the group,
U.C.S. was the sole source of shipbuilding jobs up-river. Consequently, 
the redundant men faced considerable difficulty if they hoped to find 
similar jobs in the same local area. Secondly, since the U.C.S. run­
down was contemporaneous with and, indeed, formed part of a general 
recession in the local economy, employment prospects outside the industry 
did not seem any more promising. This is the context within which we are 
about to assess the experience of the U.C.S. workers.
Chapter 3
Il ri  I
The Redundant Workers
lo Introduction
Quite apart from the underlying state of the labour market into which 
he is released, a redundant worker's chances of quick re-engagement will be 
influenced by such factors as the urgency with which he looks for a job, his
(l)
age, and, importantly, the skills which he can offer to prospective employers.
This chapter examines a number of such factors comparing the redundant men, 
where appropriate, with the remaining workers at U.C.S, and the industry 
labour force. Section 2 first of all describes our sampling procedure and 
establishes its representativeness while briefly noting the reasons for non- 
response. In section 3s look at the age structure of the redundant workers 
and their family responsibilities, including their marital status, dependents 
and reported household income at time of redundancy. Sections 4 und 3 
concerned with the men's working lives particularly those aspects which would 
have some bearing on their redeployability. Occupation is discussed in 
section 4 while section 5 considers their length of service in shipbuilding 
in and out of U.C.S. and also kheir experience of industries other than 
shipbuilding. Conclusions are presented in section 6.
2. The Sample
Lists of redundant workers submitted by U.C.S. to the Department of 
Employment were made available to us and used as a sampling frame. With 
the cooperation of the company, occupations having some affinity with each 
other were grouped together within 9 composite categories and assigned one 
of four skill levels, unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and staff. Using 
the 9 occupational categories as sampling strata, a sample of 4OO men was
( 2)randomly drawn from the population of just over 2,000 redundant workers.
(1) For a comprehensive discussion of the importance of such factors, see 
Sheppard, H.L. and Belitsky, A.H., ’The Job Hunt', Johns Hopkins Press, I966
(2) The few women involved in the run-down were excluded as were 100 or so 
male workers compulsorily retired by U.C.S., the former because they 
were atypical and the latter because they were unlikely to be active 
labour market participants.
Fieldwork was carried out in June and July of 1971 by a market research
organisation after the interviewers had been fully briefed at Glasgow University
and after the questionnaire had been ’piloted' in Glasgow on a separate sub-
sam%)le of the redundant population* Ultimately 328 usable interviews were
obtained providing'a response rate of 82^ and there w^ as no occupational
(3;bias in this response*
Besides investigating the possibility of response bias it was also 
important to establish how the men themselves perceived their skills. Few 
sampling frames are perfect and, in tracing the pattern of occupational 
dispersion following redundancy we were, for obvious reasons, obliged to 
pay due attention to the men's own appraisal of the skill characteristics 
of their various jobs* Consequently, our respondents were asked,
’bhat was your job at UoCcS* called?'' 
followed by,
’Would you say it was unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled or 
staff? f
Table 3d shows the occupational distribution of the sample, (l) based on
the data I’eceived from U.C.S* j (2) based on the job descriptions of the
interviewed workers*
Table 3d The Occupational Distribution of the Realised Sample 
(l) based on data from UfC.S* (2) based on worker's 
evaluation
Occupation (i) (2)
1* Plumbers and Painters 16 13
2, Electricians 16 16
3. Joiners and Polishers 23 22
4 . Engineers and Fitters 13 12
5. ’Shipbuild ing' trades 6 6
6. Semi-skilled workers 11 15
7. Staff 8 7
8. ’Indirect' workers 6 12
9c Dot luiown 2
Table indicates that the information from U.C.S. largely coincided
(3) Two successful interviews were discarded because the men were dismissed 
and not made redundant by U.C.S. Tlie other JO failures were made up as 
follows: 32 no trace; 15 refusals; 7 no contact after 4 calls;
9 abroad; 1 ill; 7 deceased.
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with the men’s own estimation of what their jobs were. The only striking 
difference occurs in the case of the ’indirect' workers* When we decided 
on the rationalised occupational codes to be used, it seemed reasonable 
for us to consider the 'indirect' occupations as, by and large, unskilled. 
As we shall see, however, the respondents' estimation of the skill levels 
of their occupations didn't entirely coincide with ours. The differences 
between our assessment and that of our respondents are shown in table 5,2,
Table 5,2. Skill Distribution of the Jobs held at U.C.S,
(l) Attributed; (2) Workers' Estimation (fo)
Skill level (l) (2)
Unskilled 6 9
Semi-skilled 11 15
Skilled 74 72
Staff 8 5
Not known 2
In the course of establishing the occupational/skill composition of 
the sample it was clear that a degree of imprecision was inevitable. For 
example, where groups of redundant workers were reported by department 
such as 'painters', U.C.S. pointed out that red leaders, semi-skilled 
workers, would be included but could not be distinguished from unskilled 
'brush-hands' or skilled painters. iuiother possibility for imprecision 
arose from our decision to assume that ’staff would include all those in 
supervisory positions but table 3*2 suggests that a number of such super­
visors rated themselves at the same skill level as the workers they were 
responsible for. Summing up, however, the differences between our assess­
ment of the workers and their own were not serious and the distinctive 
feature of the sample, as of the redundancy programme, remains the fact 
that it is characterised by a large proportion of dilled craftsmen.
(4) V/hen asked if they had completed a trade apprenticeship, j6°/o of the
sample affirmed that they had. Only six of the 235 workers describing 
their occupations at U.C.S. as skilled said they had not. In addition, 
11 staff, 4 unskilled and 7 semi-skilled workers claimed to have done 
so but not necessarly' ipAhipbuilding or engineering.
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3» Ago and
(5)'fliG effect of age on prospects of re-employment is well documented.
Family responsibilities are also likely to exert a different influence.
Young, single workers with little or no fanily responsibilities will
generally be under less pressure to get back into.work quickly than
mature married men with families. Table 3-3 below compares the age structure
of our realised sample with that of the remaining labour force at U.C.S.
I
and also with that of the male labour force at June I969 in British |
i
shipbuilding as a whole. This was about the time the planned reduction
of the U.C.S. labour force began. j
Table 3.3. Age Structure of Sample, Remainder of U.C.S. Labour Force 
and Labour Force in British Shiubuilding at June 1969 (¥0)
Bri ti s].i
604
ÈEÊ. 
Up to 29
30 - 39
40 " 49
50_ -  59
60 - 64
654-
Sample
31
22
20
14
9
4
Remainder of U.C.S, 
Labour Force_
16
19
24
30
11
Shipbuilding
21
18
24
24
14
Numbers Involved 328 694 169,000
Note 1o The remainder is a 10^ simple random sample of the 
labour force in the UGS yards after the redundancies*
Note. 2. One respondent whose date of birth was not reported is 
excluded from this and subsequent age distributions*
Source; U.C.S. and the Employment and Productivity Gazette, Julyi970*.
Clearly the redundant workers were a much younger group than those
unaffected by the planned run-down; 33^ were under 40 compared with f>fp/o
of the remaining labour fo&ce and only 27^ were over 50 compared with 4i^
of those left. These differences are significant at the I f i level.
Equally clearly, they were considerably younger than the industry's
(5) See, for example, Mackay, D.I., 'After the Shake-Out', Oxford Economic 
Papers, March 1972 and Fiackay, D.I, and Reid, G.L., 'Redundancy, 
Unemplo^ cpent and Manpower Policy', The Economic Journal. December 1972.
labour force as a whole. In general, therefore, the age of the redundant 
workers could be considered an advantage rather than a handicap.
Looking at family responsibilities, most of the sample (Sl^ o) 
were married men and under -g- {2J,y/<j) of these had wives with outside 
jobs at the time of redundancy. Another and important aspect of family 
responsibility is, of course, the number of dependents a man has. For 
our purposes, we decided to define 'dependent* in terms of a single 
household and asked the respondent to enumerate, with their ages, all 
the persons living in the household at the time of redundancy, A 
'dependent* was considered as anyone under school leaving age or over 
retirement age. This would include, for example, an aged parent living 
with a married son or daughter but would exclude children pursuing further 
education. It would also fail to pick up possible payments to family 
members elsewhere but it had the advantage of establishing as directly 
as possible the number of dependents our respondents were, under normal 
circumstances, likely to be responsible for. We show, below, the dis­
tribution of the dependents of the 265 married men in the sample.
Table 3*4 Number of Dependents of the 26b Married Men {^o)
None ^ A ^ Nos. N.K. Total Numbers
Married Men 29 27 22 I4 4 5 5 265
Something under one third of the married men had no dependents apart
from their wife. Otherwise, a majority {^y /o) had from 1 to 3 dependents 
with relatively few having more than that. Excluding childless couples, 
the average number of dependents was two per respondent.
Our survey also sought to establish usual weekly financial commitments 
as well as weekly household income at time of redundancy. The resulting 
average (median) for 'usual commitments' was just over £4 but no checklist
54
was used for practical reasons and the responses suggest differences 
in, interpretation. Our question on usual weekly income read, 'Altogether , 
at the time you left U.C.S., how much per week would you say was coming 
regularly into the house?’ This was directed primarily at the 265 married 
men whose responses produced a median of approximately £27* The range 
of responses in this case suggested, however, that some respondents 
actually gave not the total income of the household hut their own 
contribution to the weekly running expenses of the household. It is 
also likely that the responses referred to earned income ignoring, for 
example, family allowances etc. Consequently, it is hardly surprising 
to find that average household income in Scotland at the time, £32.5 per 
week, was somewhat higher than that resulting from our survey.
Clearly, a rigorous investigation of family income and expenditure requires 
far more time and detail than can be provided by a labour market survey.
4• A Broader View of the Redundant Workers' Skills
V/e have previously compared the age structure of the redundant workers, 
the remaining U.C.S. labour force and the shipbuilding industry labour 
force. A similar occupational comparison allows us to evaluate the skills 
of the redundant workers in a wider context.
Table 3.5 , Occupational Distribution of Sample, Remaining U.C.S.
Labour Force and British Shipbuilding Industry in May 1969
(1) (2)
Occupation Sample
1. Plumbers and Painters X y
2. Electricians 16
3. Joiners and Polishers 22
4. Engineers and Fitters 12
5v Shipbuilding Trades 6
6. Semi-skilled workers 13
7. Staff 7
8. ’Indirect* workers 12
(5) (4)
Remainder of Industry Labou:
U.C.S. Labour Force Force, May 196^
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5 r
4 5
69 6 56 6
5 9
3£_ 31
17
21
6
12
16
17
Source: U.C.S. and Employment Productivity Gazette, January 1970,
(6) The Scottish Abstract of Statistics, I971. H.M.S.O. p.79.
y?
Table 3-»5 demonstrates that the workers made redimdcint by U.C.S. 
were more skilled than the U.C.S. labour force in general and also more 
skilled than the work force of the industry as a whole. Moreover, although 
56 per cent of the workers employed by U.C.S. in the summer of 1971 were 
in skilled occupations, only 20 per cent were finishing tcadosmen. The 
majority (36 per cent) were employed in the metal working or shipbuilding 
trades. Similarly, for the industry as a whole, the shipbuilding trades
’  ■ i
(31 per cent) were in a majority over the finishing trades (26 per cent).
The pattern is reversed in the case of our sample of redundant workers,' 
where the finishing tra.desmen (63 per cent) were in an overwhelming majority
1
over the metal workers affected by the cut-back (6 per cent). The 
asymmetrical composition of skills in the sample refected, of course, one 
of the objectives of the redundancy exercise. Its decision to put more 
emphasis on the standard cargo vessel resulted in U.C.S, discarding a much 
higher proportion of finishing trades.
The main point, therefore, emerging from this broader review of the 
workers' occupational characteristics is that, looked at from the outside, 
they appeared to form a group with skills which were, on the face of it, 
transferable to a number of different industries. Relatively few of 
them had skills which were obviously specific to shipbuilding. Other 
things being equal, this would have stood them in good stead after 
redundancy, especially if their previous working experience had not been 
exclusively confined to the shipbuilding industry.
5• Shipbuilding and Other Industrial Experience
Besides his age and the skills he has to offer, a redundant worker’s 
prospects of finding another job may be affected by his past work experience. 
First, the tasks required of particular craftsmen will vary in some degree 
from industry to industry. For example, an electrician with construction
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as well as shipbuilding experience is more likely to be capable of 
transferring to the building industry than an electrician whose industrial 
experience has been confined to shipbuilding. In addition, one would 
expect that workers with diverse industrial experience would have more 
confidence about crossing industry boundaries, while one might anticipate 
less mobility from workers with experience exclusive to shipbuilding.
A man’s length of service in a particular job is another important 
element in his overall work experience. The longer his service with a 
particular firm the less recent has been his experience of going through 
the process of looking for another job which is likely to affect the 
efficiency with which he seeks alternative employment. These are some 
of the factors which we now take into account. We have already noted in 
Chapter 2 that the redundancy programme was directed primarily at short 
service workers. Table 3.6 compares the sample’s length of service a,t 
U.C.S. with that of the workers still employed by U.C.S. in the summer of
1971.
Table 3.6 Length of Service at U.C.S. Remaining U.C.S, Workers ;
Length of Service of the Sample at U.C.S.; and in
_____________Shipbuilding (A______ _ ____________
Length of Service at U.C.S. Sample
Length of Service Rest of U.C.S. Workers At U.C.S. In Sbiobull.ding
Up to a year 12 • 39 8
1 and up to 2 years 7 12 4
2 'and up to 5 years 28 26 15
5 and up to 10 years 25 17 20
10 and up to 15 years 6 1 14
15 years + 21 5 39
Numbers not known 1 1
Total 755 328 328
■^ Note: This is total accumulative and not continuous service in 
Shipbuilding.
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Table 3.6 clearly reflects the principles on which U.C.S, based their cut­
back of the labour force. Over f- of the redundant workers had less than 
5 years' service at U.C.S, compared with under of the workers still 
employed by the company. In this respect, the voluntary redundancy 
programme had similar effects to a procedure based on 'last-in, first-out'. 
At the same time, a voluntary programme allows a degree of choice within 
the limitations imposed by the company. For example, there mere similar 
proportions of workers with 2 to 5 years' service in both the sample and the 
remaining U.C.S. labour force. Althou^i some workers were of the opinion 
that U.C.S, would revert to 'last in, first out’ if the voluntary scheme 
failed to bring about the required reduction in the labour force, men with 
2 to 5 years' service would by no means have been the first to go. This 
suggests that at least some of them believed that the benefits of leaving 
tJ.CiS. with extra cash in hand were likely to outweigh any resultant costs. 
The men's own view of their position is taken up in more detail in the 
following chapter.
Although the redundant men were predominantly short service workers, 
their experience in shipbuilding was substantial. For example, whereas 
only 6 per cent of them had 10 or more years of service with U.C.S., more 
than half of them had over 10 years' total experience of the shipbuilding 
industry and many of these had worked in shipbuilding considerably longer. 
This long relationship with the industry was not peculiar to the tradesmen. 
It was shared in similar degree by the other skill groups. Table 3*7 
allows us to assess whether long association with shipbuilding implied 
little experience outside it.
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Table 3,7 Experience of Other Industries by Total Length
Experience Outwith Shipbuilding (fa)
(1) (2) (3)
Service in Shipbuilding ^ None One Other Industry A Second Industry
Up to a year 8 - 100 20
1 year and less than 2 years 4 8  92 54
2 years and less than 5 yrs 15 6 94 45
5 years and less than 10 yrs 20 12 88 38
10 years and less, than I5 yrs I4 I6 84 28
15 years and less than 20 yrs 8 11 89 54
20 years and over 31 38 62 15
Numbers not known 1
Numbers 328 18 82 3I '
The survey asked what other industries the redundant men had worked in 
and we coded up to two of their replies. Only 1 ^  had no alternative
industrial experience whatsoever but column (l) indicates that this proportion 
more than doubled in the case of those with the longest service in shipbuilding, 
Column (3) shows that this group of workers also had less breadth of 
alternative industrial experience. Only 157^  of those with 20 or more years' 
shipbuilding experience had worked in more than one industry compared with 
almost -J- of the sample taken as a whole. This underlines the potential 
problems facing such workers in redeploying from U.C.S, Those workers with 
experience outside shipbuilding in general; had found'it in three major areas, 
in order of importance, construction, other engineering and other manufacturing,
Finally, we might briefly consider two other factors which may have had 
some bearing on the subsequent employment experience of the men, namely 
their travel to work area and their previous preparedness to move away from 
home to take up a job. Table 3*8 shows the location of the home addresses 
of the workers made redundant by the various divisions of U.C.S.
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Table 3.8 Home Addresses of the Workers Made
Redundant by the Divisions of U.C.S. (9
Location of Home Address
Division of U.C.S.
Glasgow-
Paisley
Clydebank-
Dumbarton
Greenock- 
Port Glasgow
Rest of 
Scotland Numbers
Clyde bank (brown’s) 47 43 3 7 177
Scotstoun (Connell’s and 
Yarrow’s) 80 17 5 30
Govan (Fairfield's and, 
Stephen’s) 76 3 13 8 121
Total U.C.S. 61 26 6 7 328
Most of the workers, as we would anticipate, lived in Glasgow or
I
Clydebank and an evaluation of travel to work time indicates that Clydebank
I
as a shipbuilding centre generally imported men from rather than exported 
men to Glasgow. The usual (median) travel to work time for men living in 
Clydebank was q- of an hour compared with just under ^  an hour for men living 
in Glasgow and for the sample as a whole. Men living outwitb Glasgow/Clyde- 
bank generally took around tJ- hour to get to work. In other words, and 
hardly surprisingly, the men’s travel to work pattern more or less traversed 
the local area whose recession we outlined in chapter 2.
There existed, of course, the possibility of leaving the area to seek 
work elsewhere and, in this regard, the survey revealed that all the redundant 
workers were by no means ’stay-at-homes*. VAien asked if they had previously 
lived outside the West of Scotland for work reasons over of the respondents 
affirmed that they had. More of the skilled (4C^ 0 and unskilled (33/^ ) 
had done so than the semi-skilled (28p>) and staff (20^:'), While a disposition 
to move away from home is clearly dependent on much more than skill, it is 
interesting that the most mobile workers in the past had been those with 
marketable skills while the most static workers were the staff whose seniority, 
security and promotion prospects were very likely to be affected by service,
6. Conclusions
Our sample of 4-00 men was drawn, within occupational strata, from a 
total population of just over 2,000 male workers made redundant by U.C.S,
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between August I969 and the end of 1970, and the realised seimple of 328 
was representative of the kinds of worker involved in the redundancies.
In the main, they were comparatively young, skilled craftsmen with short 
service at U.C.S. but with considerable experience of the shipbuilding 
industry. Most had experience outside shipbuilding but, in general, this 
was not extensive especially for those with longest service in shipbuilding. 
As far as age and skill were concerned they appeared better equipped to find 
new employment than most other workers from the industry.
Most of the workers in the sample were married men. While one-third 
of the married men had no dependents apart from their wife, the other two- 
thirds had, on average, two such dependents in their family. Die wives of 
the majority ordinarily had no job in addition to their domestic responsibil­
ities. While income and expenditure estimates derived from surveys must be 
treated with caution, especially in the absence of exhaustive check 
lists it is unlikely that the household income of most of the redundant 
workers differed radically from the Scottish average.
Finally, the location of the men’s homes and their travel to work time 
underlined the difficulties they were likely to encounter when seeking 
alternative jobs near home. While most of them had never lived outside 
of the West of Scotland for work reasons, a considerable proportion of them 
(36^0 had previously been prepared to venture forth if the circumstances 
warranted it.
CHAPTISR 4- 
Job Search
1o Introduction
The preceding chapters have outlined the employment conditions 
confronting the redundant workers and their personal characteristics*
We have already suggested that, although relatively youthful and in
I
possession of apparently transferable sldLlls, the shortage of local job ;
I
opportunities was bound to put considerable difficulties in their way* i
I
This chapter discusses various aspects of their job search experience* |
!
In Section 2 we evaluate what expectations the workers themselves 
entertained of what lay in store for them* Here, we explore 
successively (i) the implications of the voluntary redundancy programme,
(ii) the relationship of shipbuilding experience to job expectations and 
(ill) the influence of age and occupation on job expectations* Section 3 
introduces the idea of job search ’motivation* ‘ and begins by asking how 
important it w^ as for the workers to get back into work quickly*
Subsequently, other evidence is brought to bear including the point in 
time at which the job search began, how 'intensively* the workers sought 
other jobs and their preparedness to leave home for another job* Section 
4 follows by assessing the extensiveness of the men's job search, presenting 
the types of job search methods used and the numbers of different avenues 
pursued* Their choosiness in selecting new jobs provides a final commentary 
on their actual experiences* Section 5 summarises*
2* Labour Market Expectations
(i) The Impact of the Voluntary Redundancy Programme
By volunteering for redundancy, a man automatically expects to 
have to find a new job soon or already has one lined up* This opportunity
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to line up a new job in advance is one benefit generally believed to 
result from a voluntary programme * Not all of the workers, of course 
were volunteers* In chapter 2 we saw that 20 per cent of the overall 
out^back took place during I969 on the basis of last in, first out* Of 
our 328 respondents, however, 100 workers (30 per cent) claimed not to 
have left voluntarily* The additional 10 per cent, although leaving 
during 1970, said they had not done so voluntarily* Even with this 
qualification, however, it is quite clear that the redundancy programme, 
described by the company as a voluntary one, was also largely seen as such by 
the workers* We have previously remarked that being made redundant 
in Glasgow durii^ g 1970, even voluntarily, was not an attractive proposition* 
Why then did 70 per cent of the workers willingly put themselves in this 
position? Table 4ol shows the break-down of the main reasons offered by 
the 228 acknowledged volunteers*
Table 4*1 Reasons Given for Volunteering for Redundancy {jo)
Intended
to Leave For the Had Other Expected to be Wanted out Before
Anyway Money Job to go to Paid Off Anyway Market Flooded Other Numbers
10 23 5 46 8 8 228
The most frequently quoted reason was that if they hadn't volunteered 
they would have expected to be paid off anyway. Only 10 per cent considered 
themselves to be genuinely voluntary movers who took advantage of the scheme 
•while the going was good'* For most of the others volunteering meant 
jumpting before the guillotine fell* Another striking point is that only 
12 workers (5 per cent) said they volunteered because they knew they had 
other jobs to go to before they left* This would seem to confirm that being 
allowed to volunteer for redundancy is of more benefit in theory than in
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practice, at least for manual workers who comprised the bulk of the 
UcOoSo redundancies*
The conditions attached to the voluntary paoloige and the economic 
situation in which it took place were both likely to undermine anj»' 
possible advantages which the workers might have gained from voluntary 
redundancy* First and foremost, the slack labour market was likely to 
malce other employers disinclined to hold positions open for manual 
workers until they had served out their notice with a previous employer*
In the prevailing conditions, a worker who could immediately disengage 
from U,CcSo when he wanted would have the best prospects of lining up 
another job before he actually left the company's employment* The right 
which U.CoSo reserved to determine the date of discharge complicated things 
but, in fairness to U.CoS,, the evidence does not suggest that the 
volunteers were unduly obstructed in the course of leaving once the date 
had been agreed* For example, 55 per cent of'the volunteers left U.C.S* 
within two weeks of volunteering, 29 per cent left within three to four 
weeks after volunteering and 14 per cent left between five and eight weeks 
after they had volunteered* At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding 
their date of release and the omission of paid time off for job seen oh 
from the redundancy package dissuaded many of the workers from trying to 
line up jobs in advance*
Of course, the sooner a volunteer, with no job previously lined up, 
is allowed to leave, the less time he has to do something about it. When 
we explicitly asked,
•Did you have another job to go to before you left U.CoSo?'
22 other workers, in addition to the twelve workers who volunteered because
(l) This is explored further in Section 5*
44-
they knew they I'lad another job, said that they had* This suggests 
either that they managed to fix a job up between the time at which 
they laiew they were leaving and when they actually left or that some 
of the other volunteers bad new jobs to go to but gave other primary 
reasons for volunteering, such as the money* Taking everything into 
account, since only 34 men, 10^ of the sample, had definite jobs 
arranged in advance, we can conclude that volunteering for redundancy 
from U.CoSo did not provide a running start in the job hunt*
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Although shipbuilding has long been a staple source of 
employment on the Clyde it has hardly been a stable one! Given its 
notorious instability of employment, one might have expected the workers 
to express reservations about the industry despite having spent a 
substantial proportion of their working lives in it* Such ambivalence 
could emerge, for example, where a worker was fully aware that shipbuilding 
offered an insecure future but, at the same time, recognised the 
dependence of his skills on the industry* Although, on the face of it, 
most of our craftsmen had apparently transferable skills, “shipyard' 
capabilities are frequently considered insufficiently refined by employers 
outside the industry* As we shall see, these considerations were fully 
appreciated by the men themselves* In view of this and because of the 
implications for patterns of job search, we decided to examine the 
respondents' 'allegiance* to the industry and asked (a) if, at the time 
of leaving U.CoS*, the worker intended to find another job in shipbuilding, 
(b) if he would advise a young worker to earn his living in shipbuilding 
and (c) if he felt that a shipbuilding worker like himself had particular 
advantages or disadvantages when looking for a new job. The pattern of
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responses was an interesting one*
Table 4»2 Proportion in Each Skill Group (l) Intending to Find New 
Jobs in Shipbuilding; (2) Who would Advise a Young Man
to Enter Shipbuilding
Skill ill M
Unskilled 23 35
Semi-Skilled 52 23
Skilled 45 27
Staff 56 21
Total 45 27
Just under half of the workers expressed an intention to find 
jobs within the industry but only tiround one quarter felt they would 
advise a new job seeker to take up employment in shipbuilding* The 
unskilled and the staff workers were somewhat less enamoured with ship- 
building than the skilled and even less so when compared with the semi­
skilled* Comparing the numbers intending to say .in the industry (136) 
with the numbers recommending it to others (86), many of those who felt 
personally •committed' to the industry, at the same time, evidently 
felt that others should see it in a less favourable l i g h t * T h e  reasons 
for workers intending to stay in shipbuilding and, on the other hand,- the 
reasons for respondents not recommending a future in shipbuilding- to 
others shed further light onthis*
Dable
(2)
 ^ In fact, 93 or about JO per cent of the I36 workers intending to find 
new jobs in shipbuilding said they would not advise a youth to enter 
the industry*
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Table 4q3 (a) Reasons Given By Respondents Intending' to Stay in
Shipbuilding; (b) Reasons Given By Respondents Not 
Recoimriending a Future in Shipbuilding
(a)
Reasons for Staying
in Shipbuilding %
lo good money 26
2o expected jobs to be
coming up in ship­
building 15
3* had shipbuilding
job to go to 5
4* experienced in it/
only job he Icnew 30
5o like shipbuilding 16
6o nothing else in the
area 3
7« other 5
Nos* Responding 156
Nos* BoKo 1
(b)
Why Would Not Recommend
a Future in it
Ip no money in it -
2o unprogressive industry 4
3p no future in it 58
4* skills not transferable 8
5p no prospects for 
finishing trades 5
6* no security/too many 
stoppages 21
7. bad working conditions 4
Nos* Responding 
Nos* D.K*
235
13
The reasons given by workers for intending to stay in the industry 
fall into three main categories* First, an aggregate of 42 per cent gave 
what we might term 'positive' reasons such as (5) an explicit liking for 
shipbuilding work or (l) they found the money attractive* Second, 15 
per cent gave the 'hopeful* reason (2) that they expected another ship­
building job to,turn up* Finally, excluding the 'other* category, 58 
per cent gave reasons which, in contrast with the 'positive* responses, 
seem to suggest something of an 'inevitable' attachment to the industry.
In other words, most of the allegiance to the industry was largely due to 
the historic prominence of shipbuilding in the local economy and to the 
men's investment of acquired skills and experience* Looking at those who 
would not recommend it to others, an interesting feature is that there
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are few who express a clear dislike for the industry* Almost 80 per 
cent based their advice on a pessimistic view of the industry’s future 
prospects or on the erratic, insecure employment characteristic of 
shipbuilcb'.ngo An additional 5 per cent expressed a more specific 
view on the unfavourable prospects for finishing tradesmen due to the 
switch in emphasis to cargo vessels* The opinions revealed by these 
two questions' suggest that shipbuilding was not seen as an unattractive |
type of work* At the same time, most c£ the men could not recommend the
I
industry to others because of the uncertainty surrounding its future* j
Another reason for avoiding shipbuilding emerged from the '
responses, shown below, to the question,
’On balance, do you think that a worker from the 
shipbuilding industry with your experience has 
any special advantages in looking for new work, 
or would you say he had more disadvantages?'
Table 4*4 Special Advantages or Disadvantages of Shipbuilding 
Workers Like the Respondent in Finding New Work (^o)
Special Advantages Disadvantages 
Unskilled 50 50
Semi-skilled 40 60
Skilled 52 68
Staff 50 50
Total 56 64
Fifty-one of our 528 respondents confessed not 'bo know and, of 
the remaining 277, almost two-thirds (177) felt themselves to suffer 
disadvantages when it came to looking for another job* In the case 
of the staff and unskilled workers, opinions were equally divided but 
a majority of the semi-skilled and, particularly, the skilled workers
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saw themselves to be unfavourably placed* Although the ’finishing* 
skills of the majority of the craftsmen were conventionally the most 
transferable from shipbuilding they themselves attached qualifications 
to this assessment which they amplified in replying to supplementary 
questions*
Table 4o5 Reasons Given by Respondents for Peeling Disadvantaged 
when Looking for Mew Work (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skills Rot 
Transferable
Different 
Pace of 
Work
Other Employers 
Don’t Like Ship­
building Workers Other
Eos*
EoKo Number:
Unskilled 75 9 18 1 12
Semi-skilled 75 4 13 8 — 24
Skilled 55 6 25 13 1- 134
Staff 43 w - 57 — 7
Total 58 5 22 14 1 177
It is not very surprising that the less skilled men felt some doubt 
about the marketability of their shipbuilding experience* It is, however, 
interesting that a majority of the tradesmen attribute their job seach 
disadvantages to non-transferability of skill, and so lending more weight 
to the suggestions of inertia in Tables 4*2* and 4*3* Por example, an. 
electrician voiced the opinion,
’Employers don’t appreciate the type of work in 
shipyards as it is too different from their oim. 
electrical work’*
And a painter explained,
’There is no decorating experience in shipbuilding, 
just straightforward painting work* The variety 
of work a painter gets in housebuilding is much 
greater than on ships’*
Such views were typical of those finishing tradesmen who felt their skills
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were less transferable than 311 outsider might think them to be*
In addition to this and related to it was the view expressed 
by around one-quarter of the sample, craftsmen in the main, that
employers outside the industry had an aversion to employing ship­
building workers* A joiner put it this way*
’You’ve got to hide the fact if you are going in 
for building trade work* There seems to be a
prejudice against shipyard men'* |
This slightly perplexed opinion seems to attach an element of |
irrationality to the prejudice with which outside employers viewed |
shipbuilding workers* One electrician, however, linked the prejudice ’
of employers to the less adaptable skills of the finishing tradesmen
and to the pace of work they were supposed to be used to*
’I think it's held against you, because contractors 
seem to thJ.nk shipyard workers don’t work so hard*
It's a different type of work altogether* In ship­
yards you don’t need to be so skilled although they 
only take on skilled men'*
Clearly, a considerable number of the redundant craftsmen were under
no illusions about how well received they were going to be outside of
shipbuilding, apart from the state of demand in the local labour
market* The reality of this discrimination against former shipyard
workers was also noted by Macliay et al in their engineering based labour
market study, ',**«engineering establishments in Glasgow tended to
discriminate against employees from shipyards* This hiring standard
was by no means absolute but it was nevertheless real. Discrimination
arose because individuals were considered to be less skilled than their
equivalents in engineering.o***«They were also regarded as particularly
militant ’trouble makers * and persons who generally sought out temporary
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employment outside their industry only when'it was going tlirough a
period of lower activity* It was held that such employees could not
(•5)
he relied upon to stay with the p l a n t ! '
As a final observation on the men’s perception of shipbuilding 
as a possible source of new employment, we might consider their 
expectations of returning to employment in the consortium after having 
been made redundant from it* Although redundancy normally means a more 
or less permanent loss of jobs, the cyclical pattern of hiring and 
firing which shipbuilding workers had come to expect of their industry, 
provided good reason for at least some of them to expect past history 
to repeat itself* Even if they were not re-hired by the same unit of 
UoC.So which declared them redundant, there existed some possibility 
that opportunities might open up elsewhere in TI.GoS* even if only as a 
result of natural wastage* Such expectations may have had some 
influence on their job seeking behaviour after redundancy* Overall 
there were no great expectations of this; 40 workers, 13 per cent of 
the 500 workers who were asked this question, expected they would and 
an additional 18 (6 per cent) thought m a y b e * T h e  expectation was 
highest among the less skilled workers, 29 per cent of the unskilled 
and 26 per cent of the semi-skilled* It was lower in the case of the 
staff workers (14 per cent) and lowest of all among the craftsmen.
Only 9 per cent of them expressed such an expectation reflecting their 
skill mix and the contraction in opportunities for finishing tradesmen 
on the Upper Clyde* Among those expecting or hoping to return, the most 
quoted reason (44 per cent) was simply that they expected to be asked
(5) MacKay, D*I*; Boddy, ])*; Brack, J*; Biack, J*A* and Jones, E*;
’Labour Markets Under Different Employment Conditions’, Allen and 
Unwin, 197lT~PP 3^ 1^ 3“^ .
Twenty-eight of our 528 respondents became sick or retired after 
redundancy and were not required to answer most of the questionnaire,
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back while 26 per cent said they thought they would get another job 
elsewhere in the group*
(iii) Personal Characteristics and Job Expectations
In addition to probing the men’s views and opinions on ship­
building and UoCeSo, we also asked a more general question,
’Before you left U oCpSo? did you expect that it would
be easy to find a new job?' ,
On this point, opinion was evenly divided; 160 respondents (49 per cent)
felt that it would be easy and 155 (47 per cent) felt the opposite while
15 men weren’t sure one way or another* The most optimistic were the
i
staff workers 60 per cent of whom expected it to be easy, followed by the 
unskilled (52 per cent) and skilled workers (5I per cent)* In contrast, 
only just over ore-third (55 per cent) of the semi-skilled anticipated 
that it would be easy to get back into work* As well as having the least 
confidence about the transferability of their skills, they also happened 
to be the oldest of the four skill groups* There were more than twice 
as many of them (46^) aged 50 or over as in the rest of the sample (2^ 0) 
and they were very aware of the disadvantage this vas likely to prove.
Of the workers who didn’t expect to find another job easily, 56 per cent 
attributed their pessimism to the generally bad job situation and another 
25 per cent mentioned their age. In the case of the semi-skilled, however, 
no less than half cited age as their main problem compared with only 18 per 
cent of the remainder who anticipated difficulties*
Talcing the opinions of the I60 optimistic workers into account,
50 per cent thought there were jobs to be had, 53 per cent felt their 
skill and experience would stand them in good stead, 5 por cent considered 
their age favourable, another 5 per cent were prepared to take anything
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and finally 50 per cent gave ’other* reasons* Most of the latter,
in fact, gave reasons viiich, without being wholly confident were still
based on the expectation that things would improve or jobs would show
up through the informal network,
’I thought work would pick up after the holidays 
as usual *,
or
’It goes through the grapevine who wants fitters’*
This last observation raises the question of occupational
allegiance which was also likely to influence patterns, of job search.
We pursued this by asking,
’When you left U.C.S., were you looking for the same 
type of trade or occupation as you had there?’
Table 4*7 shows the pattern of response*
Table 4»7 Was the Respondent Looking for the Same Trade or 
OcGunation at the Time of Leaving U.C.8. {%)
Yes No Nos.DoKe Numbers
Unskilled 46 54 24
Semi-skilled 43 57 42
Skilled 88 12 4 220
Staff' 79 21 14
Total 77 25 4 500
As expected those with least investment in acquired skills 
were less intent on seeking out a similar job than those who had most 
to lose from abandoning their usual occupations* The most frequently 
quoted reason by all the skill groups for wishing to stay in the same 
line was their training or experience in the job. This was, predictably,
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highest in the case of the tradesmen (77%) and lowest for the unskilled 
workers (36%) with the semi-skilled (56%) and the staff workers (46%) 
coming in between* Financial reasons like ’good wages* did not figure 
prominently in the responses of any of the occupational groups*
This brief review of the redundant workers* own assessment of 
their situation suggests tha,t they were more attached to their usual 
jobs than they were to the shipbuilding industry* At the same time, 
they were clearly aware that craft skills suitable for shipbuilding 
were less acceptable elsewhere* As a result, shipbuilding continued 
to hold some attraction for a considerable nunber of them* For example, 
almost half of the tradesmen intended to find their next jobs in the 
industry but, at the same time, would not advise young workers to put 
themselves in a similar situation of dependence on shipbuilding*
5o Job Search Motivation
Having reviewed some of the factors which may have had some 
influence on the men's behaviour after redundancy, we now consider 
some aspects of that behaviour* In a redundancy situation some workers, 
for example single men, will have a less urgent need to get back into 
work than others, like married men with young families* One would 
expect such differences to influence each respondent's ov/n assessment 
of his situation and to be reflected, for example, in the time it took 
him to find another job* Other factors besides family responsibilities, 
would be likely to enter into each individual’s assessment of his 
situation* An older worker, for example, might deem it very important 
to get back into work quickly on the grounds that the longer he was out 
of a job, the less likely the chances of him finding one* Or, conversely, 
if he were near retirement age he might consider it unimportant since he
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would be quitting the active labour force soon anyway* To shed some 
light on the men’s motivation we now look at (i) the importance they 
attached to finding other jobs quickly, (ii) the numbers of employers 
they contacted and (iii) their preparedness to leave home for a new 
job*
(i) Importance of Finding a New Job
In trying to evaluate what attitude of mind the men brought to 
looking for now work, we asked
’At the time you left UcC.S*, how important was it 
for you to get back into work quickly - very important, 
quite important, not important?'
Almost 70 per cent (206) of our $00 active job seekers considered it
very important, another quarter (69) felt it was quite important and
25 individuals (8 per cent) thought it not important* So, despite the
unpromising employment situation in Glasgow, around one-third of the job
seekers considered finding a new job quickly was of less than the utmost
importance* hooking at some of the factors likely to be associated with
this attitude of mind, the clearest dichotomy emerged in the case of
marital status* Only 42 per cent of the 56 single men considered it
very important to find a job quickly as against 75 per cent of the 242
married men. Moreover, the more dependents a man had the more likely
he was to express a sense of urgency* For example, only 6l per cent
of men with no dependents felt it very important* This rose slightly
to 68 per cent for men with one or two dependents* It rose more
dramatically to 89 per cent for men with three dependents and to 88 per
cent for men with five* Men with four dependents, however, were an
exception* Only 6 of the 10 men in this category thought it very
important o
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An interesting and generally corresponding pattern emerged 
when we took age into account* For example, 78 per cent of men 
in their 50’s answered ’very important’ to our question compared 
with 67 per cent of men under 5O0 Since a man's family responsibilities
( 5)are usually at a peak in his 50's this result was not unexpected*^ ‘
Men in their 40’s were also concerned about finding work quickly but
somewhat less so (7I per cent) than the 50-59 age group*
Why did the men evaluate the situation as they did? The reasons
given by those expressing greatest urgency were, by and large, self-
evident* For example, 80 per cent of the 206 men who replied 'very
important’ merely said they 'needed the money’ or 'had the family to
support’* Another 15 per cent said they 'didn't like being idle'*
Of those who attached less importance to finding another job, about half
gave reasons which suggested they looked upon their redundancy as an
opportunity to take a conscious, if temporary, respite from the working
routine* For example, 26 of them (28 per cent) said it gave an opportunity
to 'take a break', I7 (I8 per cent) felt that their severance pay allowed
them to afford some time off* Twenty-two respondents (25 per cent) who
did not feel it was very important to get back into work, nonetheless
considered it quite important either because they needed the money or
they didn't like being idle* As one respondent put it,
'It's not just financial - it's the feeling of being ' 
rejected, not wanted. It's a psychological thing'*
The remaining quarter found themselves in circumstances which had a lot
to do with their lower motivation* For example, 8 per cent said they were
either 'near retirai' or 'getting on in years' and I4 per cent either said
(5) ^  ^82 per cent of the active job seekers aged 50-59 had two or more 
dependents compared with 53 por cent of those under 50 and 54 per 
cent of the other age groups taken together*
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they themselves were not keeping well or that illness in the family 
was a handicap ai; the time. Only two worl<ers said it was not important 
to get back into work quickly because the money being offered by any 
jobs going didn't make it worthwhile*
Another possible indication of motivation is the point in time 
when they achially embarked on the job hunt. Ijgss than one quarter (69) 
of the 500 active participants in the labour market claimed, to have 
started looking before they actually left U.C.S. Of those who looked 
before, 4 pez" cent started less than a week before leaving, 51 per cent 
1 to 2 weeks before and another 25 per cent 5 to 4 weeks before. The 
remaining 22 per cent claimed to have started looking over 5 weeks before 
they actually left U.C.S, In the case of the 250 men who started looking 
after leaving, 96 (42 per cent) did so within a week, 69 (50 per cent)
1 to 2 weeks after and another 29 (15 per cent) 5 to 4 weeks after.
Altogether, 79 per cent of the job seekers set about looking for a new 
job either before or within 2 weeks of leaving U.C.S. which does not 
suggest undue complacency on their part.
This is illustrated by the reasons given for waiting until after 
which fell into four main categories* First, 60 workers (26 per cent) 
felt they got too short notice. This is at first glance surprising since 
only twenty five men left U.C.S. with under a week's notice or within a 
week of volunteering. However, it is important to recognise that although 
men may have volunteered for redundancy some time before they actually 
left U.C.8. the notice given them of their actual date of release could 
still be and often was considerably s h o r t e r . I n  addition, a man’s 
assessment of adequate notice would also depend on how he actually looked 
for a job and the time he spent in so doing. Belying on the ' informal net-work*
(6) This was something which we shall later see complicated things for 
the Department of Employment.
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would, for example, involve little time or effort whereas actually 
going round prospective firms would involve some cost, particularly 
if undertaken in normal working hours* If a worker was unprepared to 
accept such job seeking costs and used only his spare time to sound the 
market out it becomes more understandable that one or two weeks' notice 
is considered inadequate. In fact, the second major reason, given by 
42 workers (18 per cent), for waiting till after was that they didn't 
want to lose any wages through taking time off* From this emerges the 
reasonable hypothesis tiiat when job availability is (believed to be) 
low, the rational economic decision is to maximise earnings up to 
redundancy and the less inclined will workers be to take time off on 
'wild goose chases'* This helps to underline a major deficiency in 
the redundancy scheme from the workers' stand-point, namely the failure 
to allow paid time off for job search.
Another 20 per cent took a holiday between leaving U.C.8. and
starting to look for another job. This is hardly surprising, however,
since 65 per cent of the workers were made redundant in the summer months
of June, July and August and would have been entitled to a summer holiday
( 1)even if they had made no formal arrangements for one.'  ^ The last major 
group (19 per cent) of responses was the catch-all 'other' category. On 
closer examination we found that, rather than choosing to bide their time, 
the men were often constrained by particular circumstances. For example, 
17 per cent of the 42 'other' responses were due to the men being ill at 
the time of redundancy. Another 51 per cent were either on shift work 
or felt that the conditions attached to the voluntary redundancy scheme 
didn't make it worth their while to look before. As one man put it,
(7)Of the 46 workers who said they waited until after leaving U.C.8* 
before looking for work because they first had a holiday, 54; or 
almost three quarters, were made redundant in June, July or August.
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’If I’d had a job I wouldn't have got the redundancy 
payment'.
The reservations which we have already expressed about the benefits of 
the UoGoS. voluntary run-down were also echoed by a worker who 
explained,
'UoCoS* were undecided when we were actually leaving*
I thought there was no point in looking until I was 
free to accept'*
These last two coiranents expose the difficulties of reconciling the
company's objectives, achieving control over the run-down, a balanced
labour force and minimising the costs of 'the exercise, with the objective
of redeploying the redundant workers to their best advanta.ge. It was
also clear from several responses that at least some of those who received
money in lieu of notice were confused about the implications of this*
One respondent, for example, explained
•I wasn't allowed to take a job as I had been paid 
for four weeks'*
Another interpreted it less drastically,
'We had a week's pay for notice so there was no 
point in going to the employment exchange'*
Clearly, in some cases at least, the role of the emplojnnent service as
a job finding agency was being confused or equated with its other
function, the payment of unemployment benefit,
(ii) Numbers of Employers Contacted
The number of employers contacted, by itself, cannot be taken
as a reliable indicator of motivation since it will be affected by a
man's 'employability' and his time out of work as well as the intensity
of his job search. Such considerations are later taken into account
using regression analysis but, for the moment, we compare the number of
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employers contacted by the U.C.So workers with the experience of a 
national sample interviewed by S.R« Parker et al in 1969e
Table 4q8 Number of Employers Contacted To Find Another Job, UoC.S* 
Workers and a National Sample of Redundant Workers (%)
)loyers Contacted U.CoSo
Employers
Contacted#
National
Samplefb"!# j & m ..m. ,1 i, mi . #
None 5 One 57
One ■ 50 Two 8
2 - 5 28 5 - 5 15
6 - 1 0 17 6 - 9 9
11 - 20 15 10 - 21 6
21 - 50 7 22 or more 5
Over 50 1
Don't Know 2 2
Numbers 500 1775
* Notes For the sake of comparison, Parker's class
intervals have been increased by one because 
he asked for employers unsuccessfully contacted 
before finding a job while the U.C.8* survey 
included the successful contact as well as the 
unsuccessful ones*
Sources Parker et al, op. cit., p*92
The U'.CoSo Survey asked,
'After you began looking for new work, how many different 
employers did you contact or approach before you got a 
new job (or to present date if continuously unemployed)?'
Despite slightly different class intervals, the data can still be usefully
(@)Parker, S.R*, Thomas, O.G*, Ellis, N.D., and McCarthy, W.E*J*, 
'Effects of the Redundancy Payments Act', H.M.S.O*, 1971
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comparedo In the case of the UoC.S. workers, 5 per cent found
their first job not by contacting an employer but through an
employer or an employer's representative contacting them. Another
30 per cent were successful on their first contact* In other words,
only 33 per cent of the U.C.S. workers managed to find another job
in one transaction compared with 57 per cent of the national sample*
At the other end of the distribution, only 3 per cent of the national
sample had contacted 22 or more employers in the course of their job
search against around 8 per cent of the Clydesiders* Without taking
time into account, we cannot at this stage make any judgment on the
relative intensities of the respective workers' job search but the
U.C.So workers were clearly obliged to undertake greater activity than
the national sample. The average number of employers contacted by the
300 U.C.S. workers was 7®7 compared with 3 for the national sample*
There was some variation by both skill and age group*
Table 4.9 Average Number of Employers Contacted by Age and 
Skill Category______________ ____
Unskilled
Semi-skilled
Skilled
Staff
All
Av. No. Employers 
Contacted
10*6
l o i
7 .5
6*2
l oi
Under 30
30 - 39
40 ”> 49
50 and over 
All
Av* No. Employers 
Contacted
l oi
9.5
9.1
4.5
l oi
The unskilled workers came into contact with more employers than 
the overall average and the staff workers with slightly less* When we 
look at age, the workers between 30 and 50 tended to contact more 
employers than those under 30® This may have reflected greater urgency
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or alternatively it may have been due to the greater attractiveness
of the younger workers to employers* Men over 50 contacted the
fewest employers of all* Clearly, in their case, it was not due to
their appeal to other employers* On the contrary, this appears to
signify a 'discouraged worker effect' a conclusion which is reinforced
(9)by the evidence of the following chapter* ' ^
(iii) Preparedness to Leave Home for a New Job
In introducing the idea of mobility, we first established
whether a respondent had changed address since leaving U.C.S. and why*
Of our 500 active job seekers, 70 had moved house and 52 of them said
they had done so for work reasons* The 250 non-movers were then asked,
'When you left U.C.S* did you ever think seriously of 
leaving your home town to look for work elsewhere?'
To tills question, 92 men replied that they had, 50 per cent either
having actually moved away (and back again) or investigated the possibility
while 44 per cent said they only thought about it* Six gave some 'other'
response* Most of the non-movers, 158, said that they hadn't given it any
serious consideration, the most common reason (42 per cent) simply being
that the men wanted to stay in their home environment* This was followed
by 'age' (20 per cent) and 15 per cent also said that they had got a job
and didn't have to think of moving*
Prom this brief review, we can see that while substantial
numbers had thought of moving many were not prepared to sacrifice their
social and family relationships to take up a job elsewhere* We must
recognise, however, that the men had no firm prospects of work away from
home* Consequently, one must strongly qualify the idea of equating their
( 9) 'Discouraged'workers are those unemployed workers who, in recession, 
give up the apparently hopeless search and withdraw from the labour 
market* Por a discussion of this see Mincer, J*, 'Labour Force 
Participation and Unemployments A Review of Recent Evidence* in 
'Readings in Labour Market Analysis', ed by Burton, J.P., et al,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971*
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attitude towards mobility with their work motivation. Clearly, a 
decision to negotiate an unfavourable employment situation within one's 
home area rather than take a chance in an unfamiliar environment with 
uncertain prospects was not an unreasonable one*
In any case, the men's preparedness to move was high compared 
with tliat of other redundant manual workers previously studied* Por 
example, altogether 124 (41%) of the U.C.S* job seekers had either moved 
away or had considered moving away to take another job* Wedderburn's 
study of redundant railwayman reported 'the strength of their ties to 
their stable close knit communities w^ as clearly seen . o.oOnly a quarter 
had considered moving house in order to get a job' * And Kahn,*s
survey of redundant car workers revealed that 29 per cent had considered 
moving* Even if we apply a stricter definition than Kalon and
Wedderburn and exclude all those who only thought about moving and did 
nothing about it, we are left with 78 men (26%) who moved or investigated 
the possibility olosely* This still compares well with previous similar 
situations and indicates that many of the U*C.S« workers considered this 
option seriously*
4o Job Search Methods
Table 4®10 below shows the extent to which various methods of 
job search were used by the 500 job seekers*
Wedderburn, D*, 'Redundancy and the Railwaymen*, Cambridge University 
Press, 1965 p*142
(11) Kalin, H*Ro, 'Repercussions of Redundancy*, Allen & Unwin, I964, p88
0Table 4*10 Methods of Job Search (%)
Used Not Used
lo Friend or Relative 59 61
2o Advertisement 51 49
3® Gate Notice 17 85
4 0 Trade Union 28 72 ■
5® Employment Exchange 73 ■ 27
6* 'Off Chance’ 61 59
l o Private Employment Agency 2 98
Bo Other 5 95
There were only three ways in which a majori'ty claimed to have 
looked for work, first and foremost the employment service, applying 'on 
the off chance' and answering advertisements* These three most important 
methods were followed by 'friends or relatives' and the trade union* The 
prominence of the Employment Service in the redundant workers' pattern of 
job search is worth commenting upon since it is greater than in a number
f 1? ) ‘of previous British studies of redundancy*^ '
Rather than leaving our respondents to mention spontaneously what 
channels of job search they pursued, our question on job search methods 
asked,
*V/hen you began to look for another job after U.C*8* 
did you look for work in any of the following ways?'
Eight ways of looking for another job were then itemised and the respondent's
answer recorded. This method of putting the question is likely to jog the
respondent’s memory but, even so, it will apply to all methods of search
used thereby permitting a more reliable comparison between different methods.
This, in any case, is unlikely to explain the prominence of the Employment
(l 2)' ^ See, for example, Wedderburn, op* cit., p*147 and, by the same author,
'White Collar Redundancy'« Cambridge University Press, I964, p. 24* 
Also, see Reid, G.L*, 'Job Search and The Effectiveness of Job Finding 
Methods', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July I972*
HService in the U.C.S* case especially since it is generally younger,
more skilled workers, like many of those from U.C.S., who tend to
avoid using ito^"-'^ '^ The most obvious explajiation is that the
prevailing employment conditions and the relatively long post-redundancy
unemployment of the workers, discussed in the following chapter, pushed
them into greater contact with the Employment Service»
Besides the variety of job search methods used, the number of
ways different workers used is interesting* Table 4*11 shows the
average number of methods used by skill, ago and time out of work.
Table 4*11 Average Number of Job Search Methods Used by Skill, Age 
and Time out of Work___________ __________________ _
Time out
Ay* ÂBS. Av* of Work Ay*
Unskilled 2*12 Under 29 2*17 Under 1 week 1*84
Semi-skilled 2*17 50 - 59 2*55 1 - 2  weelcs 1,75
Skilled 2*52 40 — 49 2.41 5 - 4  weeks 2*17
Staff 1*50 50 - 59 2*25 5 - 8  weeks 2*27
All Z 25 60+ 1*84 '9 -16 weeks 2*84
All 2.25 17 "26 weeks 
Over 26 weeks
2*65
5,05
All 2,25
Overall, the pattern of job search was not extensive* On average, 
just over two methods of job search were used by the sample as a whole. 
Length of time out of work seemed to have the greatest influence on the 
number of job search methods used* Quite simply, the longer a man was 
out of work the more he was likely to cast his net wide in the hope of 
finding another job. The staff workers tended to use less avenues as 
did ihe over 60’s. In the case of the older workers, this, like their
(13)
(14)
See, for example, 'Manpower Policy in the United Kingdom', O.E.C.B., 
I97O; p . 161 and MacKay, et al, op* cit.* P*554
Chapters 7 and 8 evaluate the image and effectiveness of the 
Emplo^ nnent Service in greater detail.
few contacts with employers, probably indicates resignation to their 
fate in the prevailing circumstances. At the same timoj, as shown in 
the following chapter, the over 60*s were longer out of work than the 
rest* Yet it is clear that those out of work longest used more methods 
of looking for work* The likeliest explanation is that while the over 
60*s were probably discouraged or pessimistic job seekers,their narrow 
range of methods was outweighed by the more extensive search activity of i 
the younger workers with equally long time out of work* ,
A final commentary on the men’s job search experience is provided I
i
by their choosiness in selecting new jobs* In fact, tie question of choice 
hardly arose* We asked,
’After you began looking for work and before you got 
a new job (or up until present date if continuously 
unemployed) did you receive any definite offers of 
jobs which you turned domi?’
Only 44 workers (l5 per cent) acknowledged that they had. Over three-
quarters had either turned down one (19 workers) or two offers (15 workers).
Only ten workers claimed to have turned dovm more than two. Most of them,
58 workers, turned down the offers after they left U.G*S. and, in the main,
soon after leaving UoC.S. Only five workers turned down jobs after they
had been out of U.C.S* for over eight weeks. The most common reasons given
for turning the offers dovm were that the pay was poor (59 per cent) and
that travel was too inconvenient or the job would have involved living avray
from home (52 per cent). Only three workers turned down a job offer because
they had another job to go to an additional reflection on hov; little choice
the majority seemed to have,
5® Conclusions
This chapter vfas concerned with job search and the factors affecting 
it. Although most of the men had volunteered for redundancy which is
believed to offer a running start in the hunt for new emploi^ Tnent, few 
managed to line up jobs in advance. Employment conditions and the terms 
of the redundancy programme help to explain this«
The men's attitude towards shipbuilding was mixed. Although- 
almost half intended finding other jobs in the industry this was because 
most felt their skills put them at a disadvantage outside shipbuilding 
not because they felt any confidence in its future* Less than one-fifth 
harboured any expectations of finding future jobs back in UoC.S.
Attaciiment to occupation was high especially and understandably 
so amongst the craftsmen* Consequently, 77% said they were looking for 
the same occupation as at U.C.So Expectations about employment prospects 
were evenly divided, nearly half thinking it would be easy to find another 
job while 47% expected difficulties* The most pessimistic were the semi­
skilled workers who also happened to be the oldest*
Most of the workers, particularly married men with family responsibilities, 
felt it very important to get back into work quickly because they needed a 
regular income* Even so, under a quarter started the job hunt before 
redundancy* This did not, however, indicate undue complacency* Awkward hours 
of work and the conditions of the redundancy programme, particularly its 
failure to allow paid time off, put difficulties in the way of earlier job 
search*
In comparison with a national sample of redundant workers, the 
Clydesiders had to contact a high number of firms in the course of the job 
hunt reflecting the fewer opportunities open to them* Older men contacted 
fewer employers which can best be explained by discouragement in the job 
search*
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In comparison with previous studies, the general preparedness 
to leave or seriously consider leaving home was high* Even if we 
exclude workers who gave it serious thought but did nothing about it, 
over a quarter of our respondents had moved home for a job or investigated 
the possibility. The most common reason for not thinking about moving was 
simply attachment to the home area, a sentiment by no means peculiar to 
this particular set of redundant workers*
Relatively few avenues of job search were pursued by the U*G*S* 
workers, the most prominent being applying 'on the off clianoe' and the 
employment service which, in comparison with previous studies, was 
particularly heavily used. Given the relative youth and high skill level 
of the sample it is clear that prevailing employment conditions had much 
to do with its prominence* While, on average, the job seekers used just 
over two methods of job search, a more extensive pattern of job search 
was found in the case of those with longer time out of work* Comparing 
the average number of search methods used with the higher average number 
of employers contacted suggests that when workers increased their search 
activity they did it not by extending their range of methods but by 
intensifying their activity along a particular channel* A final comment 
on the position of the U,C*S* workers is the fact that only 15% were given 
the option of exercising any choice and turning down jobs they considered 
unsatisfactory*
Chapter 5
Employment and Unemployment 
_____After Redundancy_____
1. Introduction
A redundancy like that at U.C.8. poses serious questions for the 
workers involved, for the economy and for policy inalcers. For example, 
can the disorientation and unemployment which almost inevitably ensue 
be minimised by policy measures? Can the disemployed workers be directed
I
into jobs and activities which best meet the needs of the economy to the 
advantage of or at least cost to those involved? Such considerations ;
I
can be evaluated in a number of ways. j
Looking at the pattern of mobility which resulted we can, for example, 
identify which industries the workers moved into, whether they maintained 
their earnings, were obliged to abandon their acquired skills and whether 
they had to move away from their home area to find alternative employment. 
These issues ue take'up in the following chapter. Some workers, however, 
did not take up other jobs after redundancy tïïough sickness, retirement 
or because they were unsuccessful in the job hunt. Our survey allowed 
us to identify these groups and also to judge whether withdrawal from 
the labour market was voluntary or not. In any audit of the impact of 
redundancy, the unemployment suffered by the workers must be a major 
element. And any assessment of manpower policy, besides examining the 
placement activity of the employment service, must also investigate the 
effectiveness of the financial support offered by measures like unemploy­
ment benefit and redundancy payments. These are some of the important 
areas which we explore in this and following chapters.
Section 2 initially establishes what the employment status of our 
respondents was in the aftermath of redundancy. Much of our questionnaire 
was not applicable for the continuously unemployed and even less so for
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those who withdrew from active participation in the labour market through 
sickness or retirement. Our discussion of the sick and retired in 
section 2 is consequently brief. Section 3 evaluates the experience of 
the continuously unemployed. In section 4, using regression analysis, 
we consider a number of factors, including unemployment benefit and 
redundancy pay, which might help to explain the variance in the unemploy­
ment suffered immediately after redundancy. Section 5 provides a 
concluding summary,
2, Labour Market Status After Redundancy
After leaving U.C.S., 500 (91%) of our realised sample remained active
in the labour market and 28 (9 per cent) withdrew from it, 12 men because
they were continuously sick and 16 men because theydecided to retire.
Not all of our active participants, however, had managed to find another
job by the time of interview. Of the 5OO active job seekers, 56 (l2 per
cent) had been continuously unemployed which was exceptionally high in
comparison with other recent studies of redundancy in this country and,
at first sight, a forewarning of the wider experience of the rest of the
s a m p l e W e  look, first of all, at those who stayed in the labour market.
(i) The Active Job Seekers
Tables 5*1 nnd $.2 below show the age and skill characteristics of
the 500 active participants, 264 successful and 56 unsuccessful.
Table 5.1 Skill by Employment Experience
of 500 Active Job Seekers. (%)
Had a Continuously
Skill Job Unemployed Numbers
Unskilled 88 12 24
Semi-skilled 72 28 42
Skilled 92 8 220
Staff 86 14 14
264 56 500
1. At interview, 2.9% of the West Midlands engineering workers studied
by MacKay (1972) op. cit. were continuously unemployed, 5% of Wedderburn's 
railwayment (op. cit., p.76) and none of Kahn’s car workers (op. cit., P.I41)
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The semi-skilled workers clearly experienced the greatest difficulty
after redundancy. Over one quarter of them had never been able to find
another job. We saw in the previous chapter that the semi-skilled
workers were very conscious of their dependence on shipbuilding as a
source of employment* Although many tradesmen also had reservations
about the transferability of their skills they, at least, had their
tradesmen’s papers to offer. Table 5*1 also suggests paradoxically
that being unskilled proved less of an impediment to re-employment
than having the more specific, yet unrefined, skills of the various
tradesmen’s 'helpers’. Whatever the plausibility of this explanation,
Table 4.6 also showed that the semi-skilled workers in the total sample
suffered from a greater age disadvantage than the other three groups.
This age disadvantage remains when we consider the active job seekers
separately from those who withdrew from the market. For example, I6
(58 per cent) of the 42 semi-skilled workers who actively searched for a
job after U.C.S* were 50 o r over compared with only 17 per cent of the
active job seekers in the other occupational groups. Table 5*2 shows
the pQst redundancy employment experience of different age groups.
Table 5.2 Employment Experience by Age
of 300 Active Job Seekers (%)
Age
Had a 
Job
Continuously
Unemployed Nos. N.K. Numbers
Under 50 97 5 - 101
50 - 59 94 6 - 71
4.0 - 49 89 11 - 65
50 - 59 72 28 *** 40
60 -f 58 42 — 24
U.K. - - 1 1
Numbers 264 56 1 500
There is a clear and inverse relationship between age and job finding 
success after leaving U.C.S. which becomes much more marked at the apparent
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watershed of 50* Since over twice as many of the semi-skilled workers 
were over 50 any skill disadvantages which they may have suffered from 
were obviously not compensated by their age. Our regressichanalysis 
investigates the relationship of age and skill with unemployment more 
comprehensively,
(ii) The Sick and Retired
Those twenty eight respondents who withdrew from the labour market 
througl'i retirement or ill health were predictably older and also less i
I
skilled than the active job seekers. All but one of the former, and ;
only 21 per cent of the latter, were over 50* Similarly, 12 (43%) of |
!
them were in the lower skilled groups in comparison with 22 per cent of 
those who continued to look for work. While the continuously sick 
workers had little choice about it there was some evidence that not all 
of the l6 workers who retired did so voluntarily. Six of them, for 
example, were under retirement age at the time they were made redundant 
and eight had either looked, or considered looking, for another job since 
leaving U.C.S, Moreover, if given the choice, ten of them would have 
elected to stay at work with U.C.S, rather than retire when they did.
Had the opportunity presented itself a substantial number of the retired 
workers would have chosen to remain active in the labour force.
3* The Continuously Unemployed
The predicament of the continuously unemployed workers provided greater 
cause for concern than that of the retired workers if only because they 
had no option but to stay in the labour force. By the time they were
2
interviewed, however, all of them had been out of work for over 26 weeks.
It was less than surprising to find that the long term unemployed were
2. V/hen interviewed, the continuously unemployed had been out of work, 
on average, for 44 weeks. In comparison the average transitional 
unemployment of the successful job seekers was just under 9 weeks 
while their average total unemployment since leaving U.C.S. was 
15 weeks.
both, older and less skilled than those who had managed to find another job.
Similar proportions of the successful job seekers and the continuously
unemployed were in the unskilled (8fô) and staff (5^ ) categories. But only
5^5 per cent of the continuously unemployed were tradesmen and 53 per cent
were semi-skilled compared with equivalent proportions of 76 per cent and
11 per cent for those v/ho found other work. An age comparison revealed that
only 22 per cent of the continously unemployed were under 40 compared with
62 per cent of the successful job seekers. Conversely, almost 60 per cent
of the former were over 50 in contrast with only I6 per cent of the latter.
Such long term unemployment was bound to be disheartening. The men
could, understandably, have become resigned to the situation or they might
have reacted in a different way such as lowering their job requirements in
the interests of getting back into work in any way possible or embarking
on retraining to make their skills more marketable. To investigate these
possibilities, we first asked a two stage question,
’When you first became unemployed were you looking for:- 
a better job than before; the same kind of job; a different 
kind of job; any job?'
This was then followed by,
’And now you are looking for ,,, etc,?'
The answers to these two questions showed that the men's job requirements
had dropped as a result of their frustrating experience since leaving
U.C.S.
Table 5.3 The Unemployed Workers ’ Job Requirements
(a) At Redundancy (b) At Time of Interview ( ‘fo)
Kind of Job V/anted
A Better Same Kind Different Kind Any
Job of Job of Job Job Nos. N.K. Numbers
At Redundancy 11 49 5 37 f 3^
At Interview 26 5 71 1 3^
When made redundant, about one-third of the unsuccessful job seekers
were prepared to take any job which presented itself. Pour workers (ll
per cent) aspired tov/ards a better job and about half intended to find a
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similar job. As a result of their long unemployment, their ambitions took 
a decided drop. At the time of interview almost three-quarters of them 
were prepared to take anything that was going and no workers hoped to improve 
on their position at U.C.S. Although they had not abandoned the job hunt, 
their demoralising experience had certainly made the continuously unemployed 
'disillusioned’ workers. In view of their age, however, as well as 
immediate prospects it was no surprise to find that retraining was not 
seen as an 'escape hatch'. Only two of them had considered getting a new 
skill or qualification since being made redundant.
Further questioning allowed the continuously unemployed to give their 
own appraisal of the situation. When asked why they thought it was so 
difficult for them to find another job, just over half attributed their 
difficulties to the prevailing employment situation and just under half 
to their age. The latter inevitably were the older men in the group, as 
table 5 .4 shows.
Table 5.4 Why Continuously Unemployed Thought it
Difficult to Find Another Job By Age (%)
The Dad Employment Prospects For Numbers 
Age My Age  Situation 'My Skill'  Not Known Numbers
Under 40 - 100 - 6
40 - 49 17 83 - 1 7
50 - 59 55 36 9 - 11
60 - 64 90 10 - - 10
51 J. JL ^
We followed by asking how they rated their chances of getting a job soon 
and what they thought would improve their chances of getting back into work.
It was surprising, in view of their experience, to find that as many as -3- 
of the continuously unemployed thought their chances of finding work soon 
were either good or very good. Table 5,5 shows the expectations of the 
different age groups.
3. When interviewed, only one man over 60 said he was no longer looking for work,
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Table 3»5 How The Continuously Unemployed Rated
Age Yeiry Good Good Very Poor Hopeless Numbers N.K. Numbers
Under 40 25 25 25 25 8
40 - 49 - 67 33 1 7
50 - 59 9 18 27 46 — 11
6o - 64 10 — 40 50 10
11 23 26 40 1 36
None opted for the middle term 'poor* on the five point scale presented
to them. On balance, those under 50 were fractionally inclined to be
optimistic while those over 50 were markedly pessimistic. On top of the
responses in the previous table, this suggests that the over 50's had
resignedly concluded that their age was a less transitory obstacle to
re-employment than the prevailing employment conditions. Although the
post redundancy experience of those under 50 had not been easy, their
pessimism was not deepened to the same extent by an awareness of an
additional age disadvantage.
To establish how the continuously unemployed felt they might get out
of their predicament we asked,
'What do you think would improve your prospects of getting 
back into work? *
Table 5*6 shows the type of views expressed.
Table 5» 6 Opinions of the Continuously Unemployed On Vihat
Would Improve Their Prospects of Re-Employment (%)
More Work More Orders Change in Improvement Less Discrimination
Coming to In Government In on Grounds of
Scotland Shipbuilding Policy Health  Age_____  Other
æ  12 ^  ^
'Other' covered a diverse range of comments including for example,
'joining the Freemasons or some such organisation - 
can't get a job off your own bat; need some kind of 
influence';
'Ian Stewart could have made Fairfields pay if they had 
left him to get on with the job'.
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While several workers reached the apocalyptic conclusion,
'Another war - it's the only hope at my age'.
After this variety of observations, it was indeed age which was most
frequently quoted as a disabling factor. Many of the workers affected had
become resigned to it, A typical comment was,
'Nothing, when you get to my age and work is scare. I'm
afraid you’ve had it.’
The remaining comments concentrated mainly on the need to increase economic
activity in Scotland or more particularly, to stimulate shipbuilding on the
Clyde. Some of the outfitting tradesmen felt that the type of vessel built
also had to be taken'into account, A 35 year old joiner put it,
'Building some passenger liners. That's the only way it
would improve prospects for me,'
The sense of individual helplessness in the daunting circumstances is aptly
captured by the electrician's helper who suggested,
'A different Government, I think the Tories are not interested 
in Scotland as a place of work. They want to keep it for 
holidays and grouse shooting.’
4 Unemployment After Redundancy
The development of economic policy in this country as in' most others 
has, in the post war period, been based on the general concensus that in™ 
voluntaiy unemployment is both an economic and social evil. It imp op^ g private 
economic costs on the worker through loss of income as well as wider economic 
costs on society through loss of potential output and through the payment of 
unemployment and other social security benefits. In addition, if extensive, it 
can impoge less tangible but no less real psychological costs on the individual 
through an erosion of self-esteem and lead to a disruption in social and family 
cohesiveness through an aliénation of the unemployed from society,It goes
without saying that such im employ ment should be kept to the minimum. ___
3.See, for example, Beveridge, 'Full Ikriployment in a Free Society*, Allen & Unwin, 
second edition, (I960) Po248*
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Some unemployment, however, can be discretionary, for example, if a 
worker takes a 'break' from the work routine or if he is particular about his 
job choice* Moreover, the attainment of 'full' employment can create other 
problems like regional and occupational labour shortages. These have 
contributed to the development of so-called 'active' manpower measures, 
including statutory redundancy payments (1965) and earnings related unemployment 
benefit (I966), in order to increase mobility and flexibility in the national 
labour market. Apart from work 'motivation which might be related to family 
circumstances, and the influence of manpower policies a man's time out of work
I
is also affected by labour market conditions and by his attractiveness to |
j
potential employers. Here, such factors as his experience, age and skill might 
be considered important.
This section, using multiple regression analysis, evaluates the post 
redundancy unemployment experience of our respondents and which among the above 
sets of factors help best to explain differences in it.. Time out of work is 
taken as the period between redundancy and the first new job or, for the 
continuously unemployed, time of interview but excluding any time spent on 
holiday or 'taking a break'. That is, it is the time during which the worker 
was out of a job bi± actively seeking employment. First of all, to put the 
experience of the U.O.S. workers in a wider context, we compare their time out 
of work with that of the national sample interviewed by Parked, et al (op.citp) 
in the early summer of 1969*
Table 5°7 Post Redundancy Unemployment of ÏÏ.C.S. Workers and a 
National Sample of Men Made Redundant in I968. (9^ )
Weeks Unemployed
)r 4 5 to 8 9 to 16 17 to 26 27-52 Over 52 Nos.
15 18 14 10 17 Under 1 $00
13 17 15 21 16 12 6 264
All U.C.S. Job 
Seekers
Successful Ü.C.S, 
Job Seekers
Less than 1 1 or 2
Under Over 2 weeks Over 1 month Over 3 months Over
2 weeks to a month to 3 months to 6 months 6 months
itional Sample 46 I4 21 12 6 1559
Sourceb Parker et al,, op. cit. Table 3*4#
I {
Although Parker et al. use different class intervals it is quite evident 
that the U.C.S. workers took considerably longer to get back into work. This 
conclusion holds even if we exclude the continuously unemployed from the table,
Of the 264 successful job seekers from U.C.S. 45 per cent were in new jobs within 
a month compared with 60 per cent of the national sample. Similar proportions 
(6 per cent), however, took between six months and a year to get back to work. 
Looking at each sample skill for skill, in every case the national sample 
appeared to find it easier to find another job than the U.C.S, workers. This 
suggests that the more severe employment conditions confronting the shipbuilding 
workers over I969-7O caused them greater difficulty in comparison with the 
national sample during I968,
Employment conditions were, of course, one of the variables used in our 
regression analysis which enables us to evaluate at one and the same time, the 
relative importance of different factors correlated with a worker's time out of 
work after redundancy. Other factors which, on a priori grounds and on the 
basis of previous labour market research, one might expect to influence time 
out of work would be the method and ur'geixïyof job search as well as the 
personal characteristics and labour market measures mentioned above.
Combinations of such variables were run in a series of regression
equations. Here, v/e present the most 'economical* equation, that which provides
the highest explained variance with the least independent variables. Before 
discussing the apparent implications of this regression equation, however, we 
must note that the number of respondents included in the analysis is less than 
the sample size for two reasons. First, the exclusion of the sick and retired 
reduced the eligible sample from 528 to 500. Second, respondents with values 
missing on any of the variables used for the regression equation were also 
eliminated. This reduces our regression sample to 259» Table 5*8 gives .a 
pre]iïiinaryindication of the relationship of the independent variable with the main
explanatory variables taken individually,
(4) This allows a direct comparison with table 3-48 in Parker et al,, op, cit,, 
which uses only successful job seekers.
Skill
Unskilled
3eini~skilled
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Table 5o8 Average (x) Transitional ïïnemplo.yment (veelcs)
For Different Characteristics of the Negre o si on Sairnl aX-
Number
21
34
Average
Unemployment
19,41
15.44
When looted for V/ork Number 
Before redundancy 66
After redundancy 193
Average
Unerrployment
6ol6
14.48
Shipbuilding
fradesmen
finishing
Tr^ idesmen
'Staff'
tes
Jnder 30
)0 - 39
lie “ 49 
0-59
14
169
21
92
65
55
31
16
17.71
10,45
12.55
8.03
10.30
14.74
19.68
23.28
Job Search Strategy
Voluntary Job/clsngcrs 59
Single job holders
and others■ 200
Marital Status
Single or Widowed/
Divorced 50
Married with no
dependent children 54
Married with 1 or 2 
dependent children 106
Married with 3 or more 
dependent children 49
5.02
14.55
11.75
12.86
12.13
12.95
Note* Average unemployment for all 259 respondents eligible for our regression 
analysis was 12.36 weeks which compares with an average of 12.83 weeks 
for all 300 labour market participants.
The simple relationships shown in Table 5.8 suggest a number of tentative 
conclusions. First, we see that the finishing tradesmen and staff workers, 
although not finding it easy to find jobs quickly, managed to do so faster on 
average than less skilled workers and craftsmen with 'shipbuilding* skills such 
as boilermakers and caulkers. Secondly, the older a worker was, the more difficult 
for him to get back into work and those over 60 experienced tlie greatest difficulty 
of any sub-group of the sample. After some experimentation with various forms of 
marital status as a variable our ultimate regression equation reverted to a 
fairly simple distinction between married men and men who were either single or 
widowed/divorced. For the moment. Table 5.8 would seem to show that, if anything, 
the latter were on average back at work marginally quicker than the former.
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Finally, in addition to attributes over which the men could exercise no 
control when made redundant, we might look at an aspect of their situation which 
they could influence, namely the way in which they set about looking for jobs* 
There are various dimens ions to this including channels of job search, the 
variety of methods used, number of potential employers contacted, etc* 
Combinations of such variables were tried and some rejected either because they 
contributed little to the explained variance, were insignificant or seemed to 
have a spurious relationship with the length of transitional unemployment* For 
example, workers who failed to quote the Employment Service as a job search 
method were back into work much more quickly than those quoted it* This, 
however, did not mean that the Employment Service was a positive handicap to 
those using it, Father, workers not registering with the Employment Service 
had no need to because they found jobs relatively quickly for other reasons.
Through this process of elimination, we were left with the two job search 
variables shown in table 5*8CijThose workers who set about looking for new jobs 
before redundancy were back into work much more quickly than those v/ho commenced 
the job search after leaving UCS(id)The 'job search strategy* variable identifies 
two sets of workers, *Voluntary job changers* are those v/ho left their first 
job after UC3, voluntarily. 'Single job holders and others* include those who 
were interviewed while still in their first job after UCS, those v/ho left that 
job involuntarily and the unsuccessful job seekers. The distinction is made on 
the hypothesis that voluntary job changers will try to find other, perhaps 
'inferior', jobs quickly to use as a base for further search and this will be 
reflected in their post-redundancy unemployment. Table 5*8 would seem to support 
such an hypothesis which we discuss in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Meantime, Table 5*9 shows the results from our final regression equation.
Table 5o9 Regression Resul-ta for Post-Redundaiioy Unemployment
(Sample Size ~ 259)
(1)
Variable
Age dunimyî 
* 44 or less -l
(2)
Regression
Coefficient
'9.02
Xg Search, s'bi’abegy s “6018 
voluntary job
ci anger;;
“60 69
-0,44
Xy When looked 
for work 
dummy;
before redun­
dancy - 1
X, Job search 
Intensity; 
Employers 
contacted/ 
weeks of 
search
Xp Male unemploy- 5.19 
^ ment rate at 
time of 
redundancy;
Xg Skill dumm^ î-; 5.72 
imsJiilled or 
semi-skilled
r“ 1
X„ Skill dummy ;
'shipbuilding 
trades - 1
X Weekly 8 unemployment 
benefit (£s)
60O4
Go 48
(?)
Standard
Error
1,91
1,96
1,84
0,18
1.42
1.97
0 0 24
(4)
F
Value
22,25
9.95
15.15
5.87
5.04
8,41
2.88
5.94
(5)
Level of 
Significance
0,01 
0,01
0,01
0,05
0,05
0,01
0,05
2R Withou' 
Variable
0,158
0,258
0,249
0 ,266
0,266
0,265
0,276
0,279
Xq Marital status 4*98 
dummy; 
single or 
widowed/ 
divorced = 1
XlORedundancy 
Pay (£s)
2 ,42
0 ,005 0,006
4.24
0.75
0 .05 0,271
0,281
R 0,283
Standard Error of Estimate 12,52 
Constant term -8,95
Table 5.9 summarises the relationship between our dependent variable, 
post-redundancy unemployment, and the 10 independent or expJpnatory variables 
left in the regression equation after experimentation* Our explanatory 
variables as defined were arrived at through judgement and/or because of 
the results emerging in the course of our experimentation. For example, 
previous forms of our regression equation revealed that workers in 10 year age 
bands over the age of 40 experienced longer post redundancy unemployment 
than those luider 30 but workers in their thirties did not. Further analysis 
dividing workers in their 40's into those under and over 45 improved, our 
explanation by showing that workers under 45 were more akin to those younger 
than them and vice-versa for those over 45. That is, 45 seemed to be the key 
point at which age began to affect seriously the length of time out of work 
after redundancy. Consequently, we finished up with a simple dichotomy 
between workers under 45 and 45 or over. This, of course, also served to 
reduce our number of explanatory variables without losing much additional 
explanatory power which was another consideration*
To gain as much 'sensitivity* as possible our experimentation with 
skill variables was based on our respondents’ occupational descriptions 
rather than their place in the conventional skill hierarchy. Preceding 
regression ’runs’ indicated there was no statistically significant difference 
between the experience of finishing tradesmen and staff workers and 
consequently we decided to use both together as the skill reference group*
We remarked in chapter 5 that U.CoS, had reservations about dividing their 
less skilled workers into definitively unslcLlled and semi-skilled groups.
This uncertainty is, of course, by no means peculiar to shipbuilding.
While such a division nevertheless does usually facilitate analysis and 
presentation, our earlier regression results suggested we should group them 
together for this piece of analysis, ■ '
Finally and before discussing our ultimate regression results, some 
brief words on ‘redundancy pay’ and Xg ’unemployment benefit’. The
U.C,S, redundancy programme involved both statutory and non--statutory elements.
To avoid confusion we did not ask for redundancy pay as such hut the total 
lump sum our répondents received on leaving. So, for some men, what we have 
termed 'redundancy pay' in table 5.9 might also include things like money 
in liou of notice* i/hile tMs definition of redundancy pay is consequently 
a liberal one we tîiink it a fair assumption that few of our respondents 
would have distinguished 'redundancy pay' proper from total cash in hand in 
any meaningful way*
Our measure of weekly unemployment benefit was the maximum our respondents 
reported receiving in any one week after leaving UlCJS. Workers with post 
redundancy unemployment of less than a week were not asked this question since 
they would certainly have been ineligible for benefit. If a zero value for 
unemployment benefit had been 'plugged in' to the regression equation for 
these workers, this would have given a misleading indication of the impact 
of unemplo;yviient benefit for the eligible sample as a whole. So an estimated 
maximum un.emplo;^ Tnent benefit based on wage at UoG.S*, marital status and 
number of dependents was assigned to them. We might note here that workers 
in receipt of money in lieu of notice would also not ha.ve been entitled to 
unemplojpierit benefit for a given period and this is sonnthing we return to 
when discussing our regression results.
Our substantive results identify age, skill and job search behaviour 
as being the strongest factors explaining variation in post-redundancy 
unemployment with age being the single most potent variable. For example, 
column (6) showing the explained variance when each variable is deleted in 
turn indicates thqt removal of our age dummy causes the largest reduction 
in the explained variance. Deletion of any of the other regression variables 
has, by comparison, a relatively small effect on the aggregate explained 
variance. The sign and magnitude of tiie regression coefficient for shows 
that men under 45 experienced 9 weeks less unemplo^ 'ment tlian men over 45 and 
column (5) indicates that this difference was significant at the 1^ level.
Taking skill into account, our first skill duim%q indicates that
unskilled and semi-skilled workers suffea?ed on average about 6 weeks more
unemployment than the skill reference group, staff workers and finishing
tradesmen taken together, and iiiis was also significant at the l/’ level*
The other skill dummy, Xy, was left in to ascertain whether workers with
more specific shipbuilding skills seemed more handicapped than men with more
transferable skills. Although the regression coefficient suggeebs that they
also were longer out of work the difference between their experience and that
of the reference group could not be considered statistically significant.
Some intriguing results emerged in the case of those variables,
and X^ , which are basically about job search behaviour. A particularly
interesting comparison can be made between and X.. Although, in the case
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of column (5) indicates there was a significant difference (0*05) between 
the transitional uneraplcjTiient experienced by assiduous job seekers and those 
who contacted fewer potential employers over the search period, the magnitude 
of the regression coefficient is small* This would suggest that the energy 
expended by the intensive job seekers had little substantive impact on their 
time out cf work* Or, conversely, those who were less energetic in the active 
job search did not suffer very much more than those wlio were more energetic*
This does not, of course, mean that those with low search 'intensity' as 
defined were not interested in finding' a job. They could have been receiving 
job information informally via word of mouth, etc. But X^ does suggest that, 
in a situation of high unemployment and few vacancies, actively contacting 
employers is unlikely to be a very productive exercise. In contrast, 
indicates that those who 'jumped the gun' in the job search suffered significantly 
less unemployment than those who 'bided their time' and the size of the difference 
certainly seemed to justify the exercise. Workers who set about looking for 
other jobs before quitting UGS were likely to have impressed potential employers 
with their initiative and would not have encountered, to the same extent, the 
problems of competing for relatively few jobs with their fellow workers coming 
into an already bad labour market.
Our other market behoviour variable, as already suggested, is 
based on the premise that tliose workers who decide to fluid any job quickly 
to use as a safe 'base* will probably be unemployed for a shorter period of 
time than moi’e selective job seekers* Our dummy was set up to include only 
those workers who left their first job after UGS voluntarily and subsequently 
foimd other work. The reference group comprised all of the remaining' workers* 
Tlie magnitude and sign of the regression coefficient for this variable indicate 
that voluntary quitters did, indeed, experience less transitional unemployment 
than the other workers and this difference was significant ai; the b/ level*
In the following chapter we pursue more coriprehenaively the differences in
the post redundancy experience of voluntary job changers and others» j
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Of our remaining explanatory variables, provides a measux’e of the
prevailing labour market conditions, X^  might be considered as another
personal attribute with, ho we've r, behavioural implications, and our last two
Xg and X^Q as 'policy variables', booking' first of all at X^.,. this is the
male unemployment rate (excluding the tezmporarily stopped) in Glasgow for
the quarter in which each respondent was made red'uu.idant* We did consider
taking vacancies into accoimt as well as using some variation of V-U (i*e*
U
number of reported male vacancies numbers of wholly unemployed males ) 
numbers of wholly unemployed males.
Since, however, the level of (and variation in) vacancies over this period
( 5)
was swamped by the unemployirent figures^ we decided after experimentation 
to use hie simple male 'uneiiployment rate on its omi* It is worth noting in 
passing that a similar regression analysis reported by Mac Kay and Reid ( op* cit») 
found a vacancy variable had more explanatory potential than unemployment *
The relationship between vacancies and unenployment, however, in their 
research situation, the West Midlands over 1966-68, was quite different from 
that reported here for Clydeside* Our own results suggested that the worsening 
employment conditions over the research period did in fact have a detrimental 
effect on those who left later in the run down and 'this was significant at the
5« See section 5» cliapter 2,
5^ 0 level. %ie size of -the correlation coefficient suggests tliat a rise of 
1^ in the male unemplojcueiit rate ©n average would increase time out of work 
by 5 weeks or so*
As we indicated previously, our regression analysis experimented with 
several variations of a 'mairital status' dummy* One of several possible 
hypotheses might be, for example, that the lower levels of unemployment benefit 
available to single non and married men with no dependents would have heightened 
their urgency in finding other work by comparison with family men. Of course 
an alternative hypothesis that we have already considered previously is that 
because of their fewer commitments single men and childless married men would 
be under less pressure to get back into work quickly* Hie averages in table 3.8 
presented only rough, and mixed, evidence on such hypotheses. ;Cn fact, the 
only significant difference (0*05) emerged when we turned to the simple 
distinction between married men and men who were single or widowed/divorced*^
The correlation coefficient for suggests that it was men with little- 
or no faudly responsibilities who tended to be out of work longer. The apparent 
conflict be'bween this finding and the averages shown in table 5«8 is, of course, 
explained by the fact that measures of central tendency can be misleading when 
dispersion is not taken into account as well* V/hen we do so in table 5»9 we 
find that the difference between single men and family men was significant 
at the 5^ level*
Turning finally to our two 'policy -variables' it is clear first of all 
that redundancy pay had virtually no effect on time out of work* There is a 
scliool of thought which contends that such financial protection can be 
responsible for an extension of voluntary unemployment* While Clydeside over 
1969-1971 hardly provided a satisfactory environment to test such a hypothesis, 
MacKay and Reid (op*cit) also established a similar relationship between 
redundancy pay and unemployment in the West Mj-dlands* Another point at issue
6. ’Only one-of this group was -widowed/divorced', the rest being bachelors.
concerning redundancy ptziy is whether or not it provides adequate compensation
to those losing jobs. This is something we return to in chapter 10 after we
have eX0jnin.ed post-redundancy experience in greater detail. For the moment,
we might merely note that the size of the correlation coefficient of suggests
that mi increase of redundancy pay of £100 would tend to increase post-redundancy
unemployment by half a week but this could not be considered significant*
Taken in conjunction with the employment conditions facing the redundant wnrkers
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and with the generally modest severance payments received, we much inevitably 
conclude that financial compensation had little to do with the length of 
unemployment following redundancy*
The correlation coefficient of Xg, weekly unemployment benefit, with 
post redundancy unemployment is, however, sigm.ficant at the y^fo level thou^ 
not large. Again, the size of the relation is almost identical with that 
reported by I/EacKay and Reid* They concluded on their evidence, very similar 
to ours, tliat uneraplo;;^ rment benefit, though not redui'jdancy pay, did possibly 
lead to an element of discretionary unemployment but,
“ the small partial correlation coefficient does not indicate 
that workers were "living off the state" for long periods* - - «
In our view an increase in the period of unemployment of less than 
half a week for each extra pound of unemplojmieiit benefit does not 
seem a high price to pay for a measure which identifies and compensates 
those bearing the burden of labour market adjustment*
Although agreeing with this,, the cijzcumstances of the TJ*C*S* 
redundancies suggest we attach a further qualification to this apparent 
relationship between duration of unemployment and amount of unemployment benefit 
received. ¥e previously observed that we had to mate an estimate of the amount 
of unemployment benefit which men with less than a week's unemployment would 
have received if eligible. Other respondents’ reported maximum unemployment
7* Only 16^ 0 of the 300 active job seekers received severance pay in excess of 
£200 and the overall average was £169*2
8* MacKay, D*I. and Reid, G.L., (opocit.)
benefit was taken at face value* Our survey, however, revealed that a number 
of men had received up to four weeks* money in lieu of notice which would have 
disentitled them from unemployment benefit* Moreover, there is a 12 day waiting 
period before an unemployed man becomes eligible for earnings related supplement* 
Indeed the average unemployment benefit (£7.5) of thosqwith up to fouh weeks* post 
redundancy unemployment in comparison with that of the others (£12.4) suggested the 
former might have been reduced to some extent by institutional or administrative 
factors. Consequently, the apparent significance of the relationship between 
unemployment and the amount of benefit received might have been an artificial 
one* To put this to the test we estimated as before the maximum imemployment 
benefit, including eannings related supplement, which all men with up to four 
weeks* unemployment would have received if eligible* Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the partial correlation coefficient fell as did the significance 
level o Thus some doubt must surround the validity of the relationship 
appa^ rently established here and possibly elsewhere as well*
He]?e we have been concerned with the possible influence of unemployment 
benefit on time out of work. Further interesting questions might be asked 
about how effective it was in cushioning the impact of redundancy. As with 
redundancy pay, we leave a more comprehensive consideration of such issues 
until chapters 9 and 10 following. We might conclude by noting that our 
regression equation succeeds in 'explaining* only around 28fo of the variance 
in unemployment following redundancy. As MacKay and Reid point out, however, 
the world is not in fact populated by exclusively 'economic men* and it would 
be arrogant to assume that the few largely 'economic' variables examined here 
should, on their own, be capable of producing a substantiaT.ly higher explained 
variance. Indeed, the explained variance compares well with that found by 
other cross-sectional studies aud,.in.this context, whst is more interesting 
is the number o_f explanatory variables we found to be significant.
7 o Conclusions
This chapter was concerned with the immediate aftermath of redundancy.
CX'-er of the sample remained active in the labour market while the others 
who dropped out thx'ough sickness 07c retirement were older and less skilled* 
Althougii a majority of those retiring would have preferred to stay on at UCS, 
the prevailing circumstances coupled with their age were unfavourable to their 
continued participation*
Of the 5GC active job seekers most had been in other employment since
up
leaving UGS but a sizeable mjjnority (l2^ ) had been continuousl;^yemployed*
It was older and semi-skilled workers who experienced greatest difficulty, 
the latter also being proportionately older than the other skill groups*
The continuously unemployed could all be considered 'long term* unemployed* 
One understandable result of this was a drop in their job aspirations. At time 
of interview, virtually all of them were prepared to take any job that ws.s 
going although only -J- would have done so when made redundant* They saw their 
age and ‘bhe prevailing employment conditions as the major barriers to getting 
other work, Most of them (§) we:œ pessimistic of finding other jobs soon 
when interviewed. Their views on what would improve their prospects were 
mixed. Less discrimination against older worters in Mving standards figured 
prominently as did a greater stimulation of shipbuilding and the Scottish 
economy generally, Retraining, however, was not seen as a possible escape hatch.
The UGS workers who remained active in the labour market did not find it 
easy to find other work* In comparison with a national sainple of workers 
interviewed in the summer of 1969 they experienced substantially longer 
transitional unemployment which we ■ ■ evaluated using multiple regression 
analysis* 'This suggested that age was the most significant factor ' ' v
influencing the variation in the unemployment experienced by the UGS workers. 
Although it was men over 60 who suffered the longest unemployment after UCS, 
this was not significantly longer than that experienced by other workers 
older than 45« This was the watershed which divided the experience of the 
active sample as a whole.
After age, job search behaviour seemed to have the greatest effect on 
the extent of the unemployment suffered and, here, it was clear that the duration 
of unemployment was more dependent on when the job search started than on the 
numbers of employers contacted during the search. Other behavioural factors 
were significantly related to time out of work. For example, workers: 
voluntarily quitting their first job after UCS experienced briefer transitional 
unemployment than the remainder* This appeared to offer some support to a 
'search strategy* hypothesis holding that some workers would opt for a * stop gap' 
job and shorter frictional unemployment, Tte following chapter pursues this in 
greater detail* Our main conclusion on job search behaviour therefore is that, 
even in a very slack labour market, the course of acbion taken by some workers 
led to significantly less time out of work than others. It is important to 
"recognise, however, that this improvement was relative, occurring on what was 
a high 'plateau' of post redundancy unemployment and, clearly, if all the 
redundant workers had adopted the same strategies the advantages accruing, 
for example, to the 'early starters' would have been blunted.
In terms of personal attributes, less skilled workers and men with 
traditional 'shipbuilding' skills tended to be out of work longer than staff 
workers and 'finishing tradesmen' taken together but the difference for 
'shipbuilding' tradesmen was not significant* Similarly, single men were 
out of work longer than married men and, here, the difference was significant *
The deteriorating employment conditions in which the run down took place 
did seem to have a detrimental effect on prospects of quick re-employment*
In this context it was interesting to find that the amount of redundancy pay 
received had little apparent influence on the variation in unemployment,
V/hile the prevailing conditions would have offered little opportunity to 
workers to prolong their time on the market in a discretionary way by shopping 
around for better jobs, it is interesting to note that this finding was in line 
with the results of similar research undertaken in less severe unemployment 
conditions.
The amount of unemployment benefit received, however, did 
appear to have a significant if small effect on the length of unemployment 
after redundancy* This would not have been at variance with the intenbions 
'of, for example, earnings related supplement* In any case, our research 
suggested that men vàth under 5 weeks of unemployment may have been ineligible 
for earnings related supplement which almost certain!.y would have raised the 
significance of the relationship* When we adjusted for such 'procedural* 
factors the significance in fact fell* Altogether, there was little 
substantial evi.denee that financial labour market measures had any serious 
impact on ‘time out of work*
Chapter 6 
Job Comparisons
lo Introduction
In this chapter we look at the various ways in which redundancy affected mainly
the working lives of the men involved. As we saw in the two preceding chapters,
being made redundant meant different things for different people. For some, it
precipitated retirement from the active labour force while for others, it meant an
extensive spell of continuous unemployment. Most of the workers (264) however, had
at some stage managed to find other jobs and it is their experience we consider here.
The repercussions of redundancy are illustrated by various aspects of the men's
employment experience after leaving U.C.S. Some (123), for example, had held only
one post-redundancy job at the time they were interviewed. Others (141) had held
more than one job,^ The questionnaire asked for information on the first job held
after U.C.S. and also, for those who had more than one job, their present or last
2job at the time of interview. Consequently, we can assess, in two stages, the
nature of the redemployment which took place in the wake of the redundancies. The
first stage clearly involves the initial jobs held by all 264 successful job seekers.
The second and, by time of interview, final stage of redepbyment takes into account
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the later moves made by those who changed jobs* Since we wished to establish’ the 
total results of the dispersion from U.C.S. our analysis of the 'final' situation 
is based upon an amalgamation of the first and only jobs held by the single job
holders with the present or last jobs of the job changers.
1. Of these, 93 had held 2 jobs, 33 had 3 jobs, 8 had 4 jobs and 7 had 5 or more
jobs between leaving U.C.S. and being interviewed,
2. 'Present or Last' because men who had held jobs nevertheless could be and were 
unemployed at time of interview. This point should be kept in mind. Although 
we do not discuss it in this chapter, the deterioration in the employment status 
of the sample over time was an important feature of the redundancies at U.C.S.
3. We can say nothing about the mobility which took place between the first and
present or last job. As we saw above, however, only 48 workers, less than 1/c
of the job finders, had held more than two jobs.
Having distinguished the single job holders from the job changers, we might
also distinguish among the latter according to their reasons for leaving their first
job after redundancy. This allows us to identify those who left voluntarily from
the rest. There are good reasons to suppose that the job search strategies and
the employment experience of voluntary quitters will differ from those of single
job holders and also from those of workers unlucky enough to be made redundant once
more. For example, contrasting the experience of voluntary and involuntary job
changers,Parnes commented,
'The differences in the effects on wages, depending on the j
circumstances in which job changes occur, are perhaps even more |
significant. The most striking of these is the difference 
in wage experience of workers who lose their jobs involuntarily 
and those who voluntarily quit, Every study that has differen­
tiated between those two groups has shown a markedly higher . 
percentage of the latter enjoying an increase in earnings,'
We return to these points of distinction subsequently.
Redeployment, or mobility through the labour market, occurs in different ways,
industrially, geographically, occupationally - these different aspects of mobility
5
more often than not taking place at one and the same time. We take each of them 
up in the following sections. In each section we will be considering what happened 
at the first stage of redeployment and then evaluating to what extent this situation 
was altered by the later movements of the job changers. The following section deals 
with the industrial mobility exhibited by the workers. In section 5 ue go on to
discuss the geographical dispersion which took place. An important result of any
redundancy is the qualitative impact which it makes on the working lives of the 
men involved. Section 4 takes up various aspects of this. We take into account 
some 'objective' indicators such as the changes which took place in normal take-home 
pay and also in the hours worked for that pay. Change in occupational status is 
also evaluated. Objective indicators have their place but they do not present a 
wholly comprehensive picture of the differences between various job 'packages'.
4. Parnes, HS, 'Research on Labor Mobility', Social Science Research Council, New fork;
1954) p.177. Also see MacKay, Df. (l972) op,cit*
5, See Hunter, LG and Reid, GL, 'Urban Worker Mobility', OECD, I968, p,26 and pp,156-9
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17hat, for example, of considerations like 'good work mates', familiarity with the 
job, 'the general atmosphere' , all of which might enter into a worker's assessment 
of the 'net advantages' offered hy different jobs? Some opinion questions allow 
us to explore such subjective areas in the same section. Finally, in section 5? 
we return to those job changers who quit their first job voluntarily. We look at 
their characteristics and their subsequent employment experience in comparison 
with the remaining workers. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2. Industrial Mobility
The Clyde has a long and famous tradition of building ships. Consequently, 
apart from a network of 'service' activities being built up over time,, the sons of 
shipbuilding workers, as chapter 4 suggested, will often be attracted to shipyard 
jobs and trades upon leaving school and this might also have been expected to 
influence the pattern of redeployment following redundancy. Daniel's observation 
is of some relevance here,
'In a homogeneous community   for all but a small minority,
a boy's whole life, at home, at school, in the community will be
preparing him for that industry. It will be taken for granted
by parents, and teachers who will pass it on to the boys. The 
men he admires and the values he embraces v/ill be associated with 
work in that industry. Again the concept of choice becomes meaning­
less for explaining his inevitable entry into that industry.' 6
A local observer, seeing similar influences on Clydeside, expressed it a 
little differently,
'As long as ships have to be built, it's vital to the Clydeside psyche 
that we build them. When they stop shipbuilding here, we will all 
lose something within ourselves - forever.' 7
This might be a somewhat exaggerated and over romanticised view but it does
manage to convey something of the dilemma which the redundant U.C.S, workers found
themselves in. Referring again to chapter 4 we saw that although the workers' 
skills appeared not to be wholly specific to shipbuilding, they nevertheless had 
spent much of their working lives in the industry. Moreover, they were under no 
illusions about the wealth of alternative opportunities open to them. What 
industries, then, did they redeploy to? Table 6,1 shows the industries in which 
the different occupational groups involved in the run-down found their first jobs*
6. See Daniel, VW. 'Strategies for Displaced Employees', PEP Broadsheet No.517, 1970 p]
7. Buchan, A, op.cit. p.147
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Table 6.1
Industry#
Occupation
Ship-
building
Other
Engines
Other Cons t"
L faction Services Numb'
1. Building Trades 
(Plumbers, Painters, 
Joiners & Polishers) 17 10 15 46 11 98
2. Electricians 27 18 1 ■ 32 23 44
3. 'Metal Trades’
(Engineers, fitters, 
sheet metal workers. etc. )21 56 6 4 15 i
j
48
4 . Semi-skilled and 
Indirect Workers 25 22 5 24
i
24 1 53
5. Staff 42 21 5 11 ■ 21 j 19
TOTAL 25 25 8 29 17 2.64
*Note; Shipbuilding and Construction are single Main Order Headings 
while the other industry groups are amalgamated Main Order 
Headings of the I968 Standard Industrial Classification,
In table 6.1 we have further consolidated our occupational categories for convenience
of presentation and also because we found similar patterns of dispersion for similar
occupations. Moreover, since in this instance we are interested in where different
8trades relocated, table 6.1 is based on our respondents' job descriptions. The 
pattern of industrial dispersion was not an unexpected one given the skills of the 
redundant men. It was, for example, the 'bumlding' tradesmen - including the 
electricians who were most likely to move into construction whereas it was the metal 
workers who were likeliest to move into engineering activities other than shipbuilding. 
Looking across the industrial structure, construction was the single biggest host in­
dustry followed by shipbuilding and, providing a similar number of jobs, 'other engin­
eering' which includes metal manufacture, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering 
vehicles and other metal trades. These three industry 'groups' provided f- of the 
jobs found by the redundant, workers at the first stage of redeployment.
8. V/hen coding occupational categories, it is convenient to group such as draughtsmen, 
foremen, etc. under the rubric 'staff. However some such workers would describe 
themselves as 'skilled'. Consequently, the staff category in table 6.1 differs 
slightly from the staff category in a table using the respondents' estimations 
of their skill levels.
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While the cut-back at U.C.S. clearly produced a sizeable exodus from the 
industry, shipbuilding nevertheless still offered employment to almost J of all 
those finding jobs. Although it was not the prime provider of new employment, except 
for those in staff jobs and also for" the semi-skilled/indirect workers, it was the 
next likeliest niche for the redundant men. Of the 60 men who went straight 
back into shipbuilding jobs, 25 or 9*5/* of those finding jobs returned to U.C.S.,
6 of them to the same division from which they were made redundant and 19 to g,' 
different division. The majority of the remainder found new shipbuilding jobs on 
the Clyde, Sixteen of the 35 found work in Glasgow, Clydebank or Dumbarton and 
13 moved down-river to Greenock or Port Glasgow, One other man found a job in the 
industry elsewhere in the West of Scotland and 5 left Scotland, 4 going to England 
or Wales and 1 abroad. Again, despite the evident problems of shipbuilding, it 
continued to exert a considerable pull on men who had only recently experienced the 
insecurity characteristic of the industry.
Just over half (141) of the 264 finding jobs after redundancy subsequently left 
and moved into other jobs.^^ Table 6.2 shows the transfers which took place between 
the different industry groups as they moved from their first to present or last jobs.
Table 6»2 Industrial Mobility of the Multiple Job Holders
between First and Present or Last Jobs™(%
First Job
p/l Job ;Shipbldg. Other Eng. Other Manuf, Constr. Services N.K, Numbers
Shipbuilding 33 24 6 30 6 33 2/
Other Engineering 24 30 9 27 9 53 2/
Other Manufacturing 22 11 55 11 ■ 9 i
Construction 2 12 7 64 15 41 2 Î
Services 21 ' 29 17 13 21 24 11
N.K.
Numbers 25 32 13 53 17
1 _ J _
1 141 IOC
io 18 23 9
Note; ^8 are rounded and may
38 
not add
12
up to 100
100
9 . Although 'Other engineering' provided a similar number of jobs as shipbuilding, the 
latter is a single MOH, while the former, is made up of a number of different MOH's<
10, In total, however, I64 workers'quit their first job after U.C.S., voluntarily or 
otherwise, but '23 of them were unable to find another job. Consequently we are 
left with 141 multiple job holders.
The percentages in the margins of the table show, along the bottom, the
industrial distribution in the first job and, down the side, that in the present or
last job. Comparing the two, sector by sector* we see signs of a slight recovery in
shipbuilding employment, little change in other engineering, a decline in other
manufacturing, an even greater decline in construction and almost a 8 O/0 increase
in the service sector. Information not shown in the table but which is of interest
concerns the drift back into employment with U.C.S. at the later stages of redeployment
Nineteen workers left their first jobs and returned to U.C.S. I3 to the same division
they were made redundant from and 6 to a different division. Overall, therefore,
44 (177 )^ of the 264 successful job seekers found either their first or their present
11or last job back in the consortium.
Another interesting point emerges when we look diagonally down and across the 
table. Most of the workers (64/C') finding their present or last job in construction 
had previously found their first jobs there, the only industrial sector where that 
was the case. Workers finding first jobs in other sectors were more, likely to move 
out of them to take up their subsequent jobs.
Looking across the rows, we might also note that workers were more likely to
switch back into shipbuilding from construction (30/) than from shipbuilding to
construction (2/). This corresponds to patterns of mobility observed previously for
1'shipbuilding on the Clyde and is also consistent with the data presented in table 6.1,
For example, there was a greater likelihood of an ebb back into shipbuilding since
46/. of the 'building’ trades but only of the 'metal' trades had moved into 
construction after leaving U.C.S. The reason given by the job changers for leaving 
their first jobs shed more light on the 'dynamics' of the inter-industrial mobility 
which took place.
11. At time of interview, however, only 40 respondents gave their present or last 
employer as U.C.S. So, four men finding their first post redundancy jobs 
back at U.C.S. subsequently moved elsewhere,
12. See, for example, Hunter, LC, 'Problems of Labour Supply in Shipbuilding',
Second Marlow (Scotland) Lecture. The Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders 
in Scotland, Elrabanlc Crescent, Glasgow, I967,
97
Table 6.3 V/liy the Job Changers Left their First Jobs
Reason for Leaving
Industry of First Job Made Redundant Voluntary Other^ L.K. Numbers
Shipbuilding 56 44 - “ 25
Other Engineering 50 44 6 $2
Other Manufacturing 62 7 - 15
Construction 36 51 15 - 53
Services 18 77 6 - 17
R.K. _» ^  Z ’ 1 — i
45 49 8 1 141
^Notei 'Other' includes dismissal, sickness, etc.
The first, and most obvious, point to note in table 6,5 is that almost as many
men left their first jobs through redundancy as quit voluntarily, demonstrating yet
again the vulnerability of the short service worker in time of recession. This could
13not have bolstered their confidence about finding further employment,"
It would also be consistent with the increase in service sector employment as 
men drifted into whatever jobs were going (table 6.2) and also with the high voluntary 
quit rate from first jobs in services (table 6.5). While recognising that the 
service sector was not, in absolute terms, a very significant source of employment 
there is,at least some suggestion here as in previous studies that it was seen as 
a temporary haven to be departed from for more attractive opportunities later,
Construction was the only other case where the voluntary quit rate exceeded the 
rate of secondary redundancy. Voluntary turnover occurs in some degree in all labour 
market conditions and construction is characterised by particularly high turnover 
rates as jobs near completion and more attractive employment is sought on other sites. 
This XK no doubt helps explain why, although employment in construction declined 
overall, 64^ of the workers employed there in their present or last job had moved 
within the industry and also explains why shipbuilding attracted back a considerable 
proportion of men from construction. Finally, table 6 .4 summarises, in the aggregate,
the industrial distribution of jobs at the first and last stages of redeployment.
15. In section 5 we shall see thai men made redundant yet again had to take up 
jobs paying considerably less than their first jobs,
1 / C! -rr T&T i T O T O  I *^i-» jr\-î4- T/ Ut tTT-D ^^n4- T n n
Table 6.4 Industrial Pistribution of First and Present
or Last Jobs after IT.C.S,
First Present or Last
Shipbuilding 23 26
Other Engineering 23 24
Other Manufacturing 8 7
Construetion 29 24
Services 17 19
Nos. N.K. 1 1
Numbers 264 264
Overall, there was little difference between first and last jobs in the 
proportions finding jobs in other engineering, other manufacturing and services.
As we saw in table 6.2 , however, there was a considerable amount of mobility between 
these sectors which is not revealed in the aggregate. Shipbuilding shows some 
recovery, construction a decline and both these tendencies were more marked when væ 
considered the mobility of thejob changers alone.
5. Geographical Mobility
Given the deteriorating economy in which the U.C.S. run-down took place, one 
might have expected workers to move to other areas to find jobs especially if they 
had some previous experience of working outside the West of Scotland, Table 6.5 
shows the location of the first jobs taken up by (l) those who had previously lived 
outside of the West of Scotland for work reasons and (2) those who had not.
Table 6.5 Percentage Distribution of First Jobs by Location
Previously 
Lived Outside 
//. of Scotland
Por Work Glasgow- Clydebank- Greenock- Rest of W, Rest of England- Ireland-
leasons_____ _ Paisley Dumbarton Pt.Glasgow of Scotland Scotland Wales Abroad Nos.
1. Yes 46 15 9 10 2 14 4 94
2. No 67 15 5 8 5 1 - 169
Nos. N,K, 1 _"2 21 — — — — 1
60 15 6 9 5 6 1 264
Most of the workers {^0 fo ) moved into other jobs in the West of Scotland, 755^  
of them in the area covered by Glasgow, Paisley, Clydebank and Dumbarton, Some Gfo 
transferred to the lower reaches of the Clyde and took jobs in Greenock or Port Glasgow 
Only lO^'o had taken up jobs out of the West of Scotland including 19 who had migrated 
from Scotland altogether, 15 of them 'south of the Border'. Most of the migrants,
15 men, were skilled reflecting the nature of the cut-back and, possibly, the 
greater confidence a craftsman would have in 'selling himself elsewhere. The emig­
rants were also predominantly those who had previous experience of,working away from
1
home. Of the 94 workers who had such experience, I7 (I8/0 left Scotlahd again to
!
take up their first post-redundancy job. In comparison, of the I69 workers who 
had never previously worked away from home, less than two per cent proceeded to do 
so after redundancy. At first sight, we might conclude tha,t relatively little geo­
graphical dispersion actually took place at the first stage of redeployment although 
chapter 4 suggested that many workers were prepared to leave home. A difference 
between propensity to move, 'latent mobility' and actual mobility is, of course, no
15new^  phenomenon. When putting forward an explanation for its emergence in the 
case of the U.C.S. workers, one cannot and should not under-rate the aocial consider­
ations they ffelt important. Parnes, for examples, recognises that,
both the goals of a worker and his evaluation of his present 
situation are subject to influences external to himself, such as 
the value system of the culture an.d the wishes of his family.'16
But in any case, the recession in Scotland was accompanied in the usual fashion 
by a similar down-turn elsewhere and, as Reynolds points out,
•There is a tendency to use the terms ’movement' and 'mobility' 
interchangeably. It seems better, however, to use mobility 
to describe willingness or propensity to move. Opportunity 
must be added to willingness before any actual movement will 
occur.' (author's emphases) 17
Between I964 and I969 the male unemployment rate for Great Britain almost doubled 
from 1 .7^  to 5*3^ * Over the same period net migration from Scotland to the rest of 
the U.K. changed conversely from 22,000 to 8,000,^^ In such unpromising circum­
stances, it is hardly surprising that the emigrants were those who had followed 
that path before._____________________________ _______________________ _
1 5. For a wider discussion of the different concepts and their economic and other
implications, see Parnes, HS, op.cit., pp.15-22
16. op.cit. p . 19
17® Reynolds, LG, 'The Structure of Labor Markets', Harper and Bros., New York,1951 p24
18. The Scottish Economic Bulletin^ No.l, HMSO 1971 und the Employment and
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Subsequent job moves had no significant impact on the geographical distribution 
of the workers. If anything, there was something of a net drift back into Scotland 
and into Clydeside. Despite the substantial contraction in the local economy 
over the period under 10 per cent of the workers ended up in jobs outwith the 
West of Scotland. In comparative terms this was nevertheless fairly substantial 
and we return to the topic when considering other aspects of manpower policy in 
chapter 9«
4. Job Quality
Qualitative differences between jobs must obviously be talien into account when 
evaluating the impact of redundancy. Quantifiable factors like wages and hours 
lend themselves to reasonably objective assessment. Estimating a job's skill level 
is less certain. It includes an appraisal of the occupational level of a given 
job and, as w^e have noted previously, an objective estimation of a man's occupational 
status based on a job title may differ from the job holder's own opinion. In 
addition, there might be reasonable differences of opinion on the skill content of 
jobs at the same level of an occupational hierarchy. Some skilled engineers, tool 
makers, for example, perform more demanding tasks than similar craftsmen. We try 
to allow for such complications in the course of this section,
(i) Occupational Status
Table 6.6. first of all, shows in the aggregate how the occupational distribution 
at U.C.S. compared with those at the first and last stages of redeployment.
Table 6.6 Skill at U.C.S. First Job After and Last Job After
Skill b.c.S. First Job After Last Job After
Unskilled 8 13 13
Semi-skilled 11 14 15
Skilled 76 69 68
Staff 5 3 3
Self Employed 1 1
Nos. N.K.  2  \
Numbers 264 264 264
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Since there was a fall in the proportions in the higher occupational groups, 
the skilled and staff workers, with an accompanying rise in the lower skill groups 
we can conclude that one of the costs of the redundancies was an overall drop in the 
occupational status of the workers. This occurred largely at the first stage of 
redeployment and only altered in a marginal way subsequently. The occupational changes 
experienced by a cohort of workers are unlikely to be in the one direction. This 
can be further explored through establishing 'stability ratios', that is the 
proportion of men who managed to preserve their occupational status as it was at U.C.S., 
and by comparing the numbers moving up and down the skill hierarchy. Table 6^ 7 
shows the stabiliLy ratios which resulted in the first and present or last jobs*
Table 6.7 Occupational Stability Ratios in
First and Present or Last Jobs ^
Occupational Level 
Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled Staff Nos. 
First Job 67 67 85 55 264
Present or Last 55 65 83 33 264
As expected, there was movement up as well as down the skill hierarchy. For 
example, in their present or last job, only just over half of the unskilled workers 
were doing jobs which they considered to be unskilled. The others could only have, 
in their opinion, improved their position. A major point of interest concerns the
craftsmen. What is, in a sense, surprising is the extent to which they managed to
preserve their status in the prevailing employment conditions. In moving to their 
first new jobs 85^0 took up jobs of equivalent status. This dropped slightly to 83^ 
as a result of the moves of the job changers but still compares more than favourably 
with other recent studies in Great Britain. For example, in the national survey, 
Parker reported that 74^  ^of the skilled workers moved into first jobs of dqual skill 
while Mackay, analysing redundancies in the West Midlands over I966-68, found that 
only just over half of the skilled men involved had managed to find first or subsequent
19jobs of similar status,
19. See Parker et al., op.cit, p.100 and Mackay, DI (1972) op.cit. table 4
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Clearly, the sane did not hold true for the other occupational groups.■ For a 
number of reasons, however, their occupational mobility provides a less reliable 
indicator of the redundancy's effects than does that of the craftsmen. First,the 
very strong tradition of craft apprenticeship on Clydeside provides an objective
20criterion against which a worker and others would measure his claim to be skilled, 
ïlirthermore, it was craftsmen who were predominantly affected by the run-down.
In comparison, the other occupational groups do not act as such a convenient yard­
stick because, for example, even U.C.S. found it difficult to draw a precise line 
between their skilled and unskilled workers while staff workers, like foremen,'who
would have completed an apprenticeship may have been inclined to identify themselves
I
in terms of their craft rather than as members of a less well defined 'staff group.
t
A convenient summary of the situation is arrived at by considering the numbers 
who had moved up as opposed to down the occupational hierarchy at the final stage of 
redeployment. Overall, 62 of the 264 workers finding jobs had changed occupational 
status in their present or last jobs. . Of these 19 (31^ ’) had managed to improve 
their position while 43 (69^) has moved downward. Although only 34 (or 17%) of the 
craftsmen were obliged to move to other rungs in the ladder, most of these, 28, stepped 
downward and only 6 moved upward to staff or self-employed status. Therefore the 
redundancies from U.C.8, led to some overall deterioration in the occupational status 
of the sample but,at the same time, the craftsmen involved were more able to maintain, 
or more committed to preserving, their occupational status than similar workers 
affected by other recent redundancies in Great Britain.
(ii) Wages and Hours of Work
The hours a man works and the money he earns in different jobs provide some of 
the more straightforward means of passing judgment on the quality of the jobs in 
question. The obvious positive relationship between the hours worked and the money 
earned malces the combined measure, hourly rate of pay, a more comprehensive measure 
of that aspect of job quality we are concerned with here. As a starting point, let 
us look at the average take-home pay, the average normal working week and the average 
hourly rate for each of our skill groups in their jobs at U.C.8,
20. In chapter 4 we saw that only 6 of the 235 workers in the original sample 
claiming to be skilled had not completed a craft apprenticeship.
103
Table 6,8 Average Talce he
and Average Hourly Rate a/t U.C.8, by Skill
Average Pay Average Hours Average Hourly
Skill LP_(£g.L _ .(iKills.),.. .. .. Rate (X) N.P.
Unskilled 20.60 48.62 42.39
Semi-skilled 22.60 47.27 47.82
Skilled 25.29 46.48 54.76
Staff 25^ i&k6 61.02
All 24.62 46.54 53.25
Numbers 264 264 264
Table 6.8 shows that the earnings structure at U.C.S. held no surprises.
Average take-home pay and average hourly rate increase directly with occupational
level while the hours worked to earn that income vary inversely with skill. In
other words, the less skilled workers had to put in longer hours to bring their
21earnings up towards those of the higher skill groups.
How then did their situation change in the course of their redeployment from
U.C.S.? We assess this in a simple way, namely by establishing for each respondent
the percentage difference he experienced in take-home pay, hours worked and hourly
rate between each of his post redundancy jobs and his job at U.C.8. The distribution
of these individual differences indicates whether the position of the workers, when
in employment, improved or deteriorated as a result of redundancy. In addition,
we show the average wages, hours of work and hourly rates of pay in the workers'
first and present or last jobs after redundancy.
Table 6.9 Take Home Pay in First and Present or Last Job
As Percentage of Take Home Pay at U.C.8.
Average(X)
<,75 75<85 85(95 95<105 105(115 115(125 125-1- io Take-Home Nos. N.K. Numbers
First Job I9 I3 I5 21 10 6 16 100 24.41 16 264
P/L Job 15 12 12 21 16 6 17 100 24-73 15 264
21. Our questionnaire asked for take-home pay while published data usually relate 
to gross earnings. While recognising its importance, therefore, we leave a 
direct comparison of earnings at U.C.S. with manual workers' earnings elsewhere 
in Scotland until later in our analysis.
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If we assume that the financial position of those receiving between 95% and 105% 
of their earnings at U.C.S. remained more or less the same, the proportions lying 
on either side allow us to evaluate the overall effect of redundancy on the men's 
financial circumstances. When we do so, we can see that some overall deterioration 
resulted. It is interesting to note, however, that almost as many achieved a 
substantial improvement in their income as suffered a substantial drop. For example, 
16% were earning at least 25^  ^more than their usual take-home pay at U.C.S. while 
19% were earning at least 25';^ less. Consequently, as a comparison with Table 6.8 
indicates, the effect on average take home pay was, on the face of it, not large. 
Overall, however, almost half were doing worse than at U.C.S. against one-third 
doing better.
When we Ilok at the later stage of redeployment, we see a different picture.
The overall position of the men has improved. By this time, those doing worse 
than at U.C.S. (39%) are evenly balanced by those doing better (39%) « This aggre­
gate improvement was, of. course, due to the success of the job changers in finding 
better paying jobs than those first taken up by them. We shall also see subsequently 
that this improvement was attributable not to all the job changers but, more 
particularly, to the voluntary job changers. All the skill groups but the staff 
workers showed an aggregate improvement between their first and present or last jobs 
causing average take-home pay to rise slightly above what it was at U.C.S. The 
proportions earning more than at U.C.8. rose from 35% to 50% in the case of the 
unskilled workers, from 32% to in the case of the semi-skilled and from 31% 
to 41% in the case of the tradesmen. The position of the staff workers remained 
unchanged.
To bring the changes in the men's income into proper perspective, however,
other factors must be taken into account. First, when we allow for the change in
the general wage level, we find that the sample as a whole just barely maintained its
average take-home pay while average weekly earnings in Scotland rose by 22F/o from
2?
£24.84 ii^ 1969 to £30.30 in 1971. This is an important consideration which, for 
22, The Scottish Economic Bulletin No.4 , 1973j P.13
J up
the moment, requires us to attach a similar qualification to all our earnings and 
wage rates comparisons. We conclude this section with a more comprehensive 
comparison between our respondents’ take-home pay before and after redundancy with 
that of other workers in Scotland, Meantime, we must also note that earnings are 
dependent on hours worked as well as rates paid and so the accompanying differences 
in the working week must be talc en into account as well.
Table 6.10 Usual Hpwrs of Work in First and Present or Last Jobs
As Percentage of Usual Hours of Work at U.C.S,
Average (X)
Hours of
25(85 _85_<95 95(105 105(115 115(125 Work  Nos.^K. Numbers
First Job 6 12 10 39 13 4 16 100 47.88 8 264
P/l Job 7 11 9 42 12 5 14 100 47.15 9 264
From table 6.10 we can see that not only did the sample earn less in the first 
job after U.C.S. but, in addition, more had to work longer hours than shorter hours 
and half of these (l6%) were putting in considerably more hours (at least 25%) than 
U.C.S. At the same time, 28% of them were working shorter hours. The overall effect
was a rise in average hours of work from 46.54 ut U.C.S. to 47*88 in the first job
after U.C.S,
When we look at the situation in the present or last job, we see that, as in 
the case of their earnings, the overall position has improved. For example, 31% 
are now working longer hours as against 33% previously and the proportion working 
similar hours to U.C.S. has risen from 39% to 42%. Nevertheless, in the aggregate 
more men are still working longer hours (31%) than shorter hours (27%) compared 
with their position at U.C.S. which was again reflected in the resulting average.
Between the first and later stage of redeployment, the wages and hours worked 
by the job holders, as a whole, changed in opposite directions suggesting that those
25who moved transferred into jobs offering better rates of pay. Combining our data 
on wages and hours allows us to explore this in greater detail. Table 6,11 shows 
the proportionate changes which took place in the respondents’ hourly rates of pay as 
they redeployed from U.C.S.
2 3, Recognising again, however, that at least some of the change in rates would 
have been a simple trend effect.
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Table 6.11 Hourly 'Rate of Pay in First and Present or Last
Jobs as Percentage of Hourly Rate of Pay at ÏÏ.C.S.{%)
Average(X)
Hourly
<75 75<85 85<95 95<105 105Ù15 115<125 125+ % RatefN.P.) Nos.N.K. Numbers 
First Job 1? l6 15 26 10 7 9 100 51*26 18 264
p/l Job 13 13 15 26 13 6 14 100 52.99 17 264
The impressions gained by considering wages and hours separately are confirmed
by the combined measure in the above table. Even allowing for the better jobs
i
subsequently acquired by those who left their first jobs the men are, in the aggregate,
I
still worse off in their present or last jobs than they were at U.C.S. Miile one-
i
third of the men were then earning a higher hourly rate than at U.C.S,, 41% were
earning less per hour. This, nonetheless, represented some improvement in comparison
with the first stage of redeployment where only 26% were doing better than at U.C.S.
24
compared with almost twice as many (48%) doing worse. This improvement occurred,
in differing degrees, for all the occupational groups involved. Table 6.12 shows the
broad changes which took place in hourly rate, skill by skill, between the first
and the present or last job.
Table 6.12 Comparison of Hourly Rate in First and Present
or Last Jobs with'that at U.C.S. by Hkill 0^
F i r s t  Present or Last
Average(X) Average(x)
Hour1y No 5. No s.
Skill Numbers Worse Same Better Rate(N.P.) N.K. Worse Same Better Rate(N.P.) N.K,
Unskilled 21 55 20 25 42.51 1 35 30 35 43.29 1
Semi­
skilled 30 47 23 30 44.27 — 30 40 30 46.77
Skilled 201 48 26 26 52.30 16 44 22 34 53.82 15
Staff 12 li 18_ _1 16 É 1 18 n Æ L _1
264 48 26 26 51.26 18 41 26 33 52.99 17
Looking across the rows, when we compare the ;present or last with the first job,
we see that some improvement took place for all occupational groups. For the semi­
skilled and the staff workers, however, this meant only a decrease in the numbers 
doing worse tha% at U.C.S. In the case of the unskilled workers and the tradesmen,
24. As before, a comparison of the averages in tables 6,11 and 6.8 gives a simple 
indication of the changes in the respondents' overall position.
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there was both a reduction in the numbers doing worse and an increase in the numbers 
doing better than before redundancy. The resulting averages show the same improvement 
for all skill groups between the first and present or last jobs. Besides our previous 
qualification regarding trend effects two additional points worth noting are,
(a) the substantial improvements in average hourly rate achieved by the staff workers 
in their first as well as present or last jobs and (b) the similar if smaller 
improvements of the unskilled workers. Although this is seemingly at variance with
the proportions reported as doing better or worse than at U.C.S, measures of central 
tendency must be read with caution. In this case, the median was more represent­
ative of the changes in hourly rate experiencedparticularly by the unskilled and 
staff. The arithmetic mean, however, has for consistency been used throughout 
since, with this exception, it has served well as a summary statistic for the range 
of changes encountered by our respondents.
Our analysis of changes in earnings has so far been based on take-home pay at 
time of redundancy. A preferable comparison would be between take-home pay in 
subsequent jobs and what it would have been ha.d the men remained at U.C.S. If 
the men had been made redundant en bloc and had taken up subsequent jobs at roughly 
the same time, we could have taken trend effects into account relatively easily.
In actual fact, the phasing of the run-down makes it more difficult for the sample 
an a whole since men were being laid off and taking new jobs up over an extended 
period of time.
We can, however, approach the problem in another way by, for example, comparing
the take-home pay of the men at U.C.S. and in subsequent jobs with what it would
25
have been had their gross earnings been the same as the Scottish average. At
time of interview, 206 of our respondents were then in employment. Forty-nine
of them had been made redundant in I969 when their average talce-horae pay at U.C.S.
had been £25.13* If instead they had then been earning according to the Scottish
average (£24*84) their take-home pay would have been £19*84 (calculated). In other
words, their actual take-home pay was 116.6% of the average net take-home pay for a
similar group of Scottish workers._____________ _______________ ___________ _______
25. The appendix to this chapter sets this out in greater detail.
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Similarly, average take-home pay at U.C.S, for the 157 men made redundant during 
1970 was £25.02 compared with a calculated figure of £22.57 If their earnings had 
been the same as the Scottish average (£28.02) in 1970. Although the gap had 
narrowed take-home pay at U.C.S, still clearly lay above (lll,0/o) the Scottish average.
Although unable to make any judgment on ‘efficiency wages' at U.C.S., that is 
money earned in relation to output, we can put forward several reasons for the talce- 
home pay reported by our respondents being greater than that elsewhere. One objective 
of U.C.S. was to rationalise its wage structure to encourage flexibility and reduce 
stoppages. This involved some 'levelling up' of wage rates which, at the time, 
was not appreciated by other Clydeside shipbuilders. Since many of the men made 
redundant in I969 were also probably engaged on the push to finish the inherited 
0112 contract, it is also likely that their usual take-home pay at U.C.S. prior to 
redundancy reflected the bonuses then to be earned.
Whatever the reasons for their pay at U.C.S. being higher than elsewhere, it 
is certain that in their new jobs they were much worse off than had they remained at 
U.C.S. assuming that earnings at U.C.S, would have risen in similar fashion to those 
elsewhere. When interviewed, the average take-home pay of men made redundant in 
1969 and 1970 taken together was £24.02 or 99*13% of what it should have been had 
their gross earnings been at the Scottish average (£50.50) in 1971* Taking such 
trend effects into account in this way puts a different complexion on our earnings 
domparisons before and after redundancy and suggests that its impact on material 
wellbeing*was more substantial than the unadjusted data indicates.
(iii) The Workers' Opinions
Our opinion questions allowed us to establish how the men themselves felt their 
position to have changed. We invited our respondents to make a comparison between 
their present or last job and their job at U.C.S, in terms of skill, job preference 
and also asked if, looking back on everything, they would have preferred to stay at 
U.C.S. or been made redundant with the compensation they received.
109
Table 6.13 Subjective Skill Comparison Between Present
or Last Job and Job at Ü1C.S. by Skill
Skill in Comparison with U.C.S. (%)
■■■■ » , « H I||»VI«»I>II®.IM .M. 1 IM* III Ml» UM lai I I ... ■ ..........   w ii  i mmim
Numbers More Same Less Nos.N.K.
Unskilled 21 52 58 10 -
Semi-skilled 30 17 50 55 —
Skilled 201 26 47 27 5
Staff 12 21 10 ZL
264 27 47 26 5
At the beginning oB this chapter, we noted that the ’skill* of a given job 
may have a number of connotations. Table 6.I3 should be interpreted with this in 
mind. Although, for example, 85% of the craftsmen's present or last jobs were 
skilled, only 73% felt these jobs required at least equivalent skill to the jobs they 
held at U.C.S.
We might recall that chapter 4 revealed considerable apprehension about compar­
ability of shipyard skills and those learned elsewhere yet, after redundancy, a 
quarter of the tradesmen felt they were doing less skilled work than at U.C.S.
Further analysis showed that only one (2%) of the fortysix tradesmen whose present 
or last job was in shipbuilding felt its skill content was lower than his job at 
U.C.S. in comparison with 29 per cent of the one hundred and fiftytwo tradesmen in 
other industries. Only in the case of the unskilled workers did a majority feel 
that their present or last job was more skilled than at U.C.S. Taking the sample 
as a whole, however, the skill loss which some workers felt to have suffered was 
balanced by the gain which others thought they had experienced.
Table 6.I4 Job Preference by Skill
Job Preference
Skill Numbers E A U.C.S. No Difference Same Job Nos.N.K,
Unskilled 2 21 45 48 5 5 —
Semi-skilled 50 45 40 7 10 —
Skilled 201 57 54 5 4 2
Staff 12 10 42 8 — n Z.
264 39 52 5 4 2
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Apart from the tradesmen, the redundant men failed to express any strong preference 
one way or the other "between U.C.S. and their most recent jobs when interviewed and 
so the reasons given by the tradesmen for their choice are shown helowo
Table 6.1-3 Reasons Given by the Tradesmen for Job Preference {%)
More Skill- Familiar Physical Better Better More Better* Nos,
Numbers Variety Job Conditions Hours Money Prospects Firm N.K,
p/l Job 74 49 2 15 7 11 5 15
U.C.S. 102 20 22 5 5 52 4 15 6
Note: 'Better Firm' is a, compound description covering 'personal
relationships', 'atmosphere', 'friendly place', 'good firm 
to work for', etc.
The tradesmen saw little or no difference between U.C.S. and the most recent 
job held as far as the hours of work, the prospects of advancement and the nature 
of the firm were concerned. Some interesting if unsurprising differences emerge 
in the other reasons put forward by the workers. Knowing, as we do, that more 
workers suffered than gained financially as a result of leaving U.C.S., it is under­
standable that three times as many preferred U.C.S. as preferred their present or 
last jobs on financial grounds. The job preference based on. skill comparison does 
not mean, as we saw above, that.more of the present or last jobs necessarily involved 
more skill than at U.C.S. In the consciousness of those preferring their present 
or last jobs, however, skill content loomed larger than in the case of men preferring 
U.C.S. Taking 'familiarity with the job' and 'physical conditions' into account, 
the different preferences are, again, not unexpected ones. The U.C.S, workers' 
long service in the industry and their lack of wide alternative experience help to 
explain the greater preference for shipyard work in terms of job knowledge. Similarly. 
we cannot be surprised that the austere working conditions in the average shipyard 
compared badly with jobs elsewhere.
Altogether, then, there appeared to be some overall deterioration relative to 
U.C.S. The proportion earning higher and lower take-home pay than at U.C.S. in 
their present or last jobs was similar but more men ended up working longer hours in 
them. This caused a decline in the overall hourly rate of pay which was bad enough 
in itself but still worse in the context of the substantial rise in the general wage 
level.
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There was also, in an objective sense, a net deterioration in occupational
status. When, however, invited to compare the skill content of their present or
last jobs with their jobs at U.C.S. those feeling they had suffered a drop in skill
were equally balanced* by those who felt their most recent jobs were more skilful.
Overall, however, a majority of workers expressed a. preference for their job at
U.C.S. and gave reasons which were consistent with their past experience and also
with their experience since being made redundant. This was underlined by the workers *
retrospective assessment of their post-redundancy experience. For the sample as
a whole almost § (64%) would have preferred to remain at U.C.S. rather than have
been made redundant with compensation. The unskilled workers were a minor exception
in that just under half of them (48%) would have preferred to stay at U.C.S,
5. The Job Changers
In section 4» we observed with qualifications that the overall position of the
workers had improved at the latter stage of redeployment in comparison with the first.
Here, we elaborate on this by comparing the employment experience of the voluntary
with the non-voluntary job changers and, more particularly, with the single job
holders. Mackay (1972) op.cit. suggested that the differences between the experience
of voluntary job changers and single job holders seemed to indicate differences in
job search strategy. Although employment conditions in Glasgow, during the period
of the run-down, were three times worse than those in the West Midlands during I966-68,
our results were remarkably similar to those of Mackay,Table 6,16 compares, first
of all, the transitional unemployment of the 69 voluntary job changers who took
27
up other jobs with that of the 125 single job holders.
Table 6.16 Transitional Unemployment of Single Job
Holders and Volïmtary Job Changers (%) '
Transitional Unemployment 
Numbers Under 1 week 1-4 weeks 3-16 weeks 17-26 weeks Over 26 weeks
Single Job Holders 125 11 20 59 17 12
Voluntary Job
Changers 69 19 42 55 4 1
2 6, Over 1966-68, unemployment averaged 1,6% in the West Midlands compared with 
4.8% in the Glasgow area between July 1969 and December 1970.
2 7* 75 men altogether left their first jobs voluntarily but 6 had not taken up
other jobs by time of interview.
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Quite clearly, the single job holders took considerably longer to get back into 
work after leaving b.C.S, In fact, the average length of unemployment after 
U.C.S. for the voluntary job changers (5*4 weeks) was less than half that for the 
single job holders (l2 weeks). This corresponds with the results of Mackay who 
then went on to explore the hypothesis that the single job holders could be 
considered as 'stickers', who took their time in finding satisfactory jobs, while 
the voluntary job changers could be portrayed as 'snatohers' who jumped quickly
into any job to use as a base for further job search. ^
i
There are other aspects of the U.C.S. workers' post redundancy employment
experience which suggest similar differences in job search strategy. We must;first
note, however, that in the case of U.C.S. the 'stickers' were older and less skilled
i
than the 'snatchers'. For example, 24% of the 'stickers' were either unskilled or
semi-skilled compared with only 15% of the 'snatchers'. There were much greater
differences in the ages of the two groups. Less than 2 per cent of the:
'snatchers' were over 30 as against 23 per cent of the 'stickers'. Conversely,
over q- of the 'snatchers' were under 40 compared with just over half of the 'stickers'
28 ■making the former a considerably younger group.
Bearing in mind these differences, we can compare the employment experience of
the two groups in the light of MacKay's findings. Table 6.17 compares the take-home
pay of the 'stickers' and'snatchers' at U.C.S. and as they redeployed after redundancy.
Table 6.17 Percentage^ Wage Distributions* of 'Stickers' and 'Snatchers'
'Stickers' 'Snatchers'
Weekly Take-Home Pay (£s) U.C.S. 1st Job U.C.S. 1st Job p/l Job
Under 14 - 7 - 2 “
14 - 17 10 13 8 15 6
18 - 21 24 19 5 28 18
22 - 23 50 27 45 29 25
26 - 29 21 17 21 12 23
50 - 55 10 7 17 6 17
54+ 5 9 4 8
X 24.06 25.95 23.12 22.83 27.16
*Note; A similar pattern emerged when take-home pay was adjusted 
for hours worked.
28. The difference in age is statistically significant at the 99 ^  level but the 
difference in skill is not statistically significant.
As previously, the overall experience of the respective groups is given by the 
summary statistics at the bottom of the columns in table 6.17. In the case of the 
single job holders, there was some deterioration in their post-redundancy jobs com­
pared with U.C.S. For example, /}1% were taking home less than £22 per week compared 
with 54% at U.C.S, and 55% were taking home £26 or more as against 56%. Although 
there was little difference in average take-home pay we must note again that this 
was against the backdrop of a rising general wage level.
We see a somewhat different picture in the case of the 'snatchers'. In their 
first job after redundancy their weekly earnings took a more decided drop which was, 
however, more than compensated for in the course of their later moves. Taken along 
with their shorter unemployment after redundancy, this group, like MacKay’s equiva­
lents appeared to have adopted a different job search strategy from the single job 
holders. It was possible, of course, that the apparent improvement in talee-home pay 
could have been due to longer hours of work and/or to a general rise in the wage 
level if there had been a long lag between them quitting their first jobs and taking 
up their present or last jobs. Further investigation suggested this was not the ease, 
Fiftyone (74%) of our voluntary job changers had held only two jobs since redundancy 
and we were thus able to calculate the time spent between jobs as well as in their 
first jobs. They had held their first jobs, on average, for just under four and a 
half months, and 64 per cent of them had taken up their second jobs within two weeks 
of leaving their first. Although their average (x) hours of work in their present 
or last jobs (48.2) was somewhat higher in their present or last than in their first 
(46,4) so also was their average hourly rate of pay, 56.7 N«F. against 47*9 N.F. 
opinion question asking how the workers viewed their first post-redundancy job 
allowed us to pursue this further.
The respondents were invited to read a card asking 'which one of the following
situations best describes your views when you took your first job after leaving U.C.S,?
Table 6.18 shows the pattern of responses given by the 'stickers' and 'snatchers'.
Table 6.18 Views of First Posij-Redundaricy Jobs; 'Stickers' and
'Snatchers *
(1) (2) (3)
Stickers' 'Snatcher
14 10
25 12
1 9
1 9
4 1
26 20
9 . 55
25 4
1, Couldn't get another job
2. It was a job offering quite good conditions
5. Chance
4. It was the best of a number of good jobs
5. It was the best of a bad lot of jobs
6. It sounded a good job you were quite happy with
7. It was a stop“gap job which would do for a while
8. It was a long term job with reasonable prospects
If we consider the reasons given alternately from (l) down to be 'negative'
and those from (2) down to be 'positive' ’we find that 72»4^ of our 'stickers' gave
positive reasons and 27.6% negative reasons. In comparison, 45% of the 'snatchers' 
gave positive reasons while 55% gave negative reasons. In other words, approximately 
twice as many of the 'snatchers' went into their first jobs with an unfavourable
attitude of mind.
The relative dispositions of the two groups are similar to those of MacKay's 
workers with one proviso. In the case of the latter, both 'stickers' and 'snatchers' 
tended to be more negatively inclined towards their first jobs than did the U:C=8, 
workers. This is not surprising given the differences in the prevailing employment 
conditions. In high unemployment, a worker's estimation of a 'good' job is likely 
to fall short of what it would be in a situation offering a wider range of opportunities 
Or looking at it another way, given a higher demand for labour, job takers wil] be
more inclined to consider their jobs, potentially at any rate, as a stepping stone to
something better.
In the light of this, it is interesting to compare the 'stickers' and 'snatchers' 
amongst the UIC.S. workers purely in terms of their intended tenure of their first 
jobs after redundancy. Here, we find that four times as many of the 'snatchers' (55%) 
considered their first job a 'stop gap' compared with the 'stickers' (9%) and six 
times as many of the 'stickers' (25%) looked on it as a 'long term job' in comparison
with the 'snatchers' (4%). Consequently, even allowing for imperfect knowledge of 
the market and. the prevailing state of the economy, dividing the U.C.S. workers 
into 'stickers' and 'snatchers' provides a meaningful distinction which was reflected 
in their differing employment experience after redundancy.
At the same time, we must again recognise, however, that the 'snatchers' were 
on the whole more skilled and particularly more youthful than the 'stickers' and so 
the differences attributed to job search strategy may have been due more to force 
of circumstances than to design. In this respect, it is interesting to compare 
the 'snatchers' separately with the 72 men who changed jobs held after U.C.S. 
involuntarily, 85 per cent through further redundancy.
The involuntary job changers were more akin to the 'snatchers' than to the
29'stickers' in their age and skill. Average net earnings in their first job 
(£26.85 per week), however, represented an improvement on their earnings at U.C.S. 
(£25.09 per week). This was partly due to the fact that they also tended to be 
working slightly longer hours but, even allowing for this, their average hourly rate 
(52,78 N.P.) was still superior to that of the 'snatchers' (48.62 N.P.).
Their experience subsequent to leaving their first job, however, was unfavourable 
in comparison with the 'snatchers'. The average weekly take-home pay of the latter 
rose from £22.85 in their first job to £27.16 in their last job after U.C.S. and the 
average pay of the former moved conversely from £26.85 to £25.69. So, while the 
'snatchers' first moved into jobs paying considerably less than at U.C.S. and ended 
up in jobs which paid more, the involuntary job changers first moved into jobs 
which gave them slightly higher average earnings than at U.C.S. but finished up with 
weekly earnings lower than at U.C.S. and also lower than those of their counter­
parts who quit voluntarily. This additional comparison, therefore, underlines the 
advantages of voluntary job change and lends support to the job search strategy 
hypothesis.
29. There were no significant differences in either their age or skill.
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6. Conelusions
This chapter evaluated in different ways the effects of redundancy on the working 
lives of the 264 workers who had found new jobs since leaving U.C.S, First, the 
pattern of industrial mobility was not an unexpected one given the skills of the 
workers and their previous industrial experience. Construction, shipbuilding and 
other engineering were the major host industries, providing J of the first new jobs, 
’Building' skills predictably gravitated towards construction and the metal working 
trades towards engineering.
Although the contraction at U.C.S. cast an ominous shadow over shipbuilding on 
the Upper Clyde, about J of the first new jobs found were talcen up in shipbuilding 
and most of these on the Clyde. Indeed, over 40% of these jobs were back somewhere 
in the U.C.S. consortium and only 8% lay outwith Scotland.
The subsequent moves of the job changers did not greatly alter the initial 
pattern of dispersion. Shipbuilding, however, took over from construction as the 
biggest source of employment and with other engineering, these three sectors continued 
to provide f- of the jobs.
The redundancies did not result in any sizeable exodus from the men's home area. 
An overwhelming majority (90%) of the workers found their first jobs after U.C.S. 
in the West of Scotland and most of these in the Glasgow conurbation. Only 7% 
migrated from Scotland altogether and these were, in the main, skilled workers who 
also had previous experience of working away from home. While the importance of 
social ties cannot be ignored, a simple economic explanation is provided by the lack 
of job opportunities elsewhere in Great Britain, At the later stage of redeployment, 
there was little change in the geographical distribution.
Comparing the workers' jobs at U.C.S. with those held subsequently we took a 
number of objective and subjective factors into account. Overall, there was a 
deterioration in the occupational status of the workers, about § of the changes 
being in a downward as opposed to -g- in an upward direction. At the same time, 85% 
of the tradesmen at U.C.S. had preserved their status as skilled men in their 
present or last jobs, which compares very well with the findings of recent British 
studies of redundancy. The strong tradition of acquiring a trade on Clydeside 
no doubt contributes to this craft~consciousness*
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In substantive terms, the workers' position deteriorated as a result of 
redundancy. In their first jobs after redundancy they were overall earning less 
money and working longer hours than at U.C.S. This improved as a result of those 
who changed jobs advantageously, reflected in the increases in average pay, hours of 
work and hourly rate of pay. Even so, more were still earning a lower than a higher 
hourly rate of pay in comparison with U.C.S. at the latter stage of redeployment and 
the increase in the average wage level over the period put a very different complexion 
on our comparison of earnings before and after redundancy.
Taking the workers' own opinions into account, those who felt the skill content 
of their jobs had dropped were evenly balanced by those who felt it had risen.
There was no doubt, however, that most of the men would, in retrospect, have preferred 
to avoid redundancy. Apart from a few (9%) who saw no difference between their 
present or last job and that at U.C.S., 52% preferred their jobs at U.C.S. against 
59% preferring their present or last job. Moreover, given the choice, almost 
§  of the workers would have preferred to remain at U.C.S. rather than experience 
redundancy, compensated or not.
Finally, comparing the employment experience of the voluntary job changers with 
that of the other workers, our results suggested that Mackay's division of job 
seekers into 'stickers' and 'snatchers' was also appropriate in the case of U.C.S.
The voluntary job changers, or 'snatchers', experienced shorter frictional employment 
but at the expense of taking lower paying first jobs than the other workers. In 
the course of subsequent moves, however, their earnings improved considerably.
The advantages of quitting a job voluntarily became still clearer when the 'snatchers' 
were compared separately with the non-voluntary job changers. All this suggests 
that differences in job search strategy can be postulated and observed even in the 
most unfavourable employment conditions.
APPENDIX
In order to put our own earnings infoimation on a comparable basis with 
published data, we first established how many men were in employment when interviewed 
in mid I97I and whose earnings in their last jobs were therefore current for that 
year. Some had been made redundant in I969 and some in 1970 and the marital status 
and dependent children of each group are shown in Table A.1»
Table A.l Marital Status, Dependent Children and Year Made
Redundant of Men in Employment at Interview
Year Made 
Redundant
1969
Marital
Status
( Married
(Single
( Widowed/Divorced
Number of Dependent Children
None 1 2 1 & 5.
10 17 6 4 1 2
N
40
9
49
1970
( Married 
( Single
(Widowed/Divorced
54
29
50 51 24 5 5
1 -
127
29
. 1
157
Average gross earnings for manual workers in Scotland for 1969> 1970 and 197^
(alwere £24*84? £26,02 and £50.50 respectively.^ * Taking into account marital status 
and numbers of dependent children, we calculated the average net earnings, or take- 
home pay, of each group for their year of redundancy on the assumption they were 
then earning the Scottish average. We did likewise for year of interview, this 
time taking both groups together. Some assumptions were made about the ages of 
dependent children who, as in chapter 4? are those in each married household not of 
working age:-»
Dependent Children 
1 
2 
5
4
5
Assumed Ages 
under 11
1 under, 1 over 11
2 under, 1 over 11 
2 under, 2 over 11 
2 under, 5 over 11
(a) Again, see the Scottish Economic Bulletin No.4 , Winter 1975
Chapter 7
The Effectiveness of the Employment Service
1. Introduction
'It should be recognised that the Employment Service is the single
most important tool to ensure the proper functioning of the labour market
and that it has a crucial role to play in the Government's progranmie of
revitalising the British economy'. Such was the opinion of the Examiners
for the Manpower and Social Affairs Committee of the O.E.C.D. in their review
of manpower policy in the In a situation like the run-down at U.C.S.
which was likely to have wider repercussions throughout the local economy,
the role of the Employment Service could be considered even more.responsible.
This chapter examines various aspects of the part played by the local
Employment Service in the course of the run-down.
An obvious pre-requisite before the Employment Service can do anything
either for a job seeking worker or a labour seeking employer is that the
potential client and the agency should come into contact with one another.
It is by now conventional that a number of factors such as the 'image' of
the Employment Service, its varied functions, the quality of the workers
using it and of the jobs to be found there, tend to reduce this contact 
2
rate. In section 2, we make an appraisal of the workers' contact with 
the Employment Service, when they made contact and the reasons given by 
workers who made no contact. We go on, in section 3, to evaluate the 
performance of the Employment Service. We take into account the offers 
of work made by the service to job seekers and different features of its 
placement activity. As we shall see, few men were placed and these were
1. 'Manpower Policy in the United Kingdom', op. cit.. p.173.
2. See, for example, Kahn, H.R., op. cit. , p.l06, Daniel, W.W. , op.cit., 
p.33 and MacKay et al., op.cit., pp.346-352.
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almost exclusively craftsmen. Consequently, we go on to make a qualitative 
comparison, for the skilled workers alone, of the jobs found independently 
with those found through the Employment Service, Section 4 presents the 
conclusions.
2. Contact with the Employment Service
While recognising that various factors tend to dissuade some workers
i
from contacting the Employment Service as a job finding agency, there arej 
grounds for believing that redundant workers, particularly in a situation
3 ■ I
like U.C.S., will be more likely to make contact. For example, becaujse
most workers become redundant involuntarily they are likely to gravitate 
towards the 'formal' network as a supplement to the informal methods which 
are regularly, if casually, explored in the interest of finding a better 
job when a man is in employment. In addition, redundancy more often than 
not results in a period of frictional unemployment and, when drawing benefit, 
a man is almost inevitably brought into contact with the placement activity 
of the Employment Service. In Reid's study, in-plant placement services 
Were also mentioned as another factor tending to raise the contact rate 
between redundant workers and the Employment Service. That is, when plants 
were closing down or considerable numbers were to be made redundant, 
officers from the Department of Einployment would go into the factories 
and register men for placement even prior to their release by the companies 
in trouble.
The U.C.S. cut-back was, however, rather different from the situation 
found by Reid in the West Midlands over 1966-68. For example, no in-plant 
placement activity was undertaken by the Department of Employment. This 
was not through choice but because little opportunity for advance
3. See Reid, G.L., 'The Role of the Employment Service in Redeployment', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations (Vol. 9, No, 2, July 197l)
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registration of those about to lose their jobs was afforded by the firm*g
failure to give much warning to the men of their actual date of release.^
It was also predominantly craftsmen who were released by U.C.S, and it is
this group which is usually most likely to try to find work 'under their
own steam' and so avoid the Employment Service. In addition, the U.C.S.
redundancies involved a considerably higher voluntary element than did the
redundancies reviewed by Reid. 13ut, as we saw in preceding chapters, this
was of questionable practical benefit. Less than a quarter of the men
started looking for work before leaving U.C.S. and, in comparison with
other British workers made redundant in recent years, they had experienced
5
considerably greater unemployment by the time of interview. This extensive
unemployment, indicative of the prevailing employment conditions, provides
one of the more compelling reasons for anticipating a high contact rate
between the shipyard workers and the Employment Service. There were, then,
factors acting for and against a high contact rate between the workers and
the Enployment Service. Vliat was the pattern which emerged?
The 300 workers who remained active in the labour market after
redundancy were asked,
’When you began to look for another job after U.C.S. 
did you look for work in any of the following ways? *
- followed by some common methods of job search both formal and informal.
The differences between these methods were discussed in chapter 4® Here,
we are concerned more specifically with the Employment Service, Almost ^
(220) of the 300 job seekers affirmed that they had used the Employment
4. Here, it is worth repeating that volunteering for redundancy well in 
advance of leaving did not mean that those who did so got notice of 
the same length.
5. See also Herron, E., 'Redundancy and Redeployment from U.C.S. 1969-71', 
The Scottish Journal of Political Economy, November 1972, where the 
experience of the U.C.S. workers is also compared unfavourably with 
that of railwaymen made redundant in Manchester and Darlington during 
1963 and engineering workers made redundant in the West Midlands over
1966-68,
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So we see that for Reid's sample as a whole, the contact rate with the 
network of local employment exchanges alone was under Mien workers
using only the in-plant service are included the rate rises to over GOp 
and again to 8 2 . when allowance is made for those who contacted both 
the in-plant service and the Employment Service outside the place of work. 
In other words, the 'basic' contact rate of the U.C.8. workers { 'ly /o )  
without the assistance of the in-plant service is higher than that for the
engineering workers which is what we would expect given the difference in
the prevailing employment conditions. If, however, some in-plant services 
could have been provided by the Department of Employment the contact rate 
would undoubtedly have been higher still, This is underlined by the 
fact that, of the 220 workers who made contact with the Employment Service, 
only 5 did so before they left U.C.S.
The 80 workers who had not contacted the Emploi^ ment Service answered 
an open question asking why this was so. Their responses were categorised 
and fell into the pattern shown below.
Table 7.2 Reasons for not Contacting the Employment Service
Reason Numbers
1. Already had job to go to 41 31.3
2. Rot entitled to unemployment benefit 1 1 .3
3. Preferred to find my own job 14 17.5
4. They're no good 10 12.5
5. They don't have suitable jobs 5 6 .5
6 . They expect you to take the first 
job offered 2 2 .3
7. I wasn't looking for work 3 3.8
8. Other 4 5.0
Just over half of the workers made no contact for the simpli
that there was no need to. They stepped into jobs immediately or almost
7
immediately after leaving U.C.S. A preference for finding jobs 'off
7. Of the 80 workers who made no contact with the Employment Service,
64^0 found other jobs within two weeks of redundancy and 74^ within 
4 weeks. For the same time periods, 29^ and 44^  ^of the Employment 
Service users found new jobs.
their own bat’ was the next most frequently quoted reason. This, in
itself, need not imply any dissatisfaction with the service of the state
agency. If, however, we consider that reasons four to six inclusive do
] /
constitute such a criticism then we see that just over 3 of the workers 
avoided contact because of some unhappiness, real or imagined, with the 
Employment Service. Two of the thr-ee men saying they were not looking 
for work were over 65.
3• The Effectiveness of the Employment Service
As we saw above, the O.E.C.D. believed the Employment Service to be 
’the single most important tool to ensure the proper functioning of the 
labour market’. To fulfil this role, there are a number of objectives 
which the Employment Service might set out to meet and its effectiveness 
can be gauged by the extent to which it does or does not do so. First 
of all, an important aspect of the Service's work is the extent to which 
it improves the quality and increases the transmission of information in 
the market. This function is difficult to evaluate without actually 
monitoring the interaction of job seekers with Placement Officers,
We can, however, look at it from the 'customer's' point of view by 
considering the job offers they received as a result of contacting 
the Service.
(a) Job Offers
Of the 220 job seekers who made contact with the Employment Service, 
117, more than half, failed to receive an offer of a job. Only in the 
case of the predominating skilled group did a majority and, indeed, the 
smallest possible majority (51 0^) receive a job offer. Otherwise, 73^ ® 
of the unskilled and 6$^ of both the semi-skilled and staff workers 
received no job offers. It was also evident that the older a man was,
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the less likely was he to receive an offer of a job through the Service,
For example, 97^ of those under $0 received a job offer, 49^ of those in 
their $0's, of those between 40 and 49, 38ÿo of those from hO to 59 and
y^jo of men between 60 and 64.
On this criterion, therefore, the performance of the Ihnployraent Service 
was not impressive. In the prevailing employment conditions it would, 
however, be misguided to condemn it on these grounds. The vacancy ratio 
for the Glasgow area, i.e., the number of unfilled reported vacancies per 
100 wholly unemployed workers, stood at y/o in September I969, about the time
the redundancies began and declined thereafter to a dismal 1*77^ in July
1971 when the survey took place. Openings for less skilled workers 
contracted in a still more disheartening way. With such a dearth of 
employment opportunities the Employment Sei?vice can hardly be blamed for 
failing to provide men with an attractive 'menu' of employment opportunities. 
Quite simply, there were few jobs 'on the books' of the Employment Service 
to which unemployed men's attention could be drawn. However, having 
few notified vacancies to offer did not mean that the Employment Service 
was totally failing to transmit information. Useful leads short of definite 
prospects might stitl have been given.^
Comparing U.C.S. with the situation examined by Reid in the West 
Midlands under better employment conditions, we find, not surprisingly, 
that a higher proportion of men in the latter case (56^^  than in the 
former (47/0 received offers of jobs through the Employment Service,
The workers in the V/est Midlands also tended, to be more choosey than the 
Clydesiders, There, for example, 61.5Çü of those receivig job offers 
through the Employment Service rejected at least one of them compared 
with 51*5^ of the U.C.S, men. Although the men made redundant on Clydeside 
had not been reduced to the position where they were prepared to take any 
job, they were less inclined to turn jobs down than the Mdlands workers.
8. The following chapter provides some evidence for this assertion.
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It is also interesting to note why jobs were turned down. Almost f-
of the refusals were made for three main reasons. Most prominent was
'poor pay* accounting for of rejections, followed by 'travel would
have been too difficult or costly* {2yfo) and 'would have meant moving
house' ( ly fo )o Reid (l97l) op. cit., also found poor pay to be the most
frequently quoted reason (Z6ÿ) for turning down jobs offered by the Employment
Service but the location of jobs offered was not objected to nearly so much
as it was in the case of U.C.S. Only "jfo of the Midlands workers refused
jobs for 'travel to work* reasons. This does not mean that workers in
the West Midlands were more adventurous than the Clydesiders. A better
explanation is that ordinarily more jobs are available in the West Midlands
and offers there would usually relate to jobs near to men's homes. This
would give a low proportion of refusals for travel to work reasons. Of
course, the reverse would apply in Glasgow. All of this further illustrates
the gravity of the job situation in and around Glasgow. Many of the jobs
'on the books' of the Employment Service were considered to be poor paying
jobs by the workers or, if not, would have required them to leave home or
involved them in unacceptable travel to work costs,
(b) Placement by the Employment Service
The considerable reduction in notified vacancies, the lack of opportunity
for advance registration and the workers' disinclination to take up distant
as well as lower paying jobs obviously made things more difficult for the
Employment Service. This became clearer when it was compared with other
commonly used methods of job search. First of all, only 25 of the 264
successful job seekers found their first jobs through the Employment Service
This ratio (9.5^), commonly referred to as 'the penetration rate', is less
than half that which has recently been attributed to the Public Employment 
9
Service. In a study more specifically concerned with the Glasgow area,
9. See, for example, 'Manpower Policy in the U.K.’, op. cit., p,l6l 
where it is suggested that the penetration rate for Great Britain 
lies somewhere in the region of 2Cf/o,
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however, Mackay et al. (op. cit.) found the penetration rate of the Public
Employment Service there to be something of the order of 1$^ , considerably
lower than that held to obtain at national level but much nearer the rate
10
we find for the same area.
Despite the decline in vacancies and below (national) average perform­
ance of the Einplojnnent Service, jobs were available and being found in other 
less formal ways. Kahn in her study of car workers declared redundant
I 
1
by B,M,C. in 195^ made a similar point. 'The vacancies were there, but
those that were both acceptable and suitable had evidently not been
11channeled through the exchanges.' She believed the revocation of the
i
Notification of Vacancies Order in that year considerably reduced the
reporting of job openings to the Employment Service. We can also usefully
compare the pattern of job finding in the U.C.S, case with that found in the
1 2
West Midlands by Reid. Table 7»3 shows how the U.C.S, workers found their
first post-redundancy jobs and compares this with the West Midlands study.
Table 7.3 Row the U.C.S. Workers Pound Their First Post-Redundancy Jobs
In Comparison with Redundant Engineering Workers, V/est Midlands 1966-66
U.C.S. West Midlands
How Job V/as Pound Nos. Nos. 2k
Friends or Relatives 83 32.3 196 33.20
Advertisement 32 12.2 122 20.67
Gate Notice 2 0.8 12 2.03
Trade Union 8 3.0 12 2.03
Employment Service 25 9.5 91 15.42
Applied on 'Off Chance* 90 34.2 115 19.49
Private Employment Agency 1 0 .4 3 0.50
Other 20 7.6 39 6.61
D.K. 1 — - -
TOTAL 264 100 590 100
10. See Mackay, D.I, et al., op. cit., Table 13.2, Chapter 13»
11. Kahn, H.R,, op. cit., p.108.
12. See Reid," G.h. (1972)', op. cit.
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If we consider friends or relatives, gate notice and applying onthe 
'off-chance* to he 'informal* ways of finding another job, and advertise­
ment, trade union, employment service and private employment agency to be
'formal * ways of doing so, then for both sets of workers the former seemed
15more likely to produce new jobs than the latter. This was especially so 
in the case of the U.C.S. workers where | of the men's first jobs were 
found by such means in comparison with approximately y f/a  of the West 
Midlands workers. Consequently, we can conclude that more job opportunities 
appeared to be on offer and were being accepted along formal channels in the 
Vest Midlands than in the Glasgow area.
Penetration rates alone, however, do not convey a complete picture of 
the relative effectiveness of different job finding methods since, for 
example, a given method might fail to produce a large proportion of all the 
jobs found but still be very effective if only a small proportion of 
job seekers used it. The 'placement rate’, that is the number of jobs 
found by a given method as a proportion of the numbers claiming to use 
that method, allows for this. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding 
the numbers actually using different job search methods and the numbers 
of jobs found in different ways leaves the placement rate open to question 
here as in previous studies. Table 7*4 gives some indication of this.
13. The tendency for blue collar workers to find jobs through mainly 
informal methods of job search is, of course, a pattern well 
.established in British and American labour market studies.
See, for example, Sheppard, H.L. and Belitsky, A.H., op. cit. 
p.89, Kahn, H.R., op. cit., pp.94-95 und Wedderburn, B., op. cit, 
pp.146-149.
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Reid has previously observed that the way in which job search questions
are put can have different effects on the placement rate.^^ V/hen workers,
for example, are asked an 'open* question rather than presented with a
checklist of job search methods, higgler placement rates will ensue as
workers are more likely to mention job search channels unprompted if they
15found work through them. The V/est Midlands study used the former stylo
of question and the U.C.S, survey the latter which makes a direct comparison
!
between them inappropriate. It also suggests that we look elsewhere to 
explain the anomalies emerging in the U.C.S. data. An alternative 
explanation is that there are important differences between ways of 
looking for jobs and ways of finding them. Some men, for example, may not 
have considered 'friends or relatives' and 'applying on the off-chance' as 
methods of job search although jobs could and apparently did 'materialise' 
through them. If we fail to distinguish between ways of job search and 
job finding, then 'windfall' gains are more likely to accrue to informal 
methods improving their performance in relation to more formal methods.
Although we have questioned the validity of equating job search with 
job finding, the implications of so doing are shown when we calculate 
'adjusted* placement rates (column (4)) by including all those finding 
jobs by given methods in the numbers using those methods. This does not 
change the ranking of the different rates but changes their magnitudes 
with the exception of public and private employment agencies. This again 
illustrates that the positive act of registering with a job finding agency 
provides a 'harder* base on which to estimate success rates but, by the 
same token, such 'formal * methods will be excluded from 'windfall* place­
ment gains.
(14) Reid, G.L. (1972), op. cit.
(13) In fact, placement rates found in the West Midlands by Reid were
considerably higher for all methods but one, 'applying on the off- 
chance.
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With the foregoing reservations in mind, table 7»4 suggest that 
besides accounting for larger proportions of all the first jobs found 
the informal methods appeared also more effective in comparison with the 
formal methods. There are several substantive reasons why this should 
be so. First, although informal methods of job search have been the object 
of considerable criticism because of their alleged inefficiency, there is 
also reason to believe that this criticism is exaggerated if not misplaced.
Second, we must talce into account how the demand for labour was being 
transmitted. Despite the radical decline in notified vacancies, employers' 
manpower requirements would undoubtedly have been somewhat higher since 
notified vacancies are not definitive indicators of the true demand for 
labour. Even in a tight labour market situation when firms might be 
expected to notify vacancies more assiduously, Mackay et al. (op. cit.)
17
found that, typically, firms still under-reported to a substantial degree.
In very slack employment conditions like those prevailing in Glasgow over
1969 and 1971 ; unemployed men would have been actively seeking out firms
requiring labour, reducing still further an employer's need as well as
inclination to use the Employment Service along with other more formal
18
methods of recruitment. In such circumstances, where the demand for 
labour was largely concealed and drawn to the attention of job seekers 
through informal channels, the opportunity for formal methods, and in 
particular the Employment Service to 'perform well' was by the same token 
clearly reduced. This is amplified by a more detailed review of the 
Employment Service’s placements.
Of the 25 men placed by the Employment Service, 2$ were craftsmen, 
an occupational group which the Employment Service is not normally noted 
for placing. At the same time this only amounted to 13/9^ of all the
160 See Eeidg, G» Le, (1972)opocitc,and Rees^ A<, "Information Networks in Labor Marknts", 
American Econoiidc Review (Papers and Proceedings) May I966, pp,539-566.
17o See Mackay, D,I. et.alo, 0£»cito, PPo351«356 and p*364,
I80 See Hunter, LoO* and Reid, G.L*, op.cit. pp.ll6-117.
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craftsmen contacting the Employment Service which, nevertheless, was
obviously better than for the other skill groups. Of the 55 men from
other occupational categories registering, the Employment Service was
able to place only two, one unskilled and one semi-skilled worker.
Since, however, the skilled men had as much contact with the Employment
Service as others, this together with the almost total lack of notified
vacancies for less skilled workers made it more likely that wlien the
Employment Service made a placement a skilled worker would benefit,
A third difficulty in the way of the Employment Service was that
contacts tended to be older and, therefore, more difficult to place than 
19non-contacts, The non-contacts as previously indicated included 5 men 
over 65 who would not have been entitled to unemployment benefit. Excluding 
them, only half as many ( l2 ,y /o ) of the non-contacts were in the vulnerable 
over 59 age bracket in comparison with 23 per cent of those who did contact 
the Employment Service, Too much should not be made of this, however, since 
the best age-specific placement rate achieved by the Employment Service,
13,4®^ for those under 30, did not greatly exceed the average, ll,4^ b, for 
all Employment Service contacts.
Table 7»5 - Employment Service Placement Rates by Age Group
Age
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-39 6Q-64 All Nos,
13 .4 10.2 12,0 ■ 11.8 ■' 5.9 11 .4 220
While recognising that the relatively few placements made by the 
Employment Service make categorical conclusions risky, table 7*5 suggests 
that workers stood a small but, except for workers over 60, more or less 
equal chance of obtaining a job through the Employment Service irrespective 
of their age. The upshot of ttiis is that even if all the 3OO job seekers 
had contacted the Employment Service and its performance, age group for age
19. 'Eie differences were significant at the 95 per cent level.
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group, had been similar to that in table 7*5 the overall placement rate 
would have risen only marginally from 11.4^ 0 to 11.9^ o. In other words, 
the weak performance of the Employment Service was not primarily due to the 
fact that it had to deal with workers having particularly disadvantageous 
age and skill characteristics.
As a final comment, we must reiterate loudly and clearly that consider­
able methodological problems are involved in verifying the extent to which 
different job search methods are actually used. This might involve, for 
example, closely monitoring the search activities of a small cohort of 
job seekers. Without such validation however, we must agree with 
Sheppard and Belitsky 'that care be used when interpreting data dealing 
with the role of such agencies as the Employment Service in the job seeking
activities of blue collar workers .... reliable answers to key questions
20cannot always be obtained through one or two simply worded inquiries,'
(0) The Quality of Placement
For those workers whom the Employment Service did place, an interest­
ing question is whether their adjustment to redundancy was better than for 
those who found other jobs on their own. Here, a number of factors migiit 
be taken into account including their time out of work, how the workers 
felt about the jobs first taken up and how the jobs compared in terms 
of skill and remuneration. Since the Employment Service placements were 
almost exclusively craftsmen, the comparison we make here is between the 
experience of skilled workers finding work 'off their own bat' and the 
skilled men who found jobs through the Employment Service.
The available evidence does little to suggest that workers finding 
jobs through the Employment Service did better as a result. There was, 
for example, no significant difference between the transitional unemploy­
ment of Employment Service users and non-users although the latter were,
20. Sheppard, H.L, and Belitsky, A.H., op. cit., p.90,
\3&
The normal placing criteria of tkie Employment Service act against 
occupational mobility since there is some concern to preserve the skills 
of workers and to maintain credibility with employers seeking recruits.
So the high occupational stability of its placements is not surprising, 
but the others, as we can see, managed to do almost as well on their own. 
Another observation on the two groups concerns their respective lengths 
of service in their first jobs.
Table 7>8 Length, of Service in First Job
Employment Service Placements and Others { fo)
Service (months)
Up to 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-18 Nos. U.K. Numbers
Placements 17 26 17 9 17 4 9 - 23
?rs 34 22 15 6 12 6 4 1 178
The length of time a man stays in a job is another possible sign of 
what he feels about it. If he 'votes with his feet' and quits soon after 
taking it, this could be interpreted as an unfavourable commentary on the
quality of the job. Of course, the quit rate is also affected by factors
outwith the control of any job holder. Employment conditions influence 
the availability of alternative openings as well as the security of the 
jobs men are already in and so workers quitting jobs involuntarily can 
hardly be considered as 'voting with their feet'. In fact, i\GPp of both 
Employment Service placements and the others who quit their first jobs 
did so voluntarily while 55^ of the former left through redundancy against
41^ of the latter. So, while the workers placed by the Employment Service
did tend to hold their jobs somewhat longer than the others, relatively 
more suffered further redundancy.
Finally, when asked to express a preference between their present or 
last jobs and those at U.C.S., there was little difference between those 
who found them through the Employment Service and those who used other
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ways. Of the latter, 39^ preferred, their present or last job against 
37^ of the former. At the same time more of the Employment Service 
placements (63 )^ expressed a positive preference for their jobs at U.C.S. 
than the others (30 )^, but this was simply because 11^ of the latter had 
gone back to the selfsame job they were made redundant from, or could see 
no difference between the jobs.
Suniming up, then, the jobs found through the Employment Service had 
both good and bad points when compared with jobs found in other ways.
They were of slightly higher skill level and, in the men's opinion, had 
a higher skill content. They also tended to be held longer. Against 
that, they were, onbdance, less well paying, ultimately less secure and 
there was no indication that men relying on the Employment Service for 
placement were likely to experience shorter frictional unemployment as 
a result. Neither was there any evidence that more men finding jobs 
through the Employment Service found them preferable to those at U.C.S. 
than ffl©n finding jobs in other ways. All in,all, there is no overwhelming 
reason to believe that the performance of the Employment Service made up 
in quality for what it lacked in. quantity.
4. Conclusions
This chapter examined the role of the Employment Service during and 
after the U.C.S. redundancies. Almost % of the job seekers contacted the 
Employment Service and, contrary to the usual pattern, craftsmen were just 
as likely to use it as others. The large numbers of tradesmen made 
redundant and the prevailing conditions made this inevitable, 'In-plant' 
placement activities would have raised the contact rate even higher still. 
Most of the workers not contacting the Emplojrment Service did not do so 
because they had other jobs to go to and many others simply preferred to
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find work independently. Only around of the non-contacts anticipated 
some dissatisfaction with the sen?vice provided.
Tie Employment Service, however, was not very effective. Under 
half of the contacts received job offers, and these were more likely to 
be younger than older workers. The evident dearth of notified vacancies 
which complicated placement did not, however, persuade those receiving 
job offers to talce whatever was going. Just over half turned down job 
offers principally because of 'poor pay' followed by an unpreparedness 
to move house or accept difficult travel to work.
The Employment Service compared unfavourably with other job search 
methods, as the penetration rate, 9*5$^  indicates. This was lower than 
that established by other recent British studies and much lower than that 
suggested for Britain by the O.E.C.B,
'Informal' methods in Glasgow also appeared to be more 'effective' 
in that higher proportions of users found jobs through them than through 
formal methods. Our data suggests, however, that a fairer judgement 
on the Employment Service requires a much more thorough,if difficult, 
investigation of job search and job finding techniques together with 
the recognition that they need not be the same. While recognising this, 
informal methods have recently received support and the dearth of notified 
vacancies suggests that employers in Glasgow were satisfying their require­
ments by informal methods thereby reducing the probability of finding a 
job by more formal means. Although Employment Service contacts were 
slightly older than non-contacts, the available evidence suggests that 
this was not the main reason for its weak performance.
Apart from the quantity of placement its quality is important and 
the evidence on this was mixed. There was little difference between 
Employment Service placements and others in duration of transitional
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•unemployment, job preference or in ability to preserve occupational status. 
The former, however, felt the skill content of the jobs was higher and they 
were also likely to stay in them slightly longer. On the other side of 
the coin, these jobs were slightly less secure and offered less take-home 
pay and lower hourly income than those found by men 'under their own steam'.
In conclusion, the Emj^ loyment Service clearly had a thankless task.
The role of 'honest broker' recommended for it by the O.E.C.D. was very 
difficult .to fulfil when the requirements of one side of the market were 
not matched by similar demand on the cbher. In such circumstances, its 
relatively weali performance was virtually inevitable. The powerlessness 
of the Employment Service in the face of the daunting employment conditions 
was sympathetically recognised by many of the workers. A 4I year old 
joiner who had experienced I6 weeks transitional unemployment and unemployed 
when interviewed commented,
'Prom very recent experience all I can say is if there 
is no work for the Exchange to give the men what can 
they do?'
Similarly, a 53 year old labourer unemployed for over a year since being 
made redundant believed the solution lay outwith the Employment Service,
'More likely it's the country that needs to be changed.
They ('bhe E.S.) are only people doing a job. They can't 
find jobs that are not there.'
Chapter 6
The Image of the Employaient Service
1o Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we recognised that the 'image' of the 
Employment Service, that is employers' and workers' preconceptions of what 
it was supposed to do and how well it was likely to do it, would affect 
their confidence and the extent to which they would use it. Particular 
emphasis has been put on the liandicap placed upon the Employment Service by 
the paying out of unemployment benefit in addition to bringing job seekers 
and vacancies together* One consequence of this 'duality' is considered 
to be a reduction in the plausibility of the Employment Service as a labour
market as distinct from a social security agency* hïuch of this is often
attributed to the impact which memories of the pre-war 'dole queues’ continues 
to have on the consciousness of potential users even to-day* The 0*E.C.D, 
summed up this particular problem in the following way, 'The British 
Employment Service was originally founded for the explicit purpose of 
improving the mobility of labour* It has, however, received its chief 
imprint from the years of the depression, when its primary obligation came 
to be regarded as the payment of unemployment benefit*^
In this chapter we examine' various aspects of the U.C.S, workers'
attitude towards the Employment Service and relate this to its actual, 
performance which v/e covered in chapter 7* In section 2 we briefly look 
at what the redundant men expected of the Employment Service and why.
Section 3 goes on to establish the 'image' the respondents actually 
had of the Employment Service and also asks whether they found the service 
given them useful or not* The whole of section 4 is devoted to a detailed 
review of the worleers' opini.ons of the Employment Service and what changes 
they would like to see in it.
1* 'Manpower Policy in the United Kingdom' op*cit*, p*l60*
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v/e should recognise at the outset, however, that the Employment
Service was not ignorant of most of the déficiences identified by the
U«C*S* workers, A comprehensive documentation of these defects nevertheless
was not published until December 1971 and plans to remedy them were not put
(2 )into action until after that*^  ^ Consequently, although the criticisms 
of the UoCoBo workers were, in mid 1971s about to be overtaken by events 
they were no less authentic for that * In the following discussion we 
acknowledge the remedies envisaged by the Department of Employment's policy
I
documents* Section 5 presents the conclusions, ]
2* Tb.e V/orkers* Expectations of the Employment Service
Those workers who contacted the Employment Service were asked,
♦Did you expect that tiie Employment Service would be able to get 
you suitable work? ♦
Excluding 6 ’don't know's', the responses fell into two almost
equal optimistic and pessimistic groups, IO3 (48^ ) saying 'yes' and 111
(52 )^ saying 'no'. These proportions were not the same for all occupations
and age groups but, at the same t:.me, there was no systematic pattern in
these differences. For example, while the skilled and staff workers
divided evenly in their expectations, § of the unskilled workers were
optimistic and § of.the semi-skilled workers pessimistic, V/e know that
the semi-skilled workers were the oldest occupational group and this may
have led to their lower expectations. The proportions expressing pessimistic
expectations did not, however, increase piogressively with age* For example,
47^ of the under 30's were pessimistic compared with 63^ of men between
30 and 39, 50^ of men from 40 to 49» 56/'o of men aged 50 to 59 and only 29^
of men over 60,
(2) See 'People and Jobs - a Modern Employment Service', Department of 
Employment, December 19?1 and 'Into Action - Plan for a Modern 
Employment Service', Department‘~ôT~Tmpïbÿment, December 1972*
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Looking at the reasons for these expectations, the pessimists seem 
to have been more realistic than the optimists* For example, the predominant 
justification (68^ Q given by the optimists for expecting a job through the 
Employment SesnhLce was simply the observation
'that's their job' or 'that's what it’s there for*
This 'expectation' was either an act of unusual faith or more probably
another illustration of the limited knowledge typifying many marlæt, and,
(3) !particularly labour market situations* |
The pessimists appeared to have taken a more 'hard-headed' view of
I
the situation* By far the most prominent reason for their pessimism wasj
i
the gravity of the employment conditions. Forty six (4I/Q of the 111 
pessimists based their low expectations on this* The remaining reasons put 
forward by the pessimists fell into two main categories, unfavourable 
personal characteristics era poor opinion of the Employrront Service * For 
example, seventeen workers (l5/0 felt they suffered from an age or skill 
disadvantage, most of these (I4) believing lack of relevant skill to be their 
major problem, 11 of them tradesmen.
Altogether thirty nine (35^ 0 of the pessimists attributed their 
lack of confidence to something about the Employment Service itself* Sixteen 
of these workers simply said that suitable jobs were not to be found through 
the employment exchange net-work: and the other twenty three more bluntly 
said it was 'hopeless' or had never managed to help them before* The under­
reporting of vacancies to the Employment Service is, of course, one of the 
operating difficulties it is understood to face* In this regard, one of the 
four main objectives outlined in 'People and Jobs etc,' was 'to convince 
employers that it is worth informing the Service of at least double the two 
million vacancies notified in recent years,
( 3 ) See,, for example,. Stigler.o. GoJ.o.j. .'Information In the Labor Market'. 
Journal of Political Economy Supplement (VOL*70, 1962) and Parries, H.S., 
op.cit. pp 165-169.
(4) 'People and Jobs etc.' op.cit.p.7«
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Consequently, without doubting the conviction of our respondents, at 
least some of their criticism might be properly seen less as a criticism
of the Employment Service itself than of the system within which it has to
(5) operate* ^
A final comment on the UoC*8* workers' expectations of the Employment 
Service is afforded by the extent to wtiich they wore realised which we can 
evaluate by comparing the proportion of optimists placed by the Employment 
Service with the proportion of pessimists* Given the low placement rate 
achieved by the Employment Service, v;e would anticipate the expectations 
of the pessimists rather than khe optimists to be vindicated* In fact only 
9*4^ of the pessimists who found jobs did so through the Employment Service 
compared with 17*1/^  of the optimists* Although it is true that a bigger 
proportion of the optimists were placed by the Employment Service, it is 
nonetheless clear that the pessimists’ estimation was nearer the mark*
Only 9o4^ of the pessimists had their expectations controverted compared 
with 82*9/^  of the optimists which illustrates tliat the optimists' initial 
belief in the Employment Service was, in the circumstances, excessive anyway.
3o The 'Image' of the Emnlqiyment Serv^ ice
If the Employment Service is primarily seen not as a labour market 
agency but rather as a branch of the social security system then its 
effectiveness in the former role may suffer, particularly if labour seeking 
firms and employment seeking workers feel that the employment exchanges are 
associated with the ’work-sliy’ and people incapable of taking' eny initiative 
by themselves* In such circumstances firms would prefer to recruit through 
other sources and men anxious for work would consider an association with the 
Employment Service to be detrimental. Interestingly, however, the Department
(5) The workers' recommendations on this problem and others are discussed 
further in section 4c
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of Employment believes social and economic aims must be reconciled,
'The Employment Service has both an economic and social function and 
these cannot be separated (particularly those) special responsibilities 
to those workers who experience unusual difficulties in getting or keeping 
satisfactory emplo^ rment * ' ^
V/hile we can make no evaluation from the employers' side we can 
compare how the Employment Service was viewed by those who did and those 
who did not make contact with it* The respondents' opinions were elicited 
by showing a card listing six different descriptions of the Employment 
Service and asking,
'Looking at this card, which comment is the best description of 
your attitude to the Employment Exchange? '
Table 8*1* The Image of the Employment Service in the Eyes of
Workers Contacting and Not Contacting the Service (sfo)
View of the Workers Contacting Worlmrs not
Employment Service# the E/S Contacting the e/S All
1, A Place For Finding Out
About Jobs 27 19 25
2o A Place Where You Collect
the Dole 39 28 37
3, A Pla.ce For Finding Out
about Training 2 2
4. A PU.ace For Layabouts 13 38 20
5* A Place For Finding Men to
Fill Jobs 15 .14 14
6. None of These 3 1 2
Numbers Don’t Know 4 6 10
Numbers 220 80 300
# Note: The sequence of the listed descriptions was varied among
the show cards used by different interviewers to avoid bias.
(6) 'People and Jobs etc.* op,cit*, p*6, Rees, (op*cit*)* however, suggests 
there can be a 'strong tension’ between such social and economic 
objectives*
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Taking all 3OO active job seekers together, the Employment Service 
was most frequently seen as 'a place where you collect the dole' over J- of 
them seeing it in this light. Hiis retrospective view, however, was 
probably ting'ed. by more than a touch of irony if not bitterness because 
of the men's post redundancy experience* Some initially mi^t not have seen 
the Employment Service as basically a dole paying organisation but in the 
circumstances that's what it turned out to be? This of resignation was 
poignantly conveyed by a 51 year old fitter, |
'I used to thiidc they were to get you jobs but not now* They j
can't help much* They have more people wanting jobs than jobs :
needing people* It is not really their fault* It's just too
much unemployment in Scotland*'
Reid's appraisal of the Employment Service in another redundancy '
situation again makes a useful comparison. He found that less than 20^
considered it to be 'a place where you collect the dole' while over half
viewed it as a place for finding jobs, finding men for jobs or finding
out about training,^ ' In comparison, 37^ o of the U,C„S* workers saw it
in its dole paying role and 41^ in its 'Labour market' role* While these
differences are not conclusive in themselves, they are consistent with the
experience of the respective groups and with the performance of the
Employment Service in each case*
Some interesting differences emerged between Employment Service
contacts and non-contacts on Clydeside* The biggest difference was in the
proportions who considered the Employment Exchange 'a place for layabouts'.
Three times as many of the non-contacts described it as such and they were
also more inclined to describe it in this way than as a place for collecting
the dole* A corollary of this was that only -J- of them viewed the Employment
Service as a job finding agency. In the preceding chapter we saw that the
non-contacts were somewhat younger than the contacts, were back into work
more quicld-y and exhibited some preference for finding work on their ovai*
This suggests that they were a more independent, more forceful group*
(7) Held, G.L,, (1971) op.oit.
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Many of them also seemed extraordinarily insensitive to the position of
those thrown on to the Labour îïbcchanges. This is underlined when we compare
them with Reid's study* There, around 20^ of Emplo^ nnent Service contacts
and non-contact8 alike saw it as 'a place for layabouts'* This is still
a sizeable proportion but considerably less than among those who preferred
to 'go it alone' on Clydeside*
Some of the reasoning behind this view-point emerged in the responses
to another 'open' question on the Employment Service. For example, a $1
year old semi-skilled worker put it,
'■People should be allowed to receive money for, say, 3 months*
Tliree months is adequate time for a person to find a job, '
Another 25 year old pipe-fitter recommended,
'Tell them to dig streets or gardens for the money they are getting.
Get them to be of some use to the community*'
.And a 28 year old electrician thought,
'You should get more money for the first month and less each 
progressive month until you get a job* This would also sort out 
the hangers-on who've been on the books for years,'
This last advice was all the more extraordinary since the man's experience
after redundancy had been anything but easy* It had taken him 20 weeks
to get another job from which he had been made redundant again! Since
leaving U.C.S, he had been out of work for a total of 2? weeks and was
still unemployed when interviewed* Me are not suggesting that the social
security system suffers from no abuse but it is surprising to find men
made redundant from a labour force popularly considered as specially
solidaristic and militant exhibiting such little a.wareness of the reasons
for and the problems of involuntary unemployment*
In view of the Employment Service's performance and its image in the
eyes of the U.C.S, v/orkers we would not expect those contacting it to have
found it very useful as a job finding agency* In fact, most of them found
it either not very useful or useless but the differences between tlieir
opinions and those found, for example, by Reid (1971 ) op*cit, were not
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very great*
Table 8*2* Usefulness of Employjnent Service Information and
Advice in Looking for Hew Work, Employment Service
Contacts on Clydeside and in the West Midland
Usefulness of Information U.C.S* W.M.
Very Useful 7,7 10*4
Quite Useful 19*1 23.4
Hot Very Useful 34,5 26*8
Useless 35,0 34.2
Indifferent /Don * t Know 3.6 5.2
Numbers 220. 518*
A third of Employment Service contacts in the West Midlands found 
its assistance quite useful or very useful compered with 26*8^ of the U*0*8* 
people* Given a placement rate of l lo 4 f ^  on Clydeside, it is surprising 
to find a considerably higher proportion of the U.C.S, respondents 
commending the usefulness of the Employment Service* AI.though our question 
asked for an opinion on job infoimation specifically, tliere seemed a 
possibility that the men did not distinguish this from the sympathetic 
treatment which they may have received from Employment Service officials.
As we shall see in the following section, however, the respondents' overall 
impression of how they were treated by Employment Service officials was 
unfavourable rather than favourable*
An alternative explanation is that althou^r the placements directly 
attributable to the, Employnmnt Service were unimpressive the informs/bi on 
provided gave the recipients new ideas or brought other employment 
possibilities to their attention indirectly. For example, a worker sent 
to one firm may have found no current openings there but heard of a vacancy 
going in an associated or neighbouring company* This might be considered
( q ) This possibility was also remarked upon by Wedderburn, D,, op*cit< 
P*137 and Kahn, H.R., op*cit., p.lOf*
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a transition from a formal to an informal job search method. In such 
circumstances, the distinction between the two becomes questionable, a 
point to which Reid (1972) attaches considerable emphasis*
It is also a fact of life recogmsed in the Department of Employment’s 
advice to placement officers, ’In dealing with people who are finding 
difficulty in getting and keeping a job, the employiJBnt officer needs to 
know v/here they might find a suitable opening even if no vacancy has been 
notified by employers. Many jobs are found in this way and this means 
that employment officers must have good contacts with employers in their 
area*’ Rees (op* cit,) concurs with this*
Compared with the West Mdlands, the U,C,vS, workers’ opinions of 
the Employment Service’s assistance were not much more adverse. Certainly, 
69*5/ of the U.C.S* people thought the advice giveji them not very useful 
or worse but o lfo of the men using the Employment Service in the West 
Midlands expressed similar views. So despite more favourable employment 
conditions, the Employment Service there did not impress its clients much 
more than on Clydeside, Such findings, similar to those in other British 
studies of redundancy, underline yet again the difficulties wliich the 
Employment Ser\''ice usually has to f a c e , W h e r e  iioost attractive vacancies 
pass the Employment Ser\ûce by and where workers find informal methods of 
job search more productive as a result, it is almost inevitable that the 
placement record of the Employment Service will be poor and a majority 
of clients dissatisfied,
4* Workers’ Recommendations For the Employment Service
Although some workers did not contact the Employment Service after 
redundancy this did not necessarily mean that they had no experience of 
or opinions on the Service, Both Kmploynnnt Seran.ce contacts and non-contacts 
(9) ’3?eop].e and Jobs’, op* cit,, p*l6*
(LO) See, for example, Kahn, Hilda R., op*cit,, p*98 and pp,102-110,
Wedderburn, D, , pp.«cijb, pp*136-138, as well as Reid, G.L,, (1972) op*cit.
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were therefore asked a general question,
'Are there any clianges you would like to see in the Employment 
Service?’
We were prepared to record and classify up to three Goirments from 
each respondent but most, in fact, tended to concentrate on one point 
or another* The pattern of criticism coming from contacts, non-contacts 
and both taJcen together is shorn below.
Table 8.3» Comments on the Employment Service, Contacts
and Non-Contacts (9^ )# .. .... ...
Comment E/S Contacts Non-Contacts Together
Generally Satisfied 6 1 5
Generally Dissatisfied 14 11 13
Critical of e/S Procedure 20 14 18
Critical of Jobs Offered 11 10 11
Critical of Staff 17 18 17
Praise for Staff 5 - 4
'Layabouts * 9 14 10
Don’t Know Much About It 15 34 20
Other 35 18 30
#Note* Percentages do not add to 100 because the respondents 
were free to make more than one comment.
Overall, very few had a favourable impression of the Employment 
Service* Only 11/ of the contacts and 9/ of all the workers were satisfied 
either with the general service or with the Department’s staff. Before 
going on to look at some of the criticisms in greater detail, two-other 
general observations are worth mailing* First, references to 'layabouts’ 
are less prominent than they were in table 8*1, which was based on a 
'closed’ question using a show-card* This suggests that the emphasis on 
’layabouts’ in the previous case may have been partly due to the form of
“  ! P V  •
that question* Second, table 8.3 reports a considerable number of ’other' 
responses, again attributable to the ’open’ form of this question which 
made it difficult to classify some responses under a particul.ar heading*
On inspection, however, most of these ’other’ observations were seen to be 
variations on the main themes outlined in table 8o3* Included in them, 
however, were 14 respondents who said there were no changes they particularly 
desired to see in the Employment Service, ha/f of them because they preferred 
to find their own job and half because they felt the Service had ’made the 
best of a bad job’.
The remainder of tliis section reviews how our respondents criticised 
the Employment Service in their own words* Their comments are reported 
in a number of ’subject areas' which for the most part are equivalent to or 
sub-sections of the general headings we used in table 8*3* Most of the 
substantive criticisms outlined in table 8*3 referred either to Employment 
Service procedure or to its staff. It is these areas we turn to first*
(i) Employment Service Organisation and Procedme
The various criticisms made in this vein were concerned with the 
reporting of vacancies, the size and staffing of the employment 
exchanges in conjunction with their responsibility for paying 
unemployment benefit and their placement procedure* We cover each 
of them in turn*
(a) Tne Reporting of Vacancies
Communications between the Employment Service and recruit- 
in firms were considered deficient in two ways. First, firms 
failed to report their manpower requirements in full. Second, 
many employers who did report vacancies often failed to notify 
the Employment Service if and when they were filled. As an example 
of the former criticism, a 61 year old plumber’s helper said,
'I should like to see all jobs for working folk at (the) 
exchange not just ones they can’t fill by other means,'
And a fitter’s mate put it,
'One thing’ I would like is that the labour exchange should 
handle all vacancies for all jobs as I feel just now they 
only get the jobs no one wants*’
A , 31 year old sheet metal worker felt communications were deficient
but also felt, as things were, it was a disadvantage to be associated
with the Employment Service,
’I think myself there should be more contact between the !
exchange and employers* Employers don’t seem to be keen on | 
taking on men with a "wee green card". They’d rather have a ■ 
man who hadn’t been to the exchange, just applied "off his 1 
own bat" c ’ j
I
As a final indication of this vein of criticism, a 54 year old ;
electrician thou^t that workers, given the opportunity, would
rather use the Employment Service than other formal methods,
’Employers sliould be encouraged to malæ use of the exchange*
Surely this would save money on adverts, etc* I'fen are not 
keen to write to box numbers any>;ay, ’
This veiki of criticism is self-evidently an important one. Under-
notification of vacancies by employers is a large, if not the major,
handicap to the Service’s placement activities* In its plan for
future reorganisation (which is now current) the Department of
Employment professed ’no desire to secure a monopoly in placing work
for its Employment Service ’ and proposed to rectify this particular
deficiency by'marketing' the idea of the Employment Service to
employers,  ^ In the absence of any statutory obligation there is
clearly little alternative open to it* Changing a ’brand image’,
however, is no small task and, although obviously worthwhile,
expectations about its success in the short term, if realistic,
shouJ.d not be too high*
(11) 'People and Jobs etc,’, op.cit*, pp* 6-7
~ -j »
The frustration and cost of being referred to an already filled
vacancy was conveyed by a 52 year, old 'marker off,
'I think there is something wrong with the system* Employers 
don't notify the exchange when jobs are filled. Men are out 
expenses going on wild goose chases
A nurnber of other men also commented on the travelling costs involved
in pursuing job opportunities unsuccessfully, While redundancy pay
and unemployment benefit are intended, in part, to cover such
outlays, there is a case for these specific costs being underv/ritten
by the issue of travel tokens, especially in the case of the long
term unemployed*
(b) 'hie Size and Staffing of Employment Exchanges
In the preceding sections we suggested that circumstances made
the payment of unemployrment benefit loom still larger in the minds
of the men when asked to appraise the Employment Service, Inevitably
and understandably this function also figured prominently in their
general recommendations. Some ruefully observed that they simply
were not big enough to accommodate the numbers employed,
'The exchanges should be larger - more in keeping with the 
number of unemployed people*
or more succinctly,
'more room, more staff
This criticism was prevalent in Clydebank where one employment
exchange had to take care of considerable numbers of redundant men
whereas U,0,S, workers living in Glasgow would have reported to
different employment exchanges throughout the city. Others were
more explicit about the nature of the problem,
'Congested, - would like it speeded up on "pay-out" days « 
got to stand in one queue for the slip and another for the 
money'
This brought the recommendation from another worker,
'Send the money out by post. It would give them time to find 
jobs for people,'
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There is little that needs to be added by way of commentary 
other than to aclmowledge 'bhe pressure put on the emplo^ nnent 
exclianges by the numbers of imemployed men they were required to 
handle*
(c) The Placing Procedure of the Employment Service
Our respondents made various comments about the placing
procedure they experienced although the changes which some men
would welcome were occasionally at variance with those recommended
by others* For example, some wanted greater flexibility in the
placement criteria of the Employment Service while others complained
about being referred to 'inappropriate* job openings* The comments
reported here suggest more 'self-service' in the exchanges, different
sections for different skills and age groups as well as a review of
the Service's placement criteria*
An analytical estimator combined several of these comments in
asking for 'Self-service like they have in England* They only 
offer you jobs in your own trade whereas you would 
try many others if offered* All jobs should be 
displayed on notices and men can pick what they want'.
And a joiner suggested,
'There should be a sort of 'job libræ:y' where you could 
look through cards etc, giving jobs instead of standing 
about waiting to be attended,'
While an engineer expressed a desire
',** to see them like the London on "telly" where they 
had cards with jobs and you could look around for 
yourself*'
However, a prerequisite for a self-service system is that there should 
be a stock of jobs suitable for perusal and while this may have been 
true for 'the London one on the "telly" ' it was decidedly not for 
Glasgow at the time*
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Other workers felt more specialised treatment according to
occupation was required and it seemed that this was, again, partly
due to the sheer weight of numbers tlirown on to the exchanges* The
situation at Clydebanic was particularly remarked upon once more*
'Labour exchanges for separate jobs or skills* Clydebank 
has 2,000 men on their books and you are just another number 
to tiiem' e
And an engineer was still more critical,
‘I would like to see part of the exchange laid out only for 
engineers* The Glasgow labour exchanges are a pleasure to 
go in and look for work - comfortable seats, adequate 
lighting, pleasant decor* Clydebank is a shambles compared 
to this'*
While a pipe-fitter recommended,
'Deal with the trade unions a bit more then people wouldn't 
be sent to jobs that weren't suitable*'
FinaZly an engineer felt that men were being unnecessarily limited by
their past work history and training,
'I would like to have the chance of serving at some other 
trade* The fact that I'm a time served engineer bars me
from taking any other training course whatsoever. If I
could talce a training course in any of these things they
advertised I would willingly do so but they won't allow me,'
From such observations one, again, gets the impression of the 
emplojanent exchanges and particularly Clydebank labouring under a 
heavier work load than they could adequately handle* Hence, the 
requests for self-service and different premises for different 
occupational groups, boih clearly intended to 'break up' or short 
circuit the procedures in use. In a situation where the openings 
in any one particular trade were severely restricted it is also 
understandable that some men would want to 'talce their chances’ 
in some other field*
Other workers, particularly older men, thought or hoped that
the ineffectiveness of the Employment Ser\dce might be overcome by
some organisational change. The resentment and helplessness of
the older worker was captured by a 58 yeùr old plumber,
'I wish they would find me a job - that’s all* It seems
you are done - finished at 50® I don't feel done I I want 
to work'o
Other workers made more positive suggestions,
'There should be a special register for-older men. The 
over seem to be finished as far as the labour
exchange is concerned’,
or
'A special section making a round of employers willing them 
(sic) to take older men who have years of experience*
I'fen over 50 should have a separate office to go to where 
they can be looked after thoroughly'.
The Department of Employment’s ’plan for the fu'bui?e’ inevitably
embraced the size and staffing of its exchanges as well as their
placement procedures* Many of our respondents' recommendations were scheduled
to be introduced including the separation of placement from benefit paying
activities, paying unemployment benefit by post and providing facilities for
more ’self-service’* While admirable in themselves, even if implemented in
Glasgow over 1969 and 1971 their impact would have been questionable because
of the severity of the prevailing employment conditions* This is especially
so in the case of the older workers’ demands for preferential treatment*
Even if they had been accorded this, they would still have been at a disadvantage*
Nevertheless, their request was an understandable one which, if acted upon,
could be worthwhile An more favourable circumstances* Although 'People and Jobs'
paid some attention to specialised services for particular groups, specific
reference to the older worker was notable by its absence. The problems of the
older worker certainly justify a 'mature workers' equivalent of the Youth
( Ip)Employment Service*^
(ii) The Employment Service Officials
As we saw in table 8*5 the staff of the Employment Service 
received much more criticism than praise* The nature of the men's 
observations indicates the invidious position which the Employment 
Service officials were in. Soiæ men blamed the staff for not being
12o See Mukerjee, S«, '*][hrough No Fault of Their 0\s?n', P.E,P*1975» pp*21-25,
where some possible ways of helping the older worker are explored including
more imaginative management of internal labour marlcets by employers*
able to get them a job but most of the criticism was directed at 
the apparent attitude of the officials* One plumber in his 
"kwent ie s complained,
'Everyone is treated in the same cheeky way whether you are 
gemim or a layabout'
and another asserted,
'I'd like them to get me a job. There is a kind of "couldn't 
care less" attitude in that place. They are alright and that 
is all that matters,'
Such resentment against people who were in employment was
understandable* The frustration caused by involuntao:y unemployment
and its impact on the men's self-esteem were also evident in their
sensitivity about how they were regarded, A middle-aged electrician
demanded,
'Civility! - because you are unemployed they treat you 
like dirt,'
Similar protests were
'You sit like wooden soldiers waiting and they've nothing to 
offer you. The waiting is worst - the lack of communication. 
They treat you like dirt'
and
'Some people behind the counter treat you as a layabout - 
don't seem to realise you don't want to be out of work'.
Other workers, however, were prepared to recognise that there
were limitations on the Employment Service staff's ability to do
anything for them,
'I thoug3.it the employment exchange people quite civil but 
quite definitely very understaffed. You have to wait for 
hours and then discover there are no jobs to be got an^ a'/ay',
or
'I felt they were sympathetic and willing to help but unable 
to do so satisfactorily because of the large numbers they 
were dealing with'.
No doubt some Employment Service officers were off-hand and 
unsympathetic to the redundant workers, Ifech of the criticism 
directed at the staff would, however, have been caused by the
circumstances* The officials could not place men in jobs which 
were not there or attend to large numbers of unemployed men 
siniultaneous].y but their failure to do so drew some personal criticism: 
Taking everything into consideration parhops the most appropriate 
conclusion was drawn by one man who observed,
'I feel that they did their best for me* There just was no 
work to be got*'
(iid) The Image of the Employment Service
The preceding sections reviewed the factors influencing the 
'image* of the Employment Service and outlined what this image was 
in the eyes of the U.CoS* workers* A closer examination of the men's 
views confirms that many were concerned about being condemned as 
'layabouts' through association. Some felt there was some stigma 
in being seen to be unemployed and believed postal delivery of 
unemployment benefit would help,
*I don't think there is anything wrong with them but to me 
they are very degrading places. If they could send out money 
instead of collecting it this would help'
and
'I would have preferred to have had ray unemployment money posted 
on to me to save me the embarrassment of going there'.
Others considered the stigma was attached to the habitual users
of the employment exchanges and expressed some apprehension that it
would rub off on to 'genuine' job seekers; e,g, a fitter in his
twenties thought,
'They should have a department for those who want to work and one 
for those who don't, keep them separate. It's very depressing 
to queue with those who don't want to work.'
Similar sentiments were depressed by a 50 year old plater's helper,
'Exchanges should be separated for men really wanting to 
continue working and th^e others who just go for the handouts. '
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A curious feature mentioned in section 3 and which we return to 
here was that many of the men expressing contempt for the 'regulars', 
had experienced considerable difficulty in getting hack into work 
and were often again unemployed when interviewed. This, one might 
have ‘bhought, would have persuaded them to see other unemployed men 
in a somewhat different light, as victims of the economic situation 
in the West of Scotland* Instead, it was their concern with the 
'layabouts' which they chose to emphasise. Indeed, a surprising 
feature of the survey was how many still felt unemployment was culpable 
and avoidable. This was typified by a plumber who couldn't find a 
job at his trade and, after 18 weeks unemployment, took a labouring 
job,
'Cut off the money from men who have been on the exchange too 
long. I'm a tradesman and I've taken a labouring job because 
there was nothing else. I'd rather have this job tlmn not work 
at all,'
The preceding personal observations help to animate the data
presented in chapter 7 und earlier in this chapter. They underline
the scale of the problem and the difficulties found both by the men
and the Employment Service, Our impression of an Eraploynent Service
facing a 'Herculean' task is clearly reinforced by the workers' om i
reading of the situation. In view of the evident lack of dynamism
in the local economy, the recommendation made by a 45 year old joiner
was perhaps a legitimate one,
'A rise in unemployment money. If there's no work they can't do 
anything about it, '
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5 « Conclu s ions
Itiis chapter examined the image of the Employment Service as seen 
by the U.C.B, workers, how they evaluated its usefulness to theip and the 
changes they would like to see in it. Workers contacting the Eniployment 
Service were evenly divided in their expectations of finding jobs through 
it and these expectations'were not systematically related to age or skill*
The main reasons for holding pessimistic expectations were the prevailing 
employment conditions, lack of confidence in the Employment Service and 
unfavourable personal characteristics like age and, more particularly, skil],* 
The low opinion of the Employment Service was largely based on the fact 
that few good jobs were notified to it, which might properly be seen more 
as a criticism of the system rather than of the Employment Service itself,. 
Optimists justified their high expectations mainly with the simple observation, 
‘that's their job' but the Employment Service's low placement rate caused 
the pessimists' expectations to come much nearer the mark.
The commonest view of the Employment Service held by the U.CcS* 
workers was 'a place where you collect the dole’ and this was more prevalent 
than amongst workers made redundant in the West Midlands between 1966 and 
1968 under better employment conditions. Non contacts saw the Employment 
Service in a less favourable light than did contacts and the stress they 
put on 'layabouts' seemed extraordinarily misplaced in the prevailing 
situation especially since many of them experienced considerable difficulties 
after redundancy themselves,
.Most of the Employment Service contacts found it not very useful or 
useless in tlie job search but their assessment was not much worse than that 
of the West Midlands workers which indicates that satisfaction vrith the 
Employment Service is affected by more than just the prevailing employment 
conditions. The under-reporting of good jobs to the Employment Service 
remains a particular handicap and reduces workers' impressions of its
usefulness* More workers, however found the Employment Service useful 
than were placed by it which suggests that, although its direct placement 
rate was low, the Ihiploymont Service may have managed to put workers into 
situations which led to other opportunities*
While the workers' own opinions of the Employment Service were varied, 
loss than lO^ b of them were satisfied either with the general service Miey 
received from the Employment SeiaAce or v/ith its staff. Most of their 
substantive criticisms were concerned either with some aspect of the 
Emplo^ mient Service's operating procedure or with its officials.
Regarding procedure, the men's comments ranged over the reporting 
of vacancies, the various exchanges' efficiency in servicing their registrants 
and the placement criteria being applied. It was felt that all vacancies 
should be channelled through the Employment Service which should also be 
notified when vacancies were filled to prevent men being sent on frustrating 
and costly 'wild goose chases'* The criticisms of the service received 
were ma ini 3^ related in one way or another to the numbers of unemployed men 
on the register at tliat time which caused congestion and delays in paying 
out unemployment benefit as well as detracting from the Enplo^ orent Service's 
placement role* Recommendations for improvement included bigger exchanges, 
more staff, separate facilities for different types of worker and pgarment 
of unemploynrient benefit by post. Some older workers felt that more 
preferential treatment by a 'special task force* in the Emplo^ nnent Service 
might have improved their lot. Self-service was also recommended since 
some workers felt that, otherwise, they were presented with little or no 
opportunity to try something new*
The explicit association of 'layabouts* with the Employment Exchanges 
recurred again in the men's spontaneous criticisms of the Public Employment 
Seirvice, Such respondents seemed to feel there was a stigma in being 
unemployed or through being associated with the long terra unemployed,
A similar feature was tlie surprising number of men who saw unemployment
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n,s some sort of character defect despite experiencing considerable 
difficulties themselves, rather than as a result of economic conditions.
All the foregoing criticisms of the Employment Service, legitimate in 
the circ'uiTiG tances, were about to bo met in the Department of Employment's 
plans for reorganisation of the Employment Service* Those included 
separation of placemenb end benefit pa^Ang activities, facilities for self 
ser\dce aixl tiie building of a new network of well designed, well located 
employment offices* Without doubting the need for modernisation it would,
i
at the same time, be wishful thinking to imagine that such organisational 
changes on their own could have significantly improved the lot of the ïïçC.S,
i
worters. This could only have been achieved by the existence of adequate 
alternative job opportunities and this lay outwith tte domain of the 
Department of Employment,
Chapter 9 
Other Aspects of Manpower Policy
1, Introduc tion
‘Active imnpov.'er’ policies, or ‘positive labour market' policies, are 
in their comprehensive form a relatively recent development resulting from 
the need to reduce incompatibilities between different goals of economic 
policy. The Employment Service is obviously at the centre of such policies 
and the two preceding chapters discussed its role as a transmitter of 
information. Other concerns of manpower policy are to raise the quality, 
of the labour force by providing facilities for training and retraining, ;
I
to reduce obstacles to mobility and to provide adequate financial support!
I
to workers losing jobs in order to reduce their opposition to change and 
allow them to look for other opportunities which would fully utilise their 
capabilities.
Before evaluating the effects on Clydeside of these other aspects of 
manpower policy, however, two observations are worth talcing account of, first, 
that of Lloyd Ulman in the Brookings Institution review of the British 
economy, 'Incomes policy and active labor market policy are alternative 
strategies ... for reducing the conflict between price stability and full 
employment,'^ This recognises that, in principle, there are two broad 
ways of doing this, controlling effective demand at 'full' employment 
level so that it does not outstrip the economy's capacity to satisfy 
that demand or by attempting to raise the economic growth rate by promoting 
fuller and more efficient use of the country's resources. In other words, 
this view of active or positive labour market policies sees them in the 
context of and being made relevant by the existence of a high pressure of 
demand in the economy.
Second, the O.E.C.B., in its more recent appraisal of manpower policy 
in the United Kingdom, remarked that such measures as the Redundancy 
Payments Act (1965) and the introduction of Earnings-related Unemployment 
Benefit (1966) were introduced 'in order both to influence the short term
1. See Britain's Economic Prospects. Allen and Unwin, 1968, p.379.
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development / Ô î the economy/ and at the same time create a new institutional
situation for the future ___ These were part of 'the strategy' for
combining an economic stabilisation policy with measures which should
either reduce the ensuing unemployment without evolving new inflationary
2
phenomena or make this unemployment socially and politically tolerable'
(My emphasis). Accordingly, some active manpower policies can be viewed 
both as measures to facilitate redeployment and as measures to promote 
change through providing a financial sweetener to the bitter pill of 
redundancy and unemployment. An the latter case, however,/Che resultant 
unemployment is anything but frictional it becomes questionable whether 
they can legitimately be considered as 'active' labour market policies.
If the unemployment is extensive and the financial aspects of labour market 
policy can more appropriately be seen as a form of income support we must 
also recognise that the costs of long terra unemployment can far exceed 
the protection afforded by redundancy compensation and earnings related 
supplement.
Such considerations are important especially since the preceding two 
chapters suggested that the level of economic activity at national level 
and particularly on Clydeside would have resulted in active manpower policies 
losing some of their salience as labour market measures. Th assess the 
extent of this, section 2 examines how much retraining and geographical 
mobility was undertaken by the U.C.S. men. In section 3, we evaluate the 
use which the men made of their financial compensation, particularly their 
severance pay. Section 4 sums up.
2, The Extent of Retraining and Geographical Mobility
(a) Retraining
Since most of the men released by U.C.S. were craftsmen with more or
2. Manpower Policy in the United Kingdom, op. cit., pp.177-178
3. The following chapter makes an estimate of the net costs imposed on 
the men by redundancy.
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less marketable skills, we might have expected them to be unenthusiastic 
about retraining. In fact, of our 0^0 participants in the labour market 
only 12 had applied to a Government Training Centre (C.T.C.) since 
redundancy, six craftsmen, five semi-skilled and one unskilled, and none 
of these eventually transformed their skill as a result. One embarked on 
a training course but didn't complete it, five of the remainder, including 
four craftsmen, had their applications rejected and the others either 
changed their mind, found the waiting period for a place too long or the 
C.T.C. did not offer the training desired.
As expected, the predominant reason given by the men for not
applying to a G.T.C. was that they already had a trade. The pattern of
response for the various occupational groups is shown below.
Table 9.1 Reason for Not Applying to G.T.C. By Skill Level ( ‘ÿc)
Skill
Reason
'Had a Trade'
Training Ho Good
Had a Job or Could 
Easily Find a Job
Training Does Wot Help 
in Finding a Job
Training Too Long
Could Hot Afford It
Too Old
Never Thought of It 
Other
Unskilled (2d) Semi-Skilled (j?)
13
4
17
13
22
13
9
100
3
8
11
19
3
14
27
16
86
1
1
2
1
4
3
2
:a j
69
2
14
All (281
69
2
100 100 100
5 
<11
3
8
6 
2
100
Hot surprisingly, it was primarily the higher skilled workers who attached 
the greatest emphasis to their possession of a trade. Since the question 
was an 'open' one allowing each respondent to put forward his own reasons,
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vfe should not be surprised that some of the less skilled workers should 
think they 'had a. trade'. As used here, this category could include 
statements like 'was experienced in my own job' which need not imply 
possession of craft skills. In any case, other reasons were of greater 
importance to them. Both the semi-skilled and unskilled workers thought 
retraining did not make much sense at their age. Otherwise, they thought
retraining was not too helpful in finding other jobs, they could find jobs
i
without retraining, it involved too great an opportunity cost or, quite i 
simply, they just didn’t think about it. j
Only sixteen men, thirteen craftsmen and three semi-skilled workers/I
claimed to have been retrained other than through a G.T.C. All of the 
latter and four of the tradesmen received informal 'on the job' training 
while the remainder claimed to have undertaken more formal retraining 
including one worker who embarked on a full time course of further education, 
Quite clearly, very little transformation of the men's skills took place 
in the aftermath of redundancy.
(b) Geographical Mobility
In chapter 4» we established that, when interviewed, $2 workers had 
changed their place of residence for work reasons. In addition, 5 men 
had taken a job away from home since being made redundant but had returned 
home by time of interview. At the first stage of redeployment, half (19) 
of these workers nevertheless remained in the V/est of Scotland. Only one 
of the remainder moved elsewhere in Scotland and the other seventeen workers 
migrated to England and Vales (13), Ireland (l) or abroad (3). This, 
however,was not the total migration undertaken by these 37 workers.
Further mobility resulted in the case of the job changers. Here, we find 
that of the workers originally moving within Scotland another 9 emigrated 
at the latter stage of redeployment. This means that 26 of the 37 workers
166
who changed their place of residence to take up either their first or 
subsequent jobs actually left Scotland in order to do so, 20 of them moving 
to England or Wales, one to Ireland and five overseas.^
So, once a worker from U.C.S. became prepared to move his home to
find another job he was just as likely and, indeed, more likely to move 
a considerable distance to do so. Overall, however, the emigrants did not 
represent a large proportion of all the workers finding jobs. Twenty six
workers amount to less than 10^ of all the men who managed to get back into
work (264), and only 6*5^  of the total number of jobs held after redundancy
j
by the men in our ssjnple, 264 by single job holders and I4I by job changers.
1
Nevertheless, although not large in absolute terms, the numbers leaving
Scotland to take up jobs elsewhere was by no means insignificant in comparison
with what other evidence we have on inter-regional migration. Hunter and
Reid, for example, suggest, 'In the United Kingdom, gross inter-regional
bmigration of employees is normally around 5 per cent.' Wliile we would not 
attach too much weight to this comparison because of the question mark 
against the reliability of intra national migration data, the evidence 
suggests that amongst the U.C.S. workers the preparedness to take a job far 
from home was, if anything, above average. The emigrants were, as v/o 
would expect on the basis of previous evidence on worker mobility, skilled 
and youthful,^ Twenty were craftsmen, two unskilled, three semi-skilled 
and a staff worker. Nineteen were in their twenties, three in their 
thirties and four under fifty. No workers over fifty were among the 
emigrants.
4. As we saw in chapter 6, however, job changing produced some return
migration as well as further out migration. So the total of 26
emigrants is a gross not net figure presented to convey an impression
of the entire emigration in the aftermath of redundancy.
5* Hunter, L.C. and Reid, G.L., Urban Worker Mobility, O.E.C.D., 1968, p.46.
The average time between redundancy and interview for the 3OO active 
participants in the labour market was 13 months making a comparison 
with annual rates of migration not inappropriate.
6. Urban Worker Mobility, op. cit., pp.47-50' and Reynolds, I.G., opocit. po241,
3c Unemployment Benefit and Redundancy Fay
At the 'beginning of this chapter we suggested that to consider the 
financial aspects of active manpower policy as labour market measures or as 
some form of social security benefit depended on labour market conditions 
and, in the absence of an effective demand for labour, it was the latter 
which was likely to assume greater significance which the O.E.C.D. report 
frankly recognised. The evidence from U.O.S, endorses the aptness of 
this observation.
First of all, in chapter 5 our regression analysis, in line with other
research, found no strong relationship between the length of post-redundancy
unemployment and redundancy pay or unemployment benefit even although the
objectives of these financial labour market measures included giving men
7
time to make efficient job choices. For Glasgow, one reason we suggested 
was that labour market conditions provided men with little opportunity to 
'shop around' for jobs in the wEiy envisaged. Here, we explore further the 
way in which the men viewed and used their unemployment benefit and redundancy 
pay.
Table 9*2* looks at the relationship between unemployment and financial 
labour market measures in another way, that is by showing the average 
unemployaient benefit and the average severance pay received by workers 
experiencing different lengths of unemployment between redundancy and 
first job or, for the continuously unemployed, time of interview.^
7* For,further discussion of the objectives of the Redundancy Payments Act 
and its limitations, see Daniel, W.W., op.cit. pp.26-30'
8. As in our regression analysis, severance pay includes ex gratia
redundancy pay and other emoluments from U.C.8. as well as statutory 
redundancy pay.
1&8
Table 9.*2 Average Unemployment Benefit and Average Severance Pay
of Workers E^cperiencingDif Bering Periods of Unemployment
Unemployment Average Unemployment Average Severance
(weeks) Bene fit# x)/(£ s) Humbers
1 week 0 157,4 54
1 up to 2 6*7 152*8 45
3 up to 4 9,5 164*3 40
5 up to 8 11*5 140*7 54
9 up to 16 12*9 186*5 45
17 up to 26 12*9 155.9 51
27 and over 12*5 212*4 55
All Labour Market
Participants 9°Y 169*2 300
XNobe. Workers with less than a week of transitional unemployment 
were assumed not to be eligible for unemployment benefit*
The data in Table 9o2, although more aggregative, in general
corresponds with the results of our regression analysis. Severance pay
does not appeal’ to increase systematically with unemployment* There does,
however, appear to be a suggestion of such a relationship between unemploymient
and unemployment benefit particularly for people with under 5 weeks of
unemployment0 Our regression analysis suggested the relationship was
significant but we attached a number of qualifications to this which are
worth repeating here* First, there is a 12 day waiting period before
redundant men become eligible for earnings related supplement and second,
workers leaving with money in lieu of notice would not have been entitled to
benefit in the initial weeks of unemployment. Both these factors would have
confused the 'true' relationship until all the sample had become eligible*
Consequently we would again attach a question mark to any suggestion that
their 'financial protection' had anything but a marginal effect on the
redundant workers' time 'on the market
Nevertheless, their financial 'fall back positions' ndght still have
allowed some men to turn down unsatisfactory jobs and consequently we asked
those unemployed for over a week and so probably eligible for unemployment
benefit, 'Mien looking for jobs after leaving UlC.S. how did the money offered 
by these jobs compare with what you were receiving’ in state benefits?'
A card with a number of options was then shown to the respondents and the
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following pattern of responses emerged:-
Table 9»3 How the Money Offered by Jobs Encountered After
Leaving U.C.S. Compared with State Benefit (^ )
Money Offered 'By Job ^
Much More 23
More 28
About the Same 13
Less 12
Much Less 5
Ho Offers 10
Ho Benefit 10
Numbers N.K. __%
Total Numbers* 266
*Note. Those 34 workers who were re-employed within a week did 
not answer this question.
Table 9*3 indicates that a substantial minority of workers came ^ across 
jobs paying less than or about the same as (l^ i^) they were receiving
in unemployment benefit. Workers receiving 'no.benefit' were again those 
who, contrary to our expectations, were ineligible through receipt of money 
in lieu of notice. The 'no offers' category seems self-evident but is 
worth commenting on. They are the workers who explicitly claimed they 
could make no comparison because they had received no job offers against 
which to compare unemployment benefit. At the same time, this does not 
mean that those workers who did know the going rate for other jobs had
9
actually received offers of these jobs! This helps to explain the responses 
to our follow-up question which was:
'Bid you turn down any jobs because there wasn't much difference?'
To this an overwhelming majority (85/^ ) said they had not while 15^ 
said that they had. In view of the numbers encountering low paying jobs 
this proportion might seem surprisingly small. In fact, it is very close 
to the proportion (l3^ ) saying that the jobs they came across paid 'about
9. In chapter 4 we saw that only 44 workers had, in fact, received job 
offers which they turned down.
r/o
the same' as unemployment benefit which suggests that.the way this question 
was put may have led some workers to answer 'no' if the jobs they came 
across offered less or much less than unemployment benefit! Another 
possible explanation for the small numbers turning jobs down is that they 
may not have been offered them, mentioned already, or may have decided not 
to pursue them to that point. We also saw in chapter 7 that some jobs
were turned down for other than wage reasons such as distance from home ;
!
and, here, earnings related unemployment benefit would reinforce a worker's 
disinclination to move. All this, however, is frankly)" speculative and |
I
there is little evidence overall for contending that unemployment benefit
was responsible for an^ r substantial discretionary element in unemployment.
We saw in table $ ,2 that the average total severance payment was £l69.
Below we show the distribution which produced that average.
Table 9»4 The Distribution of the Total Severance Pay
Received by the U.C.S, Workers who Remained 
_____ Active in the Labour Market ( /^o)_____
Amount of Severance Pay (£s)
3r 50 51-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401 and over Humbers N.K. Numbers
7 25 52 8 5 3 17 300
Most of the workers received between one and two hundred pounds in 
total, which is not a high figure, due in large part to the company's 
decision to concentrate the out back on short-service workers so reducing 
its financial obligations. Although the severance pay received by the 
U.O.S. workers was, on the whole, relatively modest we can nevertheless 
usefully compare its effects on the recipients' behaviour with the effects 
reported by Parker et al., op. cit. First, Table 9.5 shows how single and 
married U.C.S. workers used their redundancy pay in comparison with the 
workers covered by the national redundancy survey.
10. In comparison, Parker et al,, op. cit., p.84, found the average total 
severance payment for their sample of compensated redundant workers 
was Ê38O.
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Table 9»5 Uses of Redundancy Pay, Single and Married U.C.S. Workers
U.C.s. Workers Workers Covered B;
Single Married Both a National Survey
Living Expenses 59 78 74 29
Durable Goods (T.V. etc.) 13 10 10 )
House Improvements 4 19 17
^  18
Travelling Expenses 9 5 4
House Purchase • 2 2 2 5
Holiday 16 15 15 8
Setting up Business ~ 0 1 <11 5  1
Paying Debts 4 16 14
 ^ 1
Put into Savings 25 12 15 52 j
Entertainments, gifts - "" - 5
Vehicle accessories - - 6
Clothes — - 6
Other 9 4 5 3
Total 141 160 157 144
Numbers 56* 242* 300* I860
*Hote; The $00 active participants included one widower and one 
worker who refused information on his marital status.
Source: U.C.S. Survey and Parker et al., op. cit., Table 3*15*
Obviously a worker could use his redundancy pay in more than one way 
which is why the total percentages add to more tlian 100.^^ Therefore 
the pattern of responses cannot indicate the proportion of redundancy'' 
pay spent in each way but it does give some idea of the importance of 
each type of use to the different groups. For example, the married 
men among the U.C.S. workers were understandably under more pressure of 
family commitments than the single workers. As a result, considerably 
more of them used their severance pay on paying debts and on general 
living expenses while less of them retained any in savings, which effectively 
meant having some left when interviewed. In comparison with both married
11. Of our 300 active labour market participants, 9 (3ÿ/ provided no inform­
ation on how they used their redundancy pay, I63 (54^ 0 used it only one 
way, 90 (36^0 iu two ways, 31 (lO;4) in three ways and 7 (F-y) in four 
ways.
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and single U.C.8, workers, the national sample appeared to have had less 
need to use their redundancy pay to support their day to day living.
Less than a third used some of their redundancy pay on living expenses 
while 52/ claimed to have put it into savings. Parker et al. provided no 
information on whether the money 'put into savings' remained as savings but, 
in view of the magnitude, it seems highly unlikely. As a verification, 
our survey checked by asking respondents how much of their severance pay 
they had left at interview and to this 84fo replied they had none. Despite 
this reservation about direct comparability with the national sample, the 
'first responses' of both groups to the question certainly suggest that 
there were more immediate pressures on the redundancy pay of the U.C.8. 
workers.
In their review of the effects of the Redundancy Payments Act, Parker
et al. observed,'it is necessary to emphasise the different aims of redundancy
12payments and earnings related unemployment benefit,' They then went on 
to point out that the Act hoped to .ueduce opposition to structural change 
by providing protection, from its economic consequences which need not 
include unemployment but could involve, for example, reduced income as a 
result of changing employers and possibly losing seniority, pension rights 
etc. At the same time, drawing a distinction between the use of redundancy 
pay and unemployment benefit can be a spurious and misleading one which 
Parker et al. recognised when they conceded that 'the most that could 
be hoped for is that these payments would enhance the efficiency of his 
(the redundant worker's) search for alternative employment. In other 
words, once made redundant, a redundant worker's severance pa^'' could and 
often would serve similar purposes to unemployment benefit, such as enabling 
workers to maintain reasonable standards of living in the interests of
12. Parker et al., op. cit., p . 4
13. Parker et al., op. cit., p.11
efficient job search. Prom table 9*5 we can see that outlay on normal 
living expenses was much more important for the U.C.8. workers than those 
interviewed in the national survey. Apart from this, there is little 
evidence of redundancy pay being used in labour market activity.
The real labour market effectiveness of either statutory or ex gratia
redundancy payments has, of course, come into question elsewhere. An
American Department of Labor analysis of company based severance payments
also observed that,
'Payments were used mainly to pay off past debts and make I
instalment payments: to meet current living expenses and, !
if anything v/as left, for savings. Expend!tuo:es for j
training or other means of increasing their job skills and j
opportunities for re-employment were insignificant.' |
1
Further criticisms of the American schemes concerned the need for longer
notice of separation and for workers to receive some advice on how to use
their severance pay,
'Apparently, without effective counselling and other forms of job 
assistance, they did not Imow how to convert their assets into 
effective job mobility.' 14
Such criticisms, equally true of the U.O.S. programme, have also been
directed in a more general way at the impact of the Redundancy Payments Act 
15in this country. Daniel, for example, echoing some of the American
reservations, also voices some of the disquiet that we have expressed,"
'As an instrument of national policy the real question mark 
against the Act is whether it offers adequate or equitable 
compensation for displaced workers, or is a substitute for 
more direct provisions for manpower redeployment'll
Other evidence besides our ovm, therefore, puts a serious question mark
against the labour market relevance of redundancy pay for redundancies managed
like those at U.C,8. Additional questions, however, allowed us to assess
14* 'The Operation of Severance Pay Plans and their Implications for Labour 
Mobility', Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. I462, Washington,
1966, pp 2-3.
15. Besides Daniel, op.cit., see Fryer, R.H. 'The Myths of the Redundancy
Payments Act', Industrial Law Journal No.l, 1973* and Muldierjee, S., op*cit.,
pp*19'“27e 
16* Dani.el, W/Wt, op * cit., p.29*
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whether the men themselves felt it affected their job search behaviour.
First our respondents were asked,
'Do you think that the money you received when you left 
U.O.S. changed the way you set about looking for a new 
job after you left U.O.S.?'
We were prepared to code up to two comments from each respondent but very
few, in fact, made more than one. In table 9*6 we show the pattern of
response for those receiving £200 or less, those receiving over £200 and
those who refused to say exactly how much they had received on leaving
U.O.S.
Table 9.6 If Severance Money Changed How Recipient Set
Amount Received
How Affected Job Search £200 and less Over £200 No Informa'
1. No information 1.5 1.9 4 .8
2. No difference 45.6 41.2 52.9
3e Not enough to cause change 14.8 5.9 9 .5
4. No - Saved the money 0.7 1.9 “
5. No - Already'' had job to go to 11.5 . 13.7 4 .8
6 , No ~ Spent on other items 3.7 1 .9 -
7. Yes - ÎÆade me more choosey 6.3 17.7 14.3
8. Yes - Helped me maintain 
my standard of living 4 .1 1.9
9 . Yes - Took a holiday 8.2 11.8 4 .8
10. Other 3.7 1 .9 9.5
Total Number of Responses 270 51 21
For all three groups the single most frequent comment v/as that severance 
pay made no difference to the way they looked for jobs. Otherwise, tv/o 
sets of more detailed reasons were given, one indicating why severance pay 
did have an effect on job search, the other why it did not. If comments 
two to six are considered 'negative' and seven to nine 'positive', there 
were some differences depending on the amount of severance pay received.
For example, 76.3^ ° of those receiving £200 or less claimed that severance 
pay had no impact for one reason or another against 64.6"^ of the men 
receiving over £200. And, conversely, 51*4?^  of the latter said it did
' tJ
cause some change compared with 18,6^ 0 of the former.
Altogether, however, a majority of all three groups felt that redundancy 
pay had no positive effect on job search behaviour. At the same time, it 
may not have been entirely irrelevant as a. labour market measure. Although 
most did not consciously see it affecting their behaviour, table 9*5 showed 
that it v/as commonly used to support the workers' normal living standards 
and such expenditure we suggested was certainly compatible with the spirit
if not the letter of the Redundancy Payments Act. Of course, as its other
I
critics also point out, before redundancy pay can become really effective
as a labour market measure it requires additional support and, more j
I
importantly, the existence of a greater number of alternative employment ’
opportunities. Daniel, for example, concludes,
'It goes without saying that the infrastructure of provisions 
for displaced employees must be a buoyant national economy 
to provide alternative jobs and the attraction of fresh 
industry to generate new jobs in areas with few alternative 
job opportunities'.1 7
In the light of the foregoing, our final question on redundancy pay
provides an interesting indication of its perceived value in the prevailing
circumstances,
'Looking back at your experiences since leaving Ü.C.S, would 
you have preferred to have been paid off at U.C.S. and 
received the money you did or to have stayed at U.C.S. and 
not received the money?'
It was clear that, irrespective of how much redundancy pay they received,
the U.C.8 . workers would, in retrospect, have preferred to stay at U.C.S.
Table 9*7 Vdiether Would Have Preferred to Stay at U.C.S. or
Been Made Redundant and Received Their Redundancy Pay (fo)
Amounts of Been Made stayed
Redundancy Pay Redundant At U.C.S. Numbers
£200 or less 33 67 234
Over £200 37 63 46
Refused information 29 71 17
No information - __1
li £ L
17. op.cit., P.54'
ri 6
Table 9*7 shows how the respondents assessed their redundanoy pay in the context 
of their employment experience since redundancy and the -§• majority who would 
have preferred to have avoided redundanoy provides another illustration of 
the difficulties the men experienced. This is further underlined by the 
fact that even more {s6 fc) of the continuously unemployed would have elected 
to stay at U.C,S, than of those who did manage to get back into work .
An additional insight into the problems caused by redundancy is the 
fact that nine {Q2.fô) of the eleven workers who returned to the same job 
at II.C.S, would have preferred not to have been made redundant compensated 
or not. Assuming, not unreasonably, that their terms and conditions of 
employment before and after redundancy were about the same, the consequences 
of redundancy for them clearly outweighed their financial compensation.
4» Conclusions
This chapter considered those aspects of manpower policy concerned with 
retraining, geographical mobility and the financial support provided to 
redundant men. We suggested that, in bad labour market conditions 
financial manpower policy might more appropriately be seen as some form 
of social security benefit rather than as a labour market measure and, 
therefore, manpower policy was bound to lose much of its relevance on 
Clydeside during the redundancies.
The effectiveness of manpower policies is also dependent on people’s 
preparedness to use them and, here, retraining after redundancy was not 
seriously entertained by the U.C.S. workers. Only 12 of the ^00 labour 
market participants had applied to a G.T.C, and none had trans6rmed his 
skills in this way, the higher skilled workers mainly because they already 
had a skill and the lower skilled workers because of their age or because 
retraining was not much help in finding other jobs. This exposes the
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problems involved in trying to promote occupational flexibility particularly 
where considerable importance is attached to the possession of craft skills 
whether or not they are being overtaken by progress. This inertia is reinforced 
if the G.TcCc’s regulations put obstacles in the way of people who already have 
a trade* Above all, however, if people are to extend their occupational horizons, 
they must be encouraged to do so by the availability of jobs requiring different 
skills* GoT.Ge's aside, only sixteen men retrained in other wa^ 's, mainly o^n 
the job’ and consequently very little skill transformation occurred after 
redundancy, i
Since redundancy, 37 workers had changed residence to take up another
I
job, 26 of them outwith Scotland, mostly in England, This amounted to 6^9^ 
of all the jobs recorded by the survey whj.ch, according to other available 
evidence with its limitations, suggests that the U,C.S, workers’ preparedness 
to leave home for work reasons was still above the British norm, Tne emigrants, 
predictably, were mostly youthful and skilled.
There was little persuasive evidence here, as elsewhere in the study, 
that ui'iemployment benefit and particularly severance pay were responsible for 
adding dny substantial discretionary element to the unemployment suffered after 
redundancy. We recognised, however, that unemployment benefit may have 
reinforced a disinclination to take a job for other reasons but this was 
speculative and, in any case, not contrary to the way in which such paj^ mients
were intended to be used.
Most of the workers (84-^ ) received £200 or less in total severance pay 
which was small in comparison with the amounts received by workers covered 
by Parker’s national redundancy survey. Besides being modest, it was used 
in a narrow range of ways. Only 16^ used it in more than two ways and the 
most frequently recurring use to which it was put was on day to day living 
expenses. While attaching a question mark to the evidence reported by the
national survey, fewer TJ,C,S, workers claimed to have put it into savings and,
indeed, at time of interview 84^ had none of it left.
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Similarly, in comparison with the national survey, the U.C.S. workers as a 
whole were more likely to use their redundancy pay on day to day living, 
the married workers more so than the single.
Most of the workers, especially the majority who received £200 or 
less, said that redundancy pay had not changed the way they usually looked 
for jobs. It was, however, largely used to support their usual standard 
of living and therefore may have had some labour market impact though 
they may not have been aware of it. For redundancy pay to have any 
substantial effect in the labour market, however, our evidence like that else­
where underlines the need for supporting measures and, unquestionably, 
alternative job opportunities. Finally, two-thirds of the workers did not 
believe that their redundancy pay was adequado compensation for the problems 
they faced afterwards. This view was, understandably, even more marked 
among the continuously unemployed. - For most of the U.C.S. workers the 
compensation they received on redundancy was an inferior alternative to 
remaining in employment at U.C.S. and, whatever else it may have been, it 
did not turn out to be a ’windfall' bonus.
This chcçutcrc takes a closer lock a'b the costs imposed by redi-uidancy 
on the U.C..S. voakors. V/e begin; in section 2, by considering the emplcyricnt 
status of the workers when intorwiowcd, ono of tho most reJTio/Lkable feature 
of the survey, which must be talrozi in'bc account when interpreting the data 
presented elsewlionre. This leads into an assessment of how much unemployment 
was experienced in total by time of interview either after leaving 010*2. 
or imbsequent jobs* Besides unemployment we take’another brief look at 
employment including: the number of jobs held after redundanoy and the 
stability of jobs found in different industries* The financial difficulties 
of the i-rorke:c?s a'l’e dealt with in section 3® Without denying the need for a 
quantitative analysis of such difficulties, on its own this can fail to convoy 
a full impression of the impact of redundancy. Tor policymakers in partioulars 
some indication of the repercussions in human terras can be a vital element in 
the development of measures for dealing with similar situations. Although our 
analysis is primarily an economic one, we felt that it could only be improved 
by providing an illustration of the redundant workers’ ovrn vievjs of their 
experience in. retrospect* These are included, under a .number of different 
headings in an attached appendix. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4*
(i) Employment Status at Time of Interview.
Even' allowing for the deterioration in the Clydeside economj' during the 
U.CoS. run-down, it was surprising that as many as 92 (31/0 of our 300 active 
labour market parti disants were unemployed when interviewed* This compares 
for example with under 1 per cent of Kabn’s oa.r workers and 5 per cent of 
Wedderbum.’s railwaymen.  ^ These differences speak for themselves especially 
since the U.CcS. vrorkers were by far the most skilled» While the interviews in 
each case occurred at different points in time after redundancy, there was no
doubt that all allowed ample time for tho workers to ’find their feet’, or 
otherwise, in the labour m a r k e t » O f  the remaining U»G»8» workers 206 
were in employment, one retired and one sick,
(1) Kahn, H.R,qp.^it., p»141 and Wedderburm, I)», opicito, p»?^ »
(2) For the U»C-workers who remained active in -bhe labour manket, the 
average period at risk - time between redundancy and interview/ - was 
13 months»
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Ï!>vcn if we leave aside ‘the con'tijTaously urejnid.oyed who were older 
Jand less skilled, over '/5 of t.he 264 previously in jobs wore out of work 
when Xïitorvie\/Gd and it was oJ car that young wforkers were no less vulnerable 
than older workers and trade syion, if anything, mo re vulnerable thayj less skills; 
workerso For example, 24 per cent of men under 30 were out of v/orJi compared 
with 22 per cent of ’bhose under 40, 10 pe:'' cent of boüi those under 30 and 
under 60, and I5 per cent of men aged 60 or over* Similarly, 23 per cent of 
the craftsræn were unemployed, 3 9 per cent of the unskilled, 17 per cent of 
the semi.-okilled and only one of the 12 staff woilcers who were, therefore, 
something of an exception*
Although the tutal out of work may have been surj)rising, its composition
was note, Vdiereas one might expect hiring standards to discriminate via age
and skill, hence the difficulties of the continuously unemployed, ’firing'
standards frequently operate on a different basis, for example on the principle
C % j
of last in first outo^ Tho redundant 1*0.8* workers would, in such 
circumstances, be highly wlnerable and although younger and more skilled 
workers were more likely to have found jobs after U.C.8. , in a continuing 
recession their age and skill coui.d not and did not protect them from further 
redundancies *
(ii) Total Unemployment Experienced By Interview.
Employment status at interview although indicative is a point in time 
observation and it is the extent of the unemployment suffered after redundancy 
which conveys a fuller impression of its impact on the men, Vdiat has to be 
taken into account here is the number of periods of uneinplo^ Tnent experienced, 
when they were experienced and how long they lasted. Unemployment could occur 
immediately after redundancy from U.C.S,, i.e* 'transitional* unemployment, 
and/or after subsequent jobs. Two further questions asked,
'How many periods of unemployment, if any, have you had since 
leaving U.G.S,?'
(3) Hunter, h*G* and Reid, ChL., op*cib,, p*130.
and
'In total, how many weeks of unemployment would this add 
up 'bo? '
In addition to ' transit ional ' luiemployroent, 'therefore,. v;e could mskc some 
qu.antitat;ive assessment of 'total' unemploymont and what proportion of the 
period at risk this amounted to.
Only eigiitcen (6/) of 'the 300 active labour market partie ip ai.it s 
had suffered no unemplo;^ nnent at all since redundancy from U.C. 8, A ira j or it y 
(37/) had experienced one period of unemployment usually after lea-v'ing 1*0.8, 
while a siseable minority (26/) had incurred the costs of two periods of 
unemployment. Tho remainder (9/) had boon thrown out of work more than 
twice with the maximrn, reported by two respondents, standing at five»
The dura'tion of 'this unemployment and its stiare of 'the period at risk were 
considerable*
r y i ç n r r » Average (x) Transitional end Total Unem%.)loyment (Weeks) 
by Age and Total Unemployment As a Percentage of 
Period at Risk
Aa®
Average (x) Average (x) . Total Unemi-Uoyment 
Transitional Total As a Percentage of 
Unemployment (weeks) Unemployment (weeks) Period at Id.sk Brmbe:
Under 30 7.8 14.7 28 ol 101
30 _ 39 10 .8 15,5 31.0 71
40 w 49 14 0 5 19.6 40. 8 63
50 - 59 19.5 25.4 51*8 40
60 25.1 28.3 56o4 24
Numbers N,K* 1 1 1 1
Total 12.8 18.5 56.9 300
Table !10ol adds to our earlier regression analysis which suggested that
unemployment following redundancy was influenced more by age than skill» Here,
we see that the likelihood of suffering longer total as well as transitional
unemployment Increased wi’bh ago » Although the former is an aggroegate which 
includes the transitional component, the relationship is nonetheless valid 
for that. '  ^ Consequently, when we took skill into account, it was no 
surprise 'to find that it was the se mi-skilled, considerably older than the 
other workers, who stood out from the rest. On average, they spent 55 per 
cent of their period at risk out of work compared with 54 per cent of the 
root of the sample,
(ill) Employment Stability, j
Tne only workers who enjoyed much stab il id: y of employment after ïï,C,S, 
wo;r;‘G the 1 0 0  men who, when interviewed, were still in their fizist post- i 
redundancy jobs which they had held for an average (x) of 10 months, ' 
Otherwise, instability of employment was widespread. Of the l6d- woidcers 
who left their first post-redundancy jobs, 11 were dismissed, 6 fell sick,
5 said they retired and, for one respondent, there was no information* More 
revealingly, 68 men (42/) suffered redundancy a second tiLme, almost as many 
as the 75 voluntary quits (46/j) , and 10 of these were unl.ucky enough to be 
made redundant yet again from their last job before interview!
Shipbuilding and construction previously seen as the biggest initial employers 
of men leaving U,G.S, also accounted for a majority of the second redundancies, 
twenty two of the sixty eight second redundancies occurring in construction 
and sixteen in shipbuilding, In relative terms, however, workers who left 
other industries were also very likely t,o do so through redundancy.
(4) he migh'b also note that, for the continuously unemployed who are
included in both distributions, transitional and total unemployment 
are identical.
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Table 10.2c Rodmidancics as Ibi'oportjons of
Ibnibe.rs Leaving First Jobs__
Industry Redundano:i.es o.o Proportions Numbers leaving
of Puiribers Leaving First First Jobs _
______   lot s  _______ _
Shipbuilding 50 32
Other Engineering 52 33
Other Manufacturing 53 15
Gonsiruc'ti.on 36 6],
Services 23 22
Numbers Not Known 1
Toted 42 _164_
Note* Indus'try groups are thin Order Headings or aggregated Main
Order Headings of the I968 Standard Industrial Classification,
Although construction accounted for the largest numbers made redundant 
from any of the industry groups, workers find:lng first jobs there were 
proportionately less -mineruble for example than workers in manufacturing 
activities. But Table 10.2 indicates that all of the workers from Ü.C.S, 
wore susceptible to further redundancy irrespective of where they found 
their first jobs* Clearly, for many of them departure from IT,O.S. was a 
classic instance of ‘out of the frying pan and into the fkre’ as the reasons 
given for leaving the last job before interview further demonstrate. Four 
men were dismissed, I5 left voluntarily and sixteen were again made 
redundant including the 10 who had also been made redundant from their
( 5)first jobs, All were included in the 94 out of work when'interviewed 
along with the 36 continuously unemployed and 23 men who had been out of work 
since leaving their first job.
Finally, to recap briefly on employment as well as unemployment, 
most of our job finders had held one (I23) or two (93) jobs since leaving
(5) Altogether, 84 jobs were lost through redundancy out of the 264 first or I4I later 
jobs held by the sample between leaving U,C,S,. and being interviewed, on average,
13 monthS' later. This amounts to 21/ out of a 'total of 485 jobs and compares with 
an equivalent figure of 10/ for electrical engineering workers made redundant by 
G.E.C, in Woolwich during I968 and interviewed by Daniel-on average two years later, 
See Daniel, W,W., 'Vhatever Harnened. to the Workers in Woglilfoh.* , P.E.P,, 1972î Po50»
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U,C.So, thirty throe had held three and the remaining fifteen more than 
threeo For men under jO the maximum number of jobs held was eight and 
this fell progressively to two for men over 60 which, along with our 
other evidence, illustrates that it was younger men who were better able 
to find jobs, if not to keep them, in the bleak economic conditions prevailing 
on Clydeside at the time»
5« Financial Difficulties
Given the amount of time so many men were ?/ithout work, we would 
not have been surprised if they had run into considerable financial 
difficulties a Here, we investigate this by identifying the costs incurred 
through redundancy and by evaluating to what extent these did, in fact, 
result in financial difficulties»
Just as the unemployment suffered after redundancy can be broken 
down into components so can the costs of redundancy» Many important costs, 
however, like the impact on self esteem and the disruption in established 
life styles, including work-place relationships, cannot be readily quantified» 
Fryer, for example, points out,
* ♦ » » the financial compensation for redundancy . . , does not 
provide the dispossessed worker vdth the wherewithal to "purchase" (job) 
property comparable to that which he has lost in terms not only of income 
but also of job interest, authority, seniority, familiarity, utilisation of 
skills and so on "
There may, on the other hand, also be compensating benefits if some 
men, for example, end up in better paid, more satisfying jobs. Either way, 
however, we are unable to pursue this in any more detail than previously.
We can, however, make a reasonable if still imperfect assessment of the 
not monetary costs privately incurred by our respondents» Such costs can 
basically be quantified as the difference between the men's income after
(6) Fryer, IMH., 0£ ^ t
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rodunriancy and what it would ho.vo bo en had tboy remai.nod in employment 
with U.C.S.
Total coot co.n bo divided into 'unemployment • coot and'wage difference 
effect'» Tho former io the product of time spent unemployed and the difference 
between take-home pay at ILC.S. and the amount of unemployment benefit received, 
The latter can obviously be calculated only for men vho found other jobs ojid 
consists of the time spent in a job times the difference in take home pay 
when compared with U.C,S. For men who held two jobs after U.,C»S. the
wage difference effect has to be calculated both for the first and present
or la.st jobs held since leaving U.C.S, In. the case of those 48 workers, with 
more than two jobs after U.C.S, we had no informât]on on service or pay| 
between first and present or last job and so were obliged to make some * 
estimate. This was taken as the mean of their take home pay in first and 
present or last job times the period at risk less any time attributable to 
either unemployment or service in the reported jobs. The total cost of 
redundancy is consequently given by the identifys-
TCR - U.1CR + VmE, + + YIDE^  where;-1 2 3
TOR = Total cost of redundancy 
ÜFCR = Unemplojnnent Cost of Redundancy = Total Unemployment x 
(Unemployment Benefit - Take-home Pay at U.C.S.)
" Wage Difference Effect of Redundancy at First Job =
Service in First Job x (Take-home Pay in First Job - 
Take-home Pay at U.C.S.)
WDE^ = Wage Difference Effect of Redundancy at Present or Last Job = 
Service in Present or Last Job x (Take-home Pay in Present or 
Last “ Take-home Pay at U.C.S.)
V/DE^  = Estimated Wage Difference Effect of Redundancy Between First 
and Present or Last Jobs =
[Wage .in 1st -h Wage in P/L 'Teke-home Pay at DOS I X 
2
[Period at R.lek - (Total unemployment since redundancy 
*!" oex*vic© ill 1st h Bewioe In present os? last job}]
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Tho actual costs incurred, by each of our respondents may, for 
different reasons, vary from our aggregate estimate. For example;
(a) The unemp]oymont benefit used in hie equation is the maximum 
received by our respondent.s. For the long term unemployed, this
would drop substantially as earnings related supplement became exhausted.
(b) Some men were paid .money in lieu of notice» Although ineligible 
for benefit if unemployed during those weeks, their income for that
(7)period should probab.Ly bo considered the same as at U.C.S.
(c) Id.eally, both our unemployment costs and wage difference effects 
should also have been relative to wage at U.C.S, had the men remained 
in employment there, that is, making allowance for trend effects*
Our wage comparisons in chapter 6, which might be described as 
an exercise in 'comparative statics’, tried to talce trend effects into 
account by use of published earnings data for different points in time. 
Here, the problem is one of 'dynamics* and consequently more complex*
It involves making some estimate of the trend in earnings at U.G.S* 
after the redundancies and its notional impact on the unemployment costs 
and wage difference effects experienced by each of the '^00 men during the 
period at risk* The computational difficulties posed by such complex 
variation in both time and quantity variables amongst our $00 respondents 
suggested a different approach*First, we based our calculations on 
pay at U*C.S* at time of redundancy. By assuming, however, that pay 
foregone is throughout equal only to that received at time of redundancy 
we clearly reduce both unemployment cost and wage difference effect below 
their probable level and so underestimate the true impact of redundancy*
(7) Receipt of money in lieu of notice was information volunteered by 
some men but not systematically asked for in our questionnaire. 
Consequently no uniform allowance could be made for it,
(s) The variegated experience of our 380 workers prohibited the 
construction of a single 'model* appropriate for them all 
although individual 'models* could be readily specified.
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Consequently we repeated our calculations making alternative 
assumptions about our respondents’ pay at U.C.S, most of our respondents 
had been made redundant in 1970 and the average time between redundancy 
and interview for the active labour inarket participants was Ip months.
In table A.3* in the appendix to chapter 6 we saw that if our respondents 
had been earning according to the Scottish average their take-home poy 
between 1970 and 197B would have risen by 8,3/ from £22*37 for week to 
£24«23* V/o assumed that their take-home pay at U.C.S, would have risen 
at a similar rate and adjusted their reported take-liome pay at U.C.S. 
accordingly. The true impact of redundancy will lie between our two 
alternative sets of calculations.
Table 10,3 presents the average unemployment cost, total wage 
difference effect and total cost incurred by the 3OO labour market 
participants, (l) assujiiing pay at U.C.S. was as reported (2) pay at 
U.C.S. adjusted as above. It similarly shows the total cost experienced 
by the 36 continuously unemployed workers and, when these are excluded, 
the various costs experienced on average by the 264 men who found other 
jobs after U.G.S.
1
Table 10,3 Average Total Cost of Redundancy For the Continuously
Unemployed and Average'Unemployment Cost, Wage Difference 
Effect and Total Cost of Redundancy for All 3OO Labour 
Market Participants and 264 Successful Job Finders:
(1) Pay at U,CoS. as Reported (2) Pay at U.C.S. Adjusted 
For Trend as Specified^
Unemployment Total Wage Total
Cost (£s) Difference Effect (£s) Cost (£s)
p )  (2) — m  (1) -(2)
36 Continuously -449*3 *"532*9 "* ™ -449*3 -532,9
Unemployed
300 Active
Labour Market -219*2 -256,2 7.2 -69.7 -207,9 -320.2
Participants
264 Successful
Job Finders -186.6 -216,9 8.3 -80,2 -172.0 -288.5
Mote, 1, The aver age us e d is the ar i tlime t i c me an,
2,Another intermediate estimation of trend effects was calcula led by 
assuming-that pay at UoCoSo had risen by 4c15/% half of the calculated rise 
over 1970^71, and the values which emerged for all 3OO workers were; 
unemployment cost - 237*7; total wage difference effect 3I.3 end to tel cost
2o4 Ü1
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Not surprisingly, it was the continuously unemployed who oxperienced, 
on average, the highest costs froin redundancy * They o’oviously raised the 
average total cost for all 300 active labour market participants* When 
excluded, however, it is evident yet again that, on balance, the U.C.S. 
workers suffered rather than gained through redundancy*
Looking, however, at the total v/agc difference effect based on 
reported take-home pay at U.C.S., there is some suggestion that the 
successful job finders experienced a small gain (flh 3) on their position 
at U.C.S. This is certainly misleading* Although the average wage 
difference effect is positive, the distribution producing it showed that 
almost 2/3 (62^0 experienced a negative wage difference effect which was, 
however, just outweighed by 38/ whose stream of earnings improved after 
leaving U.C.S. Moreover, when as in chapter 6 we take into account the 
rise in the general wage level end the difference in die hours worked 
after redundancy, the superficial gain suggested above takes on a new 
complexion*
Some impression of this is given by our accompanying adjusted 
calculations in Table 10,3. From these v/e see that the wage difference 
effect for the successful job finders moves into deficit and the other 
costs Incurred by the different groups become substantially larger,
Anotlier point worth noting is that, even without adjusting our 
calculations for trend effects, virtually twice as mny (2l/) of those 
experiencing wage difference gains were out of work when interviewed 
in comparison with those (ll/) experiencing v/age difference losses. And 
this vulnerability rose to almost 36/ for those who made gains of £250 
or more. We might therefore add a further question mark to the moderating 
effect on the costs of redundancy apparently resulting from those experiencing 
favourable wage changes. Given the continuing deterioration in the local 
economy one could justifiably predict a furbhor worsening of their situation 
ill the period following interview.
To what extent then did the cliangce in the men’s circumstances corase what 
they considered to he financial difficulties? One of the final questions asked 
was,
U0.1 in ally because of the redundancy at U.C,B, vjould you say you 
have had - no finanoi.al difficulties ^ some financial difficulties, qui to 
serious financial difficulties, very serious financial difficulties?’
Table 10o4 first of all shows the degree of financial difficulty encountered 
by workers experiencing differing durations of transitional tmomployjuent»
Table 10o4
Transitional
Degr'oe of Financial Difficulty by Post-Redundancy 
Unemployment (/)
Financial Difficulty 
Quite serious or
Unenmloyment (wks) None Soræ No So khKo kumbers.
^ 1 wko 71 27 5 - 54
1 - 2 51 29 20 - 45
3 - 4 58 28 15 40
5 - 6 58 49 15 1 54
9 - 16 55 51 16 — 45
17 - 26 26 48 26 - 51
27 and over : 15 49 56 55
M l 40 41 19 1 500
V/hile it is clear that worleers with the longest transitional unemployment
suffered the greatest financial difficulties such problems could also be due
either to later periods of unemployment or to low income while in employment»
Hence we find that 30/ of workers with transitional unemployment of under a
week still claimed to have suffered some financial- difficulties» It is also
interesting to note that, at the other end of the scale, ly/ of the officially
long term unenployed reported no financial difficulties as did a quarter of those
unemployed for 17 to 26 weeks» We might assume that these workers considered
they were adequately protected by their severance payments and state benefits
9or possibly previous savings»' It may be considered reassuring that the
9« The survey asked for each respondent’s financial commitments at time of 
redundancy in additional to post redundancy employment experience since 
these may have had some bearing on any financial difficulties* We have not 
used th.e responses since they seemed to indicate considerable differences 
in interpretation by the sample»
worîcers' financial compensation pi'G'babl,y had su ch a mo derating of feet, The 
fact remains, however, that a far larger majority of workers in this category 
did encounter financial problems »
Table 10»5 allows us to explore further some of the points raioed above. ,
It shows for the groups of worlrers experiencing vairying degrees of financial 
difficulty, 1;he average transitional and total unemployment encountered after 
leaving' UoG»So and the average redundancy pay and unemployment benefit received»'"'
Table 10* 5» Average (x) Transitional ITnemployment * A yfj'f, :fÇf /x ) „ 'Jkrlpl 
Unemployment, Average (x) Redundancy kry/ i.ni Average (x)
/ncgui/e ring DIM ;
Financplal Difficiilties :
Average Average Average Average i
Deg3?ee of Transitional Total liedimdancy Unemployment;
Financial Unemployment Unemployment Pay Benefit
Difficulty (wks) ( wks ) (£s)  ( £s_)___________ _ Kuo-ibe3?s
None 7.5 10,4 210,7 7.2 120
Some 15o5 20,9 145.1 11*2 122
Quite
Serious 19o4 29,8 147.4 11,.4 41
Very
Serious 19*7 52*5 111,6 11,6 16
Moso Mo Ko 1 1 1 1 1
All 12.8 18.5 169.2 9,7 300
Table 10,5 confirms that serious financial difficulties were related 
to the duration of transitional unemployment. It also demonstrates that 
unemployment subsequent to post-redundancy jobs could also cause problems. 
The gap between average transitional and average tobal unemployment 
widem with inci’easing financial difficulty. Since thta continuously 
unemployed are included in both averages, the widening can only be due to 
later unemployment suffered by those who found jobs after U.C.S. Tliese 
later periods of unemploymient would not, of course, have been eligible for 
compensation under the Redundancy Payments Act.
10» Since the average unemployment benefit computed is based on the maximum 
benefit each worlmr reported receiving it is, if anything, likely to 
tend towards an overstatement of the average benefit they received 
over tine.
At this junctiii’Oj we might reconsider the effect of financial labour
market measures, this time with relation to the costs of redundancy. In the
preceding chapter we concluded they had relatively little evident impact on
activity i.n the labour market; although "bhey may still have provided an
important and worthwhile 'cushion* in the aftermath of redundancy» The
preceding discussion in this chapter allows us to pursue this» Although the
active sample, on average, spent over a third of the time between redundancy
and interview out of work, table 10»4 suggests that even those experiencing
the longest imemployment were, to some extent, eus hi. one d from its most severe
effects» Certainly, previous saving’s may have contrib'uted to this 'protection'
but, since such a surprisingly high proportion (4C/) of the men reported no
financial difficul.ties, unemployment benefit and redundancy pay must alsy have
had a substantial beneficial effect.
At the same time, the limitations of such financial compensation au’e also
evident in tables 10.4 und 10.5« In table 10*4 it is quite clear that financial
difficulty increased with unemployment» This is not surprising especially
since in table 10.5 we see that the financial protection afforded those
encountering serious financial difficulties was, not very much greater than
and, in the case of redundancy pay, less than men who found no such difficulties
at alio In other words, the amount of compensation received by individuals
had little relation to the costs imposed on them by redundancy. This is,
of oou.rse, no novel observation although opinion is divided on the efficacy
of measures lilce the Redundancy Payments Act,
Parker et al, for example, in their national survey concluded,
* - “ the Act has broadly achieved its social objectives - -  ^there
was a positive association between the siae of payment received by the
individual and the extent of the social and economic costs incurred by
11him as a result of being made redundant'
11. Parker et al, pp^.cit., paragraph 3O, po6,
Hcid and Mackay, (£j?y5ÜO however, expressed reservations shout this 
conclusion as does Fryer (pp.cit,) who, amongst other criticisms points out,
'Nor is it sufficient to point to the positive association between 
sise of redundancy payment end deprivation as measured by simple 
rank ordering. Such an association tells us noliiirig about the 
a,ppropi'iateness oi’ adequacy of the compensation but only about the 
correctness of 'the direction of association, ’
In addition to such general reseir'-ations about the effectiveness of 
redundancy pay, it is worth noting that the conditions of the 11*0 « S. ' 
redundancy programme provided relatively less cover to vulnerable workers 
than usufiilo For examplo, because ÏÏ.ChS» deliberately sought to shed sho.pt- 
service workers to limit the costs of the cut-backp the compensation 
received by tho older workers was not substantially greater than that 
received by younger men.
Table 10»6 Average (x) Lej-igth of Service and Average (x) Take*"
Home Pay at U.C.S; Average Redundanoy Pay By Age
Average Length of Average Take-Home Average (fs)
Age Service at U,C»So (yrs.)Pay at UcC„S*(£s) Redundancy Pay Numbers
Under 30 1*8 24,8 144*6 101
50 - 59 1*6 25.2 150.8 71
To - 4-9 5.5 24.7 195:9 65
50 - 59 4*7 21 *7 205.6 40
6o+ 7.8 24.2 201.5 24
NK - — , ~ 1
•\rdt,i;«trf>3rJ4i^ 3an
TOTAL 2*9 24.9 169.2 500
respite tho length of sejrvice constraints imposed by U.C»So there was some
tendency for average .redundancy pay to increase with service though in both 
cases the dispersion was rela.tively small* Workers with over 2 years length 
of seivice, as we saw in chapter 2, were paid their entitled statutory 
redundancy pay in addition to the voluntary severance pay offered by UyC«8,, 
which is reflected in table 10.6. Nevertheless, the difference between the 
average redundancy pay r^eceived by the most vulnerable workers^ roughly men 
Over 58; and that reeoived by men under $0 only amounted to 2-3 weeks’ average 
take-home pay., Yet as we saw in table 5o8,, chapter 5s men in their fifties
were oui; of work on average about 12 weeks longer than men under 30 and
men over 60 about 15 weeks longer*
This serves to underline yet again the particularly dioadvantageous
position of the older worker following redundancy and this was, of course,
12worse 'Ilian usual in the case of XJ*C»3* " Such a phenomenon^ however, is
not attributable oxclusivoly to the blO«8, redundanoy xirooedure* Ma,ny 
other older workers with broken service because of inadequate skills or 
because of cyclical swings, s pattern charaoteristloe of shipbuilding anyi-iay, 
must find themselves in a similar predicament* We have already suggested 
that the older worker requires greater sympathy and more imaginative 'breatment 
from both employers and the Employment Seicvice*
The problems ouch mon face are so widespread, however, that 'bhey are 
unlikely to be solved, for example, simply by a few socially conscious ' 
employers addressing them with goodwill* Moreover, the aftermath of the 
U»C*Sa redundancies clearly illustrates that much more is required than an 
adjustment of compensation schemes in favour of the most seriously affected 
workers * Monetary’ compensation on its own is an inadequate substitute for 
’bhe complex set of social as well as economic needs satisfied through being 
in productive employaient* The attached appendix provides some justification 
for this observation*
4* Conclusions
This chapter set out to evaluate the costs which redundanoy imposed 
on our respondents* An important point of departure was the radical 
deterioration in the employment status of m&my who had managed to find other 
jobs after U*C*S. Astonishingly, almost (3I/) of the respondents at risk 
were 'unemployed v/hen interviewed*
In addition to this point in time observation, many workers particularly 
the older but even the younges’b spent much of the time between redundan.cy 
and interview unemployed* This was caused by difficulty in finding other 
jobs in the first place and also because in the unstable employment
conditions suffered furtlier lengthy spells, of unemployment.
It was ovicient that relative youth and skill were no protection In a 
continuing recosol.on vrliiclx caused many workers to suffer furtlier redundanoy 
after leaving U.C.3, Most of these occurred in construction and shipbuilding
hut this was largely hecause they had acted as hosts to the largest raribers
frojn ulChSo in the first, place, Mo industrial sector, however, provided a 
completely safo haven after rodundancy*
Despite the cushion of 'unemployrnont 'benefit the v;orlr:ers as a whole suffered 
considerable monetary as well as psychological costs smd these were caused 
more hy their extensive unemployment than by wage differences* Indeed, on 
the basis of their take-home pay at LMC.S* when made redundaait the post 
redundancy strepm of G^a’-uaings of the worlcers tdken as a whole was marginally
better thsui had they remained with U.G.S» at the some wtige* This prellminaryr
resuit,however, was excessively simplistic cind misleading» Even without 
allowing for trend effects, the impact of redundanoy on tho post-reduudanoy 
ea:mings of a majority of the sample was clisadvaxi.'bageouso When we made 
vazi'ious adjustments taking trend effects into account it wa.s clear that the 
costs imposed both by zmornployment and wage differences were substantially 
greater than those based on a straight comparison of their circumstances 
before and after redundancy»
In view of "khe amount of enemployment exqperienced and the possible income 
foregone, it was surprising to find that 40 per cent claimed to have experienced 
no financial difficulties» These, however, were mainly those wiio suffered 
least unemployment and, without under valuing the worthwhil.e cushioning effect 
of both Uîaexapl.oyùent 'benefit and severence pay, i'b was evident here as elsewhere 
that such compensation bore litkle relation to the costs experienced by«different 
individuals »
Although khis problem was exaggerated 'by the conditions attached to the 
UoCcS, redundancy programme it is by no means specific to such circumstances *
The wlneralrility of par kicularly "khe older worker in time of recession has 
long been recogised and any substantial improvonient can onJ.y be brought about 
by the application of a comprehensive policy on a broad front* In view of Uie
«J'y
prevailing norms in society such as the continuing importance attached
to holding a job, it is clear that even more substantial compensation than
that received by our respondents is a poor substitute for employment * All
of this suggests that the coining of the slogan 'the right to work' was an
15understandable and predictable reaction to the prevailing circumstances.
13. When the survey was taking place virtually one in ten of the male labour 
force in the Glasgow area was out of work and over a third of these were 
long term unemployed. Both of these percentages continued to rise 
'— through ,the rest of the year.
The Redundant Workers* Own Views of Their Experiences,
Our concluding question, general and open, asked
'Is there anything else you would like to tell me about how you left 
Die.8* and your experiences since?’
Here, we present a cross-section of the views expressed which were various 
but can be covered under the broad headings of family relationships, 
unemployment, financial and psychological effects.
(a) Family Relationships
A continuously unemployed fitter in his 40's commented,
'My wife and I are always having rows, letters from factor about rent, 
gas bills; had to cut back on food; can’t get going with your mates for 
a pint or to the match* Life can be pretty miserable at times!'
And a 36 year old electrician with 4 children aged 5 to I4 took 26 weeks to 
find another job and had 54 weeks unemployment altogether.
'It's been an awful year, I never really imagined it would be like 
this, I honestly thought I would get a job quite quickly, I am still 
a bit shaken by it all. It's depressing and its not fair on the wife
and kids. They all have to have so much less. Unemployment is hell.
While a 45 year old fitter with 6 children under I5 said
'It has shattered my plans. I will have to ask the social security to 
get shoes for my children - something I'm not looking forward to. My 
oldest girl is hoping to stay on at school. I've now got a bicycle to 
take me about looking for jobs because the fares are so high',
Another less dramatic point concerning role reversal was put by a 27 year 
old fitter's mate,
'It's put me back a bit financially. My wife has now taken a job to
help and I have to look after the baby',
(b) Unemployment
It was hardly surprising to find that the biggest concentration of 
comments centred around how the men viewed the experience of unemployment
itself. Many fomid it a novel experience which they didn’t relish.
Others compared it with the inter-war period. Yet other's referred to it 
against the backdrop of the 'liquidation crisis' which had just broken and 
anticipated that things could only get worse.
A 45 year old fitter's mate redundant in I969 observed,
'It’s a good thing that I left Ü.C.S» Now it would be harder to get 
a job', A similar comment by a $2 year old fitter was, 'I’m glad to be 
out with this possible fold up of the yards. It was no fun being 
unemployed. I'm glad to be fixed up in a good job before the market 
becomes flooded with men’, And another marine engineer not yet fixed 
up in a job hoped to be in a similar position, 'In a way I'm sorry I 
left but in another way I feel I'll maybe get another job steady before 
another lot of men come on to the market. I’m just keeping my fingers 
crossed like mad'.
The exceptional difficulty in finding other work was remarked on by very 
.young as well as older men* A 21 year old coppersmith remarked,
'I've found out it's not so easy to get a job even if you are young.
At the moment, I’m without a job and I don't know what’s coming next'. 
Older workers were, of course, even more despondent, A 57 year old fitter, 
continuously unemployed since redundancy put it,
',,,,great difficulty in trying to get a job. Age, I would say, was the 
biggest thing against me, Vihen you hear of anyone getting started it 
is always someone much younger than yourself,'
V/hile a 59 year old engineer in a similar predicament protested, .
'Not being able to get work is getting me down* Skilled persons, like 
myself should be able to get work - can’t even get a job as night 
watchman,'
The complexity of the dilemma was underlined by a 48 year old painter, 
continuously unemployed for 7 months,
'If I don't get a job next interview I'll need to think seriously of 
moving somewhere else for work - but where? That is the big question!'
Younger workers without previous experience of longer term unemployment 
were perplexed and astonished,
'I thought there would he plenty of jobs going but there's just 
nothing* It's impossible*.
A 22 year old engineer elaborated,
'I learned what it's like not to have a job* You understand bettor 
about unemployment when you've had the experience yourself. I 
volunteered to become redundant mainly because of the atmosphere.
Nothing WG,s actually said to me but the feeling of the men, that you 
were last in and so should be the one to go*’
Another 34 year old electrician explained,
'....was never out of work till last year and never realised it would 
be so bad - never away from the labour exchange. They keep asking if 
you haven't got a job yet and places you go to for a job won't give 
you one as soon as they know you have a trade. They say if your own 
trade picks up we will leave. It's a shattering experience as I now 
have 3 children to feed - affects everything. People look at you as 
if you don't want to work - makes you feel unsettled but wouldn’t want 
to move - have too many ties. Tried to be a 'bus driver but they wouldn't 
consider me when they knew I had a trade', ■ -
In view of the problems encountered by the younger men, it was hardly surprising 
to find the older men drawing parallels with the inter-war period such as 
'I think it's awful. We are going right back to the thirties - with 
queues at the labour exchange' 
or i
'This is the longest I've been idle - even longer than during the 
depression years'.
(c) Financial and Psychological Costs
The material effects of redundancy ranged from very direct inroads into 
a family's well-being,
'shoe repairs etc, are hard to keep going* 
or — . -
'It is very difficult to clothe the children'
to an almost total erosion of the little indulgences which add a degree of 
spice to an unpretentious life style» A '■}Q. year old joiner commented,
'can't afford any holidays now - not many pints with the lads,
I can't see any chance of me getting a better job at my age - just 
haviaig to malce do' «
Younger men, like a 27 year old labourer with 3 children were also affected,
'It means now we can't do anything - if it's a nice weekend, just go 
out for walks. There's no money for extras'.
The general air of desolation was captured at some length by a 60 year old 
plumber's helper*
'Life's very dull - no jobs, or nothing, can't afford a drink. I liked 
a drop of beer now and a^in - no cigarettes. I liked to 'punt' now and again 
and can't do that for lack of money; can't visit friends on the other side 
of Glasgow - don't see any improvement in future either. This Government 
seems to go out to cause unemployment. We have a daughter in Drumchapel 
(a suburban council estate) and we can hardly even visit her. When I get 
my Old Age Pensioner’s ticket for the buses it won't be so bad but I have 
four years to wait for that, My son's widow and my four grandchildren now 
live in Portsmouth. l\/hat hope have my wife and I of ever affording the fare
there. Its these things which make life worth living but now we have to
live without them'.
The aftermath of redundancy also saw an erosion in the ambitions and self
confidence of those worse affected. A milder observation was,
'....just sort of drifting from one job to another* You can't choose your 
work ~ just have to take what you can get and be more than pleased that 
you are actually working'.
The effects on others were more pervasive,
'Being long term unemployed makes you apathetic. You lose interest in 
applying for jobs as you think "I've tried that before with no success".
You lose confidence to face life and end up just existing. My wife has gone 
out to work so our roles have been reversed. This new U.C.S. crisis 
doesn't make future work prospects in the yards very hopeful'.
So spoke a staff worker in his thirties. A 43 year old plumber, continuously 
unemployed for 10 months was even worse affected,
‘I've lost faith in myself* I begin to wonder if it's me that there's 
something wrong with when I go for interviews. It's also affected my 
daughter (l2 years old)* I can't buy her all the things I used to*
I don't go out a lot because it means walking and I can't afford to 
have my shoes repaired. Even if I get a job I don’t know how I'll 
manage for the first fortnight with 'bus fares being so high and you 
have a week's lying time'.
In such an overall context the lack of emphasis on strong political comment 
was perhaps surprising. Political observations were not, however, totally 
absent but, when made, tended to be incidental if not subordinate to other 
statements. For example, a young electrician began,
'It's soul destroying being off work. It's bad for your morale,
I am used to working. We are not any better off than in my grand- , 
father's time. It was obvious when I left U.C,S. that this latest 
crisis was going to happen'.
He concluded,
'The trouble is that the capitalists would not put their money back 
into the yards to modernise them'.
And a 48 year old electrician advised,
'A change of Government is all I want to see. I'm a lot worse off 
financially after being out of work for so long (27 weeks), Mnd 
you I'm lucky. Some of the men who left at the same time as me 
still haven't found work'.
Overall, it was powerlessness, disappointment and resentment rather 
than revolution which most aptly describe the men's attitude towards the 
social order. The concluding remarks of a 3I year old semi-skilled worker 
accurately capture this disillusionment.
'If giant concerns like U.C.S* can't copy with the changes in society, 
what chance has the individual? You tend to lose confidence and this ha.s 
adverse effects when seeking work. Also there is a feeling of 
bitterness and frustration at the social systern that can force an able 
bodied 50 year old to sign on and collect dole money.
There shouM be enough work’.
Point fi of Departure
1c Introduction
The preceding chapters have explored, in various ways, the impact of 
redundancy on men obliged to find alternative jobs iji an area experiencing 
disturbing, even 'Lraumatic, industrial change. A1bhough the study has, in 
the main, been based on economic, and primarily labour market considerations, 
it has explicitly recognised the importance of the social as well as the 
economic objectives of economic policy. The necessity of so doing is now widely 
acknowledged by policy makers. |
’The objectives of regional or of other policies are by no means solely
economics they reflect also public concern about disparities in ;
!
opportunity and in environment. The objective of reducing unemployment
in less prosperous areas, for example, reflects the economic aim of
avoiding the waste of under-utilised resources, the social aim of
preventing’ the human distress and loss of dignity which prolonged
unemployment brings in its train, and the political aim of preventing
divisive strains within the country manifesting themselves in public
(l)unrest and disorder.’  ^ '
Such wide concern could justifiably be expressed over the redundancies 
considered here because, besides undermining emp].o\mient status and work-place 
relationships, they also frequently affected the men’s families, their standing 
within the family and the community and ultimately culminated in the extensive 
social, industrial and political agitation occasioned by the U.C.S. liquidation 
crisis. Although there still remains a widespread belief, to bo found even in 
the raiiks of those affected, that 'the problems of unemployment' are either 
self-inflicted or belong to a previous era, our preceding analysis indicates 
that unemployment in 1971 could have effects often strikingly similar,to those
(2)reported for the inter-war years. '
Despite improvements in the social security system and in the overall 
management of the economy since then, social and economic roles as well as
(1) Industrial kqbili'^ _^™ hofional Policy in EFTA' E.P.T.A. Geneva, 1971 p«7C,
(2) See, for exatyple, 'AImiJ.[ithout,bkuk. - A&eppiyLmhde_Js^ ' 
Cambridge University Press I9jü pp.2861290.
social values, particularly the importance attached to work, have not for most 
people changed radically from those of the 1950'^» So, the re-emergence in our 
survey of apprehension over role reversal and being considered a ‘layabout’ 
cannot be considered all that surprising. Paradoxically, the relative security 
of employment until recently characteristic of the post-1945 period, has surely 
contributed to the sense of deprivation and alienation of those without work.
In an insightful passage, Orwell put it:
’V/hen I first saw unemployed men at close quarters, the thing that 
horrified and amazed me was to find that many of them were ashamed 
of being unemployed it was a disaster which happened to you
as an individual and for which you were to blame ..... no human 
being finds it easy to regard himself as a statistical unit. So 
long as Bert Jones across the street is still at work, Alf Smith 
is bound to feel himself dishonoured and a failure.' (Emphases are 
Orwell’s.) (3)
The self-esteem of many of the U.C,S. workers was threatened in a similar 
way. While the intervening changes in social and economic policy suggest that 
we should not overstate such similarities, many of our more vulnerable respondents 
would feel no overstatement was involved. At the same time, circumstances have 
clearly changed, the problems of unemployment and the 'regions’ have been 
addressed before and considerable effort expended in putting forward solutions.
At the outset, we observed that, in areas like Clydeside, labour market questions 
were inextricably tied up with wider considerations of regional economic policy. 
Our own data, by itself, clearly does not permit a penetrative evaluation of 
regional policy as such, Nevertheless, manpower policy is continuing to evolve 
with the setting up of the Manpower Services Commission and the role of this 
new organisation and its relationship with regional policy deserve some 
further comment.
In the following section we take a closer look at the aims of the 
Manpower Services Commission and finally, in section 5, suggest a number 
of possible points of departure for manpower policy to make it more
(5) Orwell, G. ’The Road _to. _ ' (Penguin edition, 1972) p.76.
effective for dealing with situations like the critical decline of U,CcS*
2. The Manpower Services Commission . .
We acknowledged in chapter eight that the Employment Service was itself 
aware of the need for various changes in its functions and procedures. This 
resulted . in the proposals embodied in the Government White Paper "Employment 
and Training" and enacted in the Employment and Training Act, July 1975.
As a result of this legislation a new Manpower Services Commission (M.S.C.) 
has been set up to assist the Secretary of State in the formulation of manpower 
policy and to develop and extend employment and training policy in co-ordination 
with both sides of industry and local education authorities. Responsibility 
for the administration of redundancy payments and unemployment benefit has 
been retained within the Department of Employment leaving the M.S.O. free to 
concentrate on employment and training. Such reforms are being phased in 
gradually and will not reach completion until May 1975»
Introducing the Employment and Training Bill, the Secretary of State 
for Emplo'^ ment claimed: "The object of this legislation is to reform arrange­
ments for promoting and to promote a more efficient working of the labour 
market, with fuller opportunities for individuals to develop and use their 
own capabilities". '
This was to be carried out through two agencies, an Employment Service 
Agency and a Training Services Agency, both of which would be responsible 
to the Manpower Services Commission, The creation of these new organisations 
was intended:
(a) to bring a higher degree of specialisation to the management 
of manpower policy and,
(b) to co-ordinate the development of training programmes in 
industry and further educational establishments more closely 
with the existing and future manpower needs of the economy.
(4) "Employment and Training: Government Proposals", Cmnd 5250, H.M.S.O.
March 1975° Also see ’D.E, News’ April 1975 and September 1975*
(5) See ’Hansard - House of Commons Parliamentary Debates’ Issue No.927 
9th March -"15th March 1975 P.1155°
These improvements were to he brought about in a number of ways. 
Modernisation of the employment exchange network and changes in its placement 
activity, already touched upon in Chapter 8, were to be the on-going 
responsibility of the Employment Service Agency, The Employment and Training 
Act also revised the financing of industrial training and made an annual sum 
of £35 million available to the industrial training boards and also to enable 
the Training Services Agency to promote training in areas not covered by the 
boards. On top of this, the new organisation aimed to widen opportunities for 
retraining by increasing the number of Government Training Centres from 52 to 
63 in 1975; raising the number of places from 12,000 to 18,000 and the annua], 
throughput from 40,000 trainees in 1975 to between 60,000 and 70,000 in 1975» 
The Manpower Services Commission, consisting of 10 members representing 
both sides of industry and education, was to preside over these developments, 
liaising with industry, the trade unions and the education system to ascertain 
how the various interested parties felt their needs could best be served. 
Having done so and developed its plans accordingly, the actual implementation 
of these would be the responsibility of the Employment Service Agency and 
the Training Services Agency,
The M.S.G, is a worthwhile institutional innovation. On its own, 
however, it is incapable of solving problems like those presented by the 
decline and ultimate fall of U.G.S, Because shipbuilding has been such a 
large and prominent industry on the Clyde for so long, it Was inevitable that 
its serious contraction and possible disappearance would have wide-ranging 
repercussions. The sudden loss of so many jobs and so much income would 
have had a serious impact anyv^ here and Clydeside could afford it less than 
most other industrial centres. Apart from inevitable ’multiplier' effects, 
the prominence of this labour intensive industry had created a large dependent 
work force, many with skills highly specific to shipbuilding and, as we saw, 
many with apparently transferable skills which, however, could often be less 
acceptable elsewhere. These circumstances together with the prevailing state 
of the local economy meant that the problem was a wider one than that of U.C^ S, 
alone.
The decline of a large and traditional industry, particularly where it 
has done so much to mould the character of its locality and determine the hopes 
and ambitions of its people, clearly creates complex problems which demand and. 
deserve a comprehensive as well as a sympathetic package of policies. Action 
is required on both the demand and supply sides of the labour market. Some of 
the necessary changes, however can be brought about less quickly than others.
In putting the policy package together, the importance of this time dimension 
must be clearly recognised in additioh to other constraints such as trade union 
reservations about the implications of retraining and individual reluctance to 
surrender time-served skills.
The need for action on the demand side is obvious enough. This, however, 
has to bear in mind the need for jobs of a similar as well as of a different 
character to those being surrendered. The former are required to afford as 
much protection as possible to those whose skills and standard of living are 
jeopardised while the latter are needed to create a wider and more attractive 
frame of reference for school leavers. One of the major difficulties which 
we and others have observed in the problem re^ons, for example, is that job 
aspirations continue to be influenced by the traditional industries of a 
community even though they might be in decline. Even with the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde, U.C.S. experienced 
no fall in the numbers of applications for apprenticeships nor in the uptake 
of those on offer.
Action on the supply side is equally important. Economic development, 
changes in technology and in the requirements of society inevitably demand 
that equivalent changes talce place in the occupational structure of the society. 
This requires, in the first instance, the acceptance of such changes and a 
preparedness to transform skills accordingly. This is easier for new entrants 
to the labour force than for workers, particularly craftsmen, who have already 
acquired their skills at some cost. It also takes time to transform the 
occupational skills of a community by diverting school leavers into new forms 
of training and, meanwhile, the problem of the mature labour force remains.
Opposition, both individual axid collective to économie change can he reduced 
if the society deriving the hanefits also shares the costs by taking 
constr-uctive action on behalf of those directly affected.
Diversification of the Industrial str*.icture in the problem area is park 
of this. But again, transformation is not instantaneous and does not 
talce place without imposing different costs on firms, individuals and the 
coimminityo If the problem is seen in a wider context than that of the 
specific enterprise, any resultant economic analysis must take social 
as well as private costs and benefits into account. Here the
respective merits of gradual as opposed to sudden change require serious 
consideration. All this, of course, goes far beyond mere redundancy 
administration and underlines the need for a comprehensive approach. It
is in this context that we have to evaluate the potential of the M. 8.0,
Although the Employment and Training Bill was warmly received by both 
sides of the House on its second reading, the accompanying debate revealed 
that its limitations also provided cause. for concern. Reservations were 
expressed about the impact which the new institutions might be expected 
to have on both general and regional unemployment. An example of the
former was:
‘The first question is whether the Bill will be helpful in 
seeking to return to full employment. I believe that it can be, 
but this will depend on other policies’.(6)
And the latter was aptly expressed:
’.....with an unemployment situation such as we have in Scotland 
we must ask ourselves why we are training people. If we do not 
have the necessary jobs, to all intents and purposes training 
may become abortive’.(7)
This observation underlined an important omission, the failure of the 
Employment and Training Bill to spell out any specific relationship with 
regional policy and its associated institutions, although the Secretary 
of State for Employment, introducing the new measures frankly recognised
6) IMâ-*» p.1149
7) IMdc, p. 1200
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’There are obvious implications for manpower planning intelligence
and regional policy.’
The lack of co-ordination between government departments and other bodies
concerned with manpower and regional policies remains, however, a major as
well as a recurring criticism. Commenting on the changes in regional policy
introduced in 1972, Nuttall, for example observed:
’This (the Industry Act 1972) gives the Secretary of State more
opportunities for direct intervention in industry than were possessed
by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation ....But the Department’s
role so far has not, generally speaking, been initiatory or positive
In order to undertake a more active role it would be necessary, of
course, for it, in conjunction with other government departments
and planning bodies, to analyse the long-term industrial and
(q)
employment needs of the regions.’ '
As things stand, the planning of the M.S.C. responsible to the Secretary 
of State for Employment, may very well proceed without any comprehensive 
co-ordination with the intentions of the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry under the Industry Act, Yet the need for such co-ordination was 
firmly endorsed by the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons,
’...,.we think that both the Department of Employment and the 
Department of the Environment should be more actively committed 
(to regional policy). The first of these as the department 
primarily concerned with unemployment has an important share in 
the execution of regional policy.
The continuing absence of any capacity in the M.S.C. to participate directly 
in the processes of job creation, however, still confines it to a ’reactive’ 
role and malces it, on its own, an inadequate answer to the problems of 
industrial decline in areas like Clydeside.
(8) Ibid.. P0II48
(9) Nuttall, T. ’The Industry Act and Regional Policy’. National Westminster B&m 
Quarterly Review, November 1975°
(10)’Regional Development Incentives’, a report by the Expenditure Commiktee of 
the House of Commons, H.M.S.O. 1975 p*72.
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5• Points of Departure
(i) Demand Side Changes
Although the feeling that the Publie Employment Service should take a 
more direct role in the development of industrial and regional policy is 
widespread there is less unanimity concerning how this might be achieved. A 
number of possible courses of action could be taken, some of which have been 
experimented, with while others have only been contemplated,
First, the need for more effective liaison between employment-creating
I
and labour market agencies cannot be over-emphasised. To achieve this, à 
prerequisite is that there be continuous co-operation and construction within
I
the Manpower Services Commission, The training plans of the Training Services
i
Agency, formulated in conjunction with the Industrial Training Boards and 
other interested parties, can only be improved after taking into account 
the wider labour market knowledge of the Employment Service Agency, Closer 
co-operation between the Manpower Services Commission and other public bodies 
is, if anything, more important. The benefits to be gained from liaison, 
particularly with the Department of Trade and Industry require no further 
emphasis* Additional benefits would accrue from, for example, synchron­
isation with the expenditure plans of local government authorities and with 
the objectives of regional development councils. The advantages to be 
achieved through counter-cyclical investment hardly require elaboration.
They are nevertheless worth repeating when we realise that during the period 
of the U.G,8, run-down, when so many finishing tradesmen were losing their
jobs, house building in both public and private sectors in Scotland was
(ll j
being out back rather than expanded. ^
The need to retain expertise, and commitment, particularly of a local 
nature, in the formulation of appropriate policies is paramount. Devolution 
of responsibility to the regional centres of the Departments of Snployment 
and Trade and Industry does not necessarily provide this. Such devolution 
was consciously put into effect in the D.T.I, subsequent to the Industry Act 
(1972), but as Nuttall observed, this did not in itself result in the emergence
(11) Mulcherjee, S. a,nd..audJIaamplQyme^' - A Eresh Look*
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of the required creative institutions and can still fail to create jobs where 
most urgently needed* In this respect the changes introduced in manpower policy 
by the Ehiployment and Training Act cannot be considered as providing any novel 
remit for talcing action within the ‘regions’. Although liaison with industry 
and local education authorities is written in, it offers little in the way of a 
solution for problems specific to a particular firm or locality. Yet it is 
becoming more generally recognised that particular problems can arise within 
regions for which regional measures themselves are either too indiscriminate or 
lack immediacy. As things stand, no reliance can be put on incoming investment 
to arrive at the right time and place within a region. Moreover, the jobs 
created through incentive-led private investment may only be remotely connected 
with skills traditional to the host region, many, for example, more suitable 
for women. A case can be made, therefore, for attempting to transform the 
industrial structure of a locality in a more purposive way by, say, trying to 
lead in activities more likely to draw on the traditional skills to be found 
there.
Gradual change, however, can create its own problems. For example, it 
might be argued that prolonging the life of a sick industry serves to perpetuate 
an outdated industrial structure and fails to en].arge the horizons of job 
seekers. Obviously such apprehensions cannot be brushed aside li^tly.
At the same time, workers have a considerable stake in their acquired skills 
and since their ’choice’ is determined primarily by their industrial environment, 
society must accept some responsibility to protect them from the more severe 
effects of radical changes in that environment. In any event such social 
obligations need not come into conflict with economic efficiency, as the 
introduction of oil rig construction to the Clyde by Marathon indicates*
Vdiile this opportunistic innovation might be an indictment of British enterprise, 
particularly in the shipbuilding industry, there seems little reason why such 
suitable ’bridging’ activities should depend exclusively on, to some extent, 
fortuitous investment decisions of the private sector.
A more radical alternative would move beyond traditional policies 
dependent largely on incentive-led private investment and would involve 
government departments or more probably, alternative specialised bodies, in 
direct job creation* A variety of possibilities present themselves here, some, 
for example, envisaging direct state enterprise on the East European model if 
smaller in scale, others combining private with public capital in the development 
of local industry* Commenting on the qualified success of 'conventional' 
regional policies in alleviating regional unemployment, McCrone, for example, 
suggested: j
'A quite different way in which public authorities may intervene ,
to provide regional development is by the use of public companies. o
!
This type of policy has been pursued in Italy where it is one o:Ç the 
main instruments open to the Government in tackling the regional 
problem The fulfilment of regi.onal plans and the establislrnent
of growth areas might be achievedmore readily if key enterprises 
could be started in this way instead of always having to rely on the
(12)
rather roundabout techniques for inducing private enterprise’,^
Adaptations of the Italian IcR,I« model have also been considered as
possibilities by the Labour Party when in opposition and actually experimented
(ix j
with in Northern Ireland*^ ^
The requirements of the regions, the deficiencies of exclusive dependence 
on private investment and apprehensions about committing excessive authority 
to anonymous centralised bodies have also resulted in support for regional 
development boards,Although these could be wholly owned by the State, 
participation by private capital might be justified on several grounds. For ■ 
example, in situations where innovation and imagination are at a premium it
(12) McCrone, G, ’Regional Policy in Britain’, Allen and Unwin, I969, 
pp*204-205,
(13) See, for example, ’Tlie Feasibility of State Industry in Northern Ireland’ 
Northern Ireland Economic Council, #È0 Belfast, 1971 & 'The National 
Enterprise Board', Opposition Green Paper, the Labour Party, 1975»
(14) See for exanple, Mukherjee, S, ’Scotland and Unemployment* etc.* 
op,.cite, pp,65-66 and ’West Central Scotland - A Programme for 
Action’, West Central Scotland Plan Steering Committee,1974» 
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makes sense to provide some means whereby all worthwhile ideas and. expertise 
can be mobilised in the interests of the region. In addition, apart from 
trying to introduce entirely new activities, an alternative way of galvanising 
a sluggish local economy is by revitalising indigenous industry. The 
achievement of this objective can be assisted by public money acting as a 
catalyst to and in harness with existing private capital* Resurgence need 
not inevitably follow, however, and the pitfalls of ’feather-bedding' have 
obviously got to be carefully guarded against in any such enterprise.
Taking such precautions could be made part of the remit of a locally 
based development board* For example, some constructive tension could be 
built in by dividing responsibilities within the board* The funding intentions 
of the 'development unit’ could be made subject to the criticism of a 
’management services’ branch* Indeed the provision of specialised management 
services to clients would fulfil a more general need since many smaller firms 
might not be capable of supporting such an expense on their own.
The frame of reference of such a board would also include analysing 
the potential as well a,s the deficiencies of the problem area and initiating 
appropriate action* This would require adequate manpower planning at the 
local level to establish what the available pool of skills was and how it 
might be transformed. Action could be taken subsequently, or in anticipation 
of the results of retraining, to attract in appropriate activities or introduce 
them directly, in collaboration with commissioned expertise where necessary*
Exploring the various possibilities for increasing the growth potential 
of a local economy and its effects on the demand side of the labour market 
reveals that any firm distinction between demand and supply side action becomes 
more and more questionable* A preparedness to change, such as negotiating 
a flexibility agreement, is more likely in a promising than in a threatening 
economic climate. Attempts to improve the efficiency of local firms without 
any favourable impact on employment prospects are not likely to win the support 
of the local labour force. The development board would obviously have to bear 
this in mind and include in its package of services some ideas, foD: example, 
on the management of internal labour markets to protect particularly vulnerable
groups of workers, such as older men, from the harsh effects of losing their 
jobs without any prospects of finding alternative employment. This could 
include, for exajnple, transfer from heavy production work to less demanding 
jobs, such as storemen, with advancing years.
(ii) Supply Side Changes.
The changes introduced by the Employment and 'draining Act still leave
a number of gaps in British manpower policy when compared with that of other
countries. Some of these although involving supply side considerations are
due to the Act's lack of emphasis on the demand side of the labour market.
Because of this, reservations could be, and indeed have been, expressed
about the realism of its various objectives; to extend training opportunities
for youths, to increase retraining opportunities and facilities for adults
and to undertalce not only training for the current needs of the economy
but to initiate some anticipatory training for the future. Although 8,11
of these objectives are admirable in their own right, their worthwhileness
is diminished unless participants can have a reasonable expectation of improving
their job prospects as a result.
Expectations about the benefits of retraining, however can only be low
in an area like Clydeside when a dearth of employment opportunities even for
well qualified tradesiiien is also accompanied by a strong attaclmient to the
traditions of craft apprenticeship. Both these factors must clearly be
taken into account if 'training for the future' is intended to be put into
practice. This country’s manpower policy has not so far embraced the Swedish
philosophy of providing training places as a substitute, albeit a temporary
(iq)
one, for employment. There are obvious dangers in creating expectations 
which cannot be satisfied which do not arise to the same extent in Sweden 
as in a country of Britain’s size and regional disparity,Nevertheless,
(15) See Muldierjee, S. 'Malting Labour Markets Work’ PEP Broadsheet No*532,
1972 pp. 88-92.
(16) See Hansard, op.cit., pp.1192 and 1200.
(L  I q .
the Employment and Training Act does envisage forward planning in Training 
as part of the future scheme of things. Certainly, in the case of new entrants, 
to the labour force, the making of informed career choices can be assisted by 
vocational guidance and the further co-operation intended between the MoS.C* 
and local education authorities will hopefully reinforce this. But the horizons 
of school leavers also have to be extended. While the general education system 
has an obvious role to play here an additional and necessary requirement yet 
again is that workers and school leavers should have a wider frame of reference 
within which to exercise choice over training courses and particularly jobs.
Of course it can be argued that mobility on the supply side provides an
1
alternative to revitalising the local economy and, indeed, out migration from
the problem regions has historically been a prominent element in the reduction
(l7 j
of regional unemployment*'  ^This, however, is often on].y undertaken as a last
resort and then only involuntarily. Moreover, the deep seated sense of identity 
evident in regional and, more so, national sentiment means that public policy 
cannot, for long, remain insensitive to political pressure from the regions* 
There is no reason, however, why the option of leaving the home area for work 
should not be made more attractive to those who might be interested. Much 
reluctance to do so is due to apprehension and unfamiliarity with other possible 
work locations.
This is a problem which could be tackled in the pre-redundancy phase and
underlines the importance of initiating registration and placement activity
before workers actually move out into the market. Yet, as we saw previously,
the Employment Service in Glasgow was handicapped by the U.C.S. decision not
to participate in pre-redundancy registration and placement■activity* Although 
not intended to be obstructive, this did not make things any easier either for 
the Employment Service or for the men soon to be on the labour market. This 
obviously should not be left to the discretion of the employer alone. In this 
respect, even after re-organisation, the power of the Manpower 8ervi.ce here
(17) See Richardson, H.W, and West, E,G., 'Must We Always Take Work to the 
Workers', Lloyds Bank Review, January, 1964»
(18) See Nuttall, T. op.cit.
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compares badly with other European countries. We have already.recognised 
that a crisis like that on the Clyde cannot be solved overnight. Time must be 
won while transitional s teps are taken allowing more fundamental changes to 
occur in the longer run* To achieve this would seem to require a more 
comprehensive and more interventionist approach to manpower policy in this 
country*
(iii) A More Interventionist Manpower Policy
Apart from conferring no power over job creation neither do the changes 
in the manpower service give any authority to prevent or retard job ’destruction’, 
Yet the preservation of jobs in major redundancy situations can play a crucial 
part in the development of policies for dealing with such crises. Per example, 
even a temporary ’stay of execution’ can allow the employment service vital 
time to provide in-plant services to help find alternative employment for the 
men involved. Even in the daunting circumstances evaluated here, the combination 
of in-plant services with the phased run-down conducted by UtCfc, would probably 
have reduced the problems encountered by the redundant men once in the market. 
Moreover, even if a firm or industry is suffering serious problems, its labour 
force can be reduced over time by cutting back on recruitment and allowing 
natural wastage to talce its toll. This approach might not be appropriate in 
every case and, where adopted, would probably require a negotiated subsidy 
to maintain the activity for the required period of time. In particular 
situations, howOver, such costs might be deemed preferable to those which 
society would otherwise have to bear. Here, the employment ministries of 
countries like France, Germany and Sweden have more rights and employers more 
obligations in redundancy situations than is the case in this country.
In France, the managerial prerogative of employers contemplating redundan-
(19)oies is subject to far more severe constraints, Such employers, for example, 
are obliged to obtain Ministry of Labour approval before any dismissals occur 
and then only after alternative courses of action have been discussed. In
(19) Mukherjee, S, ’Through No Fault of Their Own’ op,cit., 
pp* I89-I9I
these discussions, the views of the labour force must be taken into account*
The government department in effect, lias the right to enter into the management 
of the firm's internal labour market in the period preceding the contemplated 
lay-offs, investigating various possibilities such as reducing overtime 
and shortening the working week as well as relying to a greater extent on 
natural wastage, Wpen redundancy is unavoidable, the French Ministry, unlike 
the Department of Employment here, does have the right to retard and stagger 
the lay-offs where a local employment situation is particularly difficult and 
the Enployment Service requires time to assist the redeployment of the affected 
men* Similar provisions exist in Germany although not supported by law to the 
same extent as in France*
In comparison, British manpower policy remains permissive and reactive 
rather than interventionist. There is a clear cut need to increase the 
authority of our own Employment Service in certain circumstances which must 
inevitably be accompanied by a reduction in the prerogatives of employers.
Inducing employers to adapt their own manpower policies in recognition of the 
wider good of the community is, as a comparison of the British and ïbench 
experience shows, more likely to be brought about by legislation than exhortation! 
Such legislation, however, woul.d be well worthwhile if it leads to the adoption 
of a much more enlightened approach to manpower policy on all levels.
The setting up of the M.S.C, does not, of course, take us along any of 
these paths. Hopefully, however, it does have the potential to become a 
necessary and enabling step on the road towards a more genuinely active and 
effective manpower policy. For, as one participant in the parliamentary debate 
on the Employment and Training Bill put it,
'It is a cliche but nevertheless it is profoundly true to say 
that manpower is the most precious resource possessed by this 
country. If we fail in our manpower policies, we fail in a number 
of senses. We fail because people's working lives will be less 
satisfying to them and less rewarding than they might have been, 
and we fail in the sense that in any loss of productivity society
(20) Ibid. pp.227-229
Ï17
as a whole loses the essential economic growth which we ought 
to achieve,
(21) Hansard, op*cit. p,ll60
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INSERT (i)
FIELDWORK AND ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire used for the UCS survey can be regarded as the composite product 
of a nember of different imputs. First, the surveys used by previous labour 
market researchers were perused for relevant questions. The resultant 'skeleton* 
was subsequently rearranged and filled out by additional questions which seemed 
appropriate to the UCS situation for theoretical, 'policy* or more local reasons.
Our sample of AOOwas randomly drawn within occupational strata, as described in 
chapter 3 of the thesis, from the sampling frame, a list of some 2,000 redundant 
workers made available to us by UCS. A separate smaller sample of 20 names was 
drav/n and used as the basis for a pilot survey which took place in Glasgow between 
the 10th and 15th May 1971. The fieldwork was carried out by Data plan Ltd, a 
market research firm organised on a national basis. This firm was chosen from 
four invited to tender for the fieldwork on the basis of its field organisational 
size and structure and the services offered as well as on the basis of the estimated 
costs. Four interviewers were employed on the 'pilot* and these were 'briefed* 
and 'debriefed' at Glasgow University before and after going into the field. Some 
minor changes were made to the content and ordering of the questionnaire as a 
result. Data plan undertook the reproduction of the final form of the questionnaire 
and .ensured that its layout would ease its use 'in the field..* A copy of the 
questionnaire is enclosed.
' ' ^
This form of the questionnaire was put into the field for the main survey on the 
2 June, 1971 and was virtually completed, apart from tracing a number of removed 
respondents, by I5 July 1971. The timing was deliberate and, in the event, ■ 
successful. On the one hand, it had to give enough time for the 'tail end* of the 
run-dovm to 'find their feet* or otherwise in the labour market. In other voids, 
approximately six months had elapsed between the end of 1970 and the commencement 
of the fieldwork.
. 1
On the other hand, the fieldwork had to finish,more or less, before the beginning 
of the Glasgow 'Fair* holidays, traditionally the latter two weeks of July, sûice 
it was to be expected that numbers of the sample might then be absent from home, 
reducing the response rate. Our ultimate response rate of 82.5% and the data 
provided by the survey suggest that the timing strategy was appropriate.
Twenty interviewers under a field supervisor were employed by Data plan on the main 
survey and the four hundred selected names and addresses were distributed amongst 
them. Prior briefing was again conducted in the University of Glasgow. As completed 
questionnaires were returned to Data plan, they were edited to ensure that the 
interview had been conducted appropriately and the questionnaire completed logically, 
eg to guard against workers who had found other jobs answering questions specific to 
the continuously unemployed. They were then dispatched in batches to Glasgow University 
where they were inspected and given a more refined editing. Unsatisfactorily completed 
questionnaires were returned to Data plan and the mspondents re-interviewed.
After our own editing, the survey data was put on 80 column punch cards and then 
transferred to magnetic tape where it was more thoroughly 'cleaned* for punching and 
other errors. Analysis v;as then carried out with the assistance of the Computing 
Services Department in the University of Glasgow and the SPSS (Statistical Program 
for the Social Sciences) packaged computer program.
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